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This thesis consists of three empirical chapters that investigate the nature, reasons 
and consequences of financial analysts’ forecasts in London Stock Exchange. The first 
empirical chapter examines the rationality and accuracy of financial analysts’ forecasts. 
Results show that analyst forecasts are overall optimistic, but not as extreme as the 
literature suggests. However, analysts seem to converge to a more rational position the 
closer they get to the announcement date. Despite no evidence of relationship is found 
between forecast error and prior year change in earnings per share, analysts are believed to 
be systematically revising their forecasts downwards as the time approaches the earnings’ 
announcement date. The second empirical chapter attempts to study the factors that 
contribute to the forecast error and in particular earnings management. Results show that 
earnings management positively affects the magnitude of the forecast error, that is, when 
earnings are manipulated the forecast error appears to be bigger. However, this positive 
impact appears to be driven by accruals earnings management and not by real earnings 
management. Moreover, forecasts seem to be more optimistic for companies that manage 
their earnings downwards through accruals.  These findings reveal that analysts may not be 
as biased as the literature claim, instead, they are probably victims of earnings 
management. The third empirical chapter examines whether financial analysts’ forecast is a 
major component of market sentiment and tests how this contribution can affect cross 
sectional returns. Results confirm that analysts releasing higher than average earnings per 
share forecasts lead to higher sentiment levels. Inconsistent with previous literature, short 
term stock returns are significantly positively affected by sentiment levels, but growth 
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Chapter 1: Introduction:  
1.2. Introduction   
The rise of finance in modern history mirrors a dominant era of financial markets 
on the global economy. The scope of economic and financial interactions between the 
different countries and corporations is simply impossible to imagine without the existence 
of financial markets. At the heart of these financial markets sits financial analysts. Many 
people look at financial analysts as the “greedy whipping boys” who earn an unbelievable 
amount of money while sitting for few a hours in some skyscraper’s office. The latest 
financial crisis added even more resentment towards financial institutions including 
financial analysts, as they were seen the main reason behind 2008 financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, who are financial analysts? And what role do they play in the financial 
markets?  
Contrary to peoples’ belief, financial analyst’s career is among the most rigorous yet 
rewarding jobs in the market. Early career analysts are expected to spend the majority of 
the time in gathering data from news, analyse reports and industry publications in order to 
develop a fundamental understanding of a particular business or industry sector. After 
achieving a certain level of knowledge as well as a good network of market contacts, 
financial analysts are supposed to put their expertise and turn their numbers into 
forecasting future performances and investment recommendations. While doing so, they 
must acquire a strong marketing ability to sell their opinions thus convince others (mainly 
investors) that not just their numbers are accurate, but what lies behind their figures is 
concrete.      
The life of a financial analyst is rather challenging and rewarding, however, it comes at a 
big cost. According to The Job Crowd database, the average working hours of a junior 
financial analyst is 12 hours a day, which is 4 hours more than the average full time 
employee in other industries. In September 2011, Joris Luyendijk wrote on “Voices of 
Finance” in “The Guardian” about the life of a previous financial analyst at a major bank. 
The analyst reports that working as a junior in a city corporation is insanely demanding, to 
the point that you would dream of having free weekends at most of the times, and that 
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money cannot comensate for the tough life style expected from an analyst (The Guardian, 
2011).  
One of the main roles that analysts do is forecasting company’s earnings. Analysts’ 
consensus earnings’ forecasts are used by the market to judge the performance of 
companies. Backed by their fundamental analysis as well as current news, analysts produce 
earnings’ forecasts at different stages throughout the fiscal year and some may revise their 
forecasts at later stages. These forecasts constitute a main source of information for 
investors to make their investment decisions. The implication of analysts’ forecast go 
beyond just being a source of information investors take into consideration. How accurate 
these forecasts are and what direction they take could result in serious consequences on the 
financial market. Along with the media, these forecasts will create a market expectation 
regarding a certain stock which will lead to a strong reaction if these expectations are not 
met, and the higher the error made by analysts the stronger the reaction of the market. In 
2010, for example, consensus analysts polled on Thomson Reuters forecasted the revenue 
of Palm (a former smartphone maker), to be $1.6 billion for the full fiscal year (CNN, 
2010). Although revenues for that year were already low compared to Palm’s usual 
performance, the company announced that their revenues would be way below the market 
expectation ($285 million). This news came as a shock and market prices plunged by 
almost 30%. As negative news regarding Palm’s future kept on showing, some analysts 
even estimated the share price to be valued at $0, recommending investors to sell their 
Palm’s share. Much to their disbelief, Hewlett-Packard offered to acquire Palm for $5.7 a 
share when it was trading at $4, keeping investors that listened to the $0 valuation in 
shock.   
While many acknowledges the professionalism of analysts and their expertise in the field, 
they are human beings and are subject to committing errors when forecasting a company’s 
performance. In this manner, most studies show that analysts’ forecasts are overall 
optimistic regarding company’s earnings (Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Ciconne (2005). 
Other studies go even further and claim that analysts’ forecasts are not just optimistic but 
also extreme which makes their rationality questionable (DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and 
Capstaff et al (2001)). There exists, indeed, other cases in which analysts were seen 
pessimistic. Henderson and Marks (2013) for example report that analysts are overall 
pessimistic when it comes to forecasting revenues and earnings.  
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Taking the debate around analyst forecast error a step further, many academics questioned 
the reliability and efficiency of analysts after they observed trends in their forecasts. A 
popular trend is when some analysts systematically revise their earnings forecast 
downwards on many occasions during the fiscal year. In particular, this downward revision 
is mainly observed towards the end of the fiscal year. This has been statistically proven by 
Debondt and Thaler (1990), Capstaff et. al (1995) and Capstaff et. al (2001)) and many 
more.  
From extremely optimistic to downward revisions, these biases of earnings forecasts are 
not caused randomly but through clear motivations that led forecasters to deliberately 
commit some direction in their forecasts. One important reason behind optimistic forecasts 
is based on the sell-side theory, in which sell-side analysts tend to release favourable 
results that push for more investments. McNichols and O’Brien (1997) denote that even 
when analysts are not biased, we still see optimistic forecasts, as analysts prefer not to 
release unfavourable forecasts in most of the cases. Another important motivation is the 
relationship between managers and analysts. At the beginning of the fiscal year, analysts 
tend to release optimistic forecasts in order to stimulate stock prices. However, as time 
approaches the of fiscal year, analysts lower their forecasts gradually allowing the reported 
earnings to meet or beat these forecasts. These forecast revisions would lead to a positive 
earnings surprise that appears in favour of the managers. In return, this theory assumes that 
analysts follow such trend hoping to preserve private access to companies’ managers. The 
supporters of this theory are many including Mest and Plummer (2003) and Das, Levine 
and Sivaramaknishnan (1998), Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004), and Baron, Biard 
and Liang (2013). Based on this theory, Baron et al. (2013) investigate the timing in the 
year at which analyst forecasts are released compared to their type. They find that on 
average, pessimistic forecasts are issued later in the year than optimistic ones, which may 
explain why the last quarter of a fiscal year is less optimistic in terms of earnings forecast. 
Additionally, their main argument is that why would analysts holding unfavourable 
forecast figures release them later in the year, unless they tend to help managers to reach a 
positive earnings surprise. They also find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between optimistic forecasts and trading volumes. Notwithstanding, having trends in 
analyst forecasts at some point does not mean that all analysts are biased. The reason for 
this claim is that trends can be generated from different sources and reasons. To be more 
specific, when analysts’ forecast show a downward revision trend, it might be due to them 
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acquiring more information about the company all along the fiscal year which helps them 
to be more accurate in their forecast analysis. Having said that, there exists no clear-cut 
evidence that managers talk down analysts’ forecasts in order to meet or beat public 
expectation and reach a positive surprise. It is very important to note that these are only 
suggestions that came up after examining the motivations of market participants which has 
led to that specific reasoning.  
All things considered, this research investigates analysts’ forecasts concerning the UK 
companies from an objective point of view. While it follows the literature to some extent in 
order to examine all possible factors surrounding analysts’ earnings forecast, it contributes 
by revising some of these theories and provide statistical evidence to show how analysts’ 
forecasts should be observed from a different scope. Motivated by the importance of 
analyst forecasts in financial markets, this research provides three empirical chapters that 
examines the accuracy of these forecasts on aggregate, what factors can cause analysts’ 
forecast errors to increase, and finally the consequences of these errors. These three 
chapters complete each other in the way that the models chosen for each of them analyse 
the issues from different angles. The standpoint in chapter 2 is to critically assess the 
accuracy and rationality of financial analysts. Chapter 3, however, assumes that forecast 
error cannot be based on biased forecasts solely, as other external factors might cause this 
error to increase. Albeit different motivations and reasons stand behind the forecast error, 
one can admit that this error can have an impact on the financial market. Chapter 4 
addresses this issue and examines the effect of forecast error on stock returns.   
To start with, the first empirical chapter in this research talks about the overall accuracy of 
analyst earnings forecasts. While doing so, it breaks down analyst forecast accuracy into 
two categories. The first is simply how far is the aggregate earnings’ forecast from the 
reported earnings per share, the second observes whether the forecast falls below the 
reported earnings per share (pessimistic forecast) or above the earnings per share 
(optimistic forecast). The study in the first empirical chapter covers all companies listed in 
FTSE All Share index (Financial Times Stock Exchange) in London Stock Exchange for a 
period starting from 1993 until 2013. The main reason for starting from 1993 is to make 
sure that companies have adopted the third Financial Reporting Standard FRS3 into their 
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reports1. The companies are selected according to each year’s true number of available 
public companies at the time of the observation year.      
Moreover, the first empirical chapter attempts to fill many gaps in the literature that 
covered a similar topic. To our knowledge, all findings provided in previous studies show 
weaknesses in their data management2, which might have led to unreliable results instead 
being statistically singnificant. A critical review of these gaps and ways to correct for them 
are discussed thoroughly. With a better organised and more suited sample, this research 
attempts to re-examine the analyst forecast rationality and bias, by providing insight 
information about the forecast error month by month until the earnings announcement date. 
Additionally, the first empirical chapter investigates the rationality of analyst forecasts by 
testing some popular trends including the downward revision trend following Debondt and 
Thaler (1990) and Capstaff et al. (2001) and whether financial analysts incorporate 
companies’ past earnings in their financial forecasts following Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(1992).     
The importance of the first empirical chapter lies in understanding the characteristics of 
analyst forecasts regarding the UK companies as well as proving empirically how these 
forecasts are directed and whether they are optimistic or pessimistic in their figures. 
Another essential part is to observe the evolution of financial analysts’ forecasts over 20 
years, and compare the findings with previous related studies that covered different periods 
for UK companies. As discussed earlier, this chapter tries to uncover the bias in earnings 
forecasts as they are seen through the statistical evidence, and although it links the findings 
to the theories provided in the literature, chapter 2 leaves a margin for other factors to be 
addressed in the following chapters.   
The second empirical chapter focuses on the variables that affect analysts’ forecast error. 
The chapter highlights how difficult it is for analysts to forecast a company’s earnings, as it 
involves conducting a fundamental analysis based on available information and news that 
                                                 
1 A detailed discussion on the changes in the accounting standards and its impact on the forecasts is provided 
in the first empirical chapter 
2 Types of shortcomings include observing forecasts until the fiscal year end only, assuming all companies 
release their annual reports after a fixed number of months of the fiscal year end, using a fixed number of 
companies throughout the overall period of study (called the survivorship effect) and many more. These 
pitfalls will be discussed in details in the first empirical chapter.  
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are continually released, and possibly missing on many unobserved variables. A very 
important factor that analysts might find hard to observe is earnings management. Earnings 
management is the procedure of managing the discretionary variables that affect the 
bottom line of the income statement. This could be done via two main categories: accruals-
based earnings management and real earnings management. Accruals-earnings 
management is an accounting management tool that alters the estimated accruals accounts 
in order to boost or decrease the company’s earnings. Real earnings management is when 
managers adjust the short-term real activities expenditures, such as Research and 
Developments or Advertisement, in order to reshape the earnings. Earnings management is 
a popular tool that managers use for many reasons. The most reasonable motivation is 
boosting earnings in the short term in order to avoid losses (Roychowdhury (2008), 
Burrgstahler and Dichev (1997)), and short-term earnings management provides a quick 
solution for it. Another reason is that managers would defer their earnings at some point in 
anticipation of dry future periods, which will smooth out the volatility in earnings 
(DeAngelo et al. (1996)). This method would make earnings look more stable and show 
the company’s weaknesses in certain periods. Perhaps the most sensitive motivation 
discussed in the literature is the relationship between manager’s compensation and 
earnings management. Some studies show that earnings related compensations and the 
bonus schemes are the main motivation as to why managers tend to use this tool to boost 
earnings (Healy (1985), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006)).   
Based on the above documentation, it is commonly assumed that many managers use 
earnings management as a tool to help them reach one of the above motivations. Applying 
such adjustments is managed internally with information surrounding such alteration 
becomes of a speculative nature. Assuming there is no possibility for information leakage, 
there is no doubt that earnings management would make the forecasters job even harder 
leading to a higher forecast error as reported earnings show up differently to what they 
were initially anticipated.  
Consequently, this chapter tries to empirically test whether earnings management holds a 
causal effect on forecast error. The models used include other probably influencing 
variables such as the number of analysts following a company, firm’s profitability in 
previous years, trading volume of the related stock, the level of earnings’ uncertainty and 
other controlling variables.  
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Another motivation behind earnings management is that managers try to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts in order to generate a positive surprise (Libby et al. (2007), Ke and Yu 
(2006), Bernhardt and Campello (2007)). If this is true, forecast error and earnings 
management might bear a reversal causality. For this reason, chapter 3 controls for this 
issue by creating a sample of suspicious and unsuspicious forecasts then runs different tests 
on each. Moreover, the analysis employs the “Generalised methods of moments” (GMM) 
in order to control for a possible endogeneity problem.  
The second empirical chapter contributes to the literature by providing an empirical 
evidence of the negative effect caused by earnings management. While chapter 2 shows 
that analysts’ forecasts appear to be generally optimistic, the second chapter claims that 
analysts are not alone guilty of their forecast optimism, and that earnings management 
could be one of the reasons why these forecasts appear to be inaccurate or even showing 
possible abnormal trends.    
After discussing the nature and characteristics of forecasts in chapter 2 and the external 
variables that might contribute to this error in chapter 3, one evident truth remains 
unchanged is that the forecast error will have a serious impact on the stock market due to 
the major role financial analysts play.   
Therefore, the third empirical chapter pursues the consequences of analysts’ forecast error 
and attempts to find an answer of the impact of forecast errors can have on the financial 
markets. Previous studies suggest that drifts in prices that occur straight after the earnings 
are announced, are partially driven by analysts’ earnings forecasts which feed the market 
with earnings expectations during the period before the announcement date (Abarbanel and 
Bernard (1992), Lundholm and Soliman (2006)). As a result, the drift in prices is a natural 
reaction of the market. The same findings had initially been proven by Watts (1978). 
Others claim that firms that meet or beat consensus earnings forecasts report higher stock 
returns than the ones that don’t (Bartov et al. (2002), Bernhard and Campello (2007)).  
Many of these findings touch on the existence of a behavioural aspect in analysts forecast. 
According to DeBondt and Thaler (1990), earnings forecasts are too extreme to be rational 
and analysts overreact to previous information. Concerning the stock market, the authors 
add that there exist many reasons to believe that investors are subject to the same cognitive 
biases as any human being. Based on these arguments, a behavioural common factor 
appears to be shared between financial analysts and investors. This leads us to Market 
Sentiment. On the one side, Brown and Cliff (2004) define Market Sentiment as 
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expectation of market participants relative to a norm, which is the average return. On the 
other side, analyst forecasts logically contribute to the market expectation via releasing 
performance predictions relative to a norm.  
Market sentiment is proven to be directly related to stock returns in many financial markets 
but the literature shows contradicting results. Baker and wurgler (2006) show that when 
sentiment is low, subsequent stock return appear to be high on the long horizon for small 
and vulnerable stocks. Moreover, Schmelling (2009) also find a negative relationship 
between sentiment levels and future returns. Results shown by Fisher and Statman (2006), 
however, suggest a positive relationship between individual investors’s sentiment and 
returns on small stocks.   Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) claim that market sentiment play 
an important role in creating a market bubbles.   
Consequently, chapter 4 suggests that the impact of forecast error on cross-sectional stock 
returns exists via its contribution to the Market Sentiment, and not as a direct measure. 
Therefore, the chapter sees forecast optimism as a component of Market sentiment and 
expects their relationship to be positive. Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), a sentiment 
index is estimated based on the principal component analysis of seven factors that come as 
follow: Analyst forecast error, the dividend premium, the return on IPOs, the number of 
IPOs, the share of equity issues over total issues, share turnover ratio and discount on 
closed end fund. After the construction of the sentiment index, the analysis of this chapter 
examines the impact of market sentiment on stock returns depending on detailed stock 
portfolios based on Fama and French (2014) five factors. This research provides a detailed 
comparison of stock returns during periods of high and low sentiment levels. Moreover, it 
attempts to investigate the value premium puzzle by comparing how returns on growth or 
value stocks change from one sentiment level to another.   
The third empirical chapter contributes to the literature in many ways. First, it introduces a 
new measure of Market Sentiment by considering analysts forecast error as a major 
component. To our knowledge, previous studies attempt to see the reaction of the stock 
market using long horizons, however, this research believes that the information and news 
in the market are absorbed and reflected very quickly in the stocks. Therefore, the second 
contribution would be by examining the short term monthly impact of sentiment on stock 
returns. Third, it will particularly address the relationship between investor sentiment and 
the value premium pattern. While doing so, it helps unlocking this puzzle by introducing 
the forecast error as a component of market sentiment.  
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The remainder of the research will come as follow: the next section discusses the research 
background and rationale of the thesis. Section 1.4 discusses the research questions with a 
brief outline of the findings. The following section explains the reasons for choosing the 
UK market as a sample study and highlight the key characteristics of London Stock 
Exchange. The last section in the Introduction chapter talks about the research philosophy. 
Following the research philosophy section, there are three empirical chapters. Chapter 2 
examines the nature, accuracy and rationality of analyst forecasts. Chapter 3 studies the 
external reasons that contribute to the forecast error in particular earnings management. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of forecast error on stock returns using Market Sentiment 
as an intermediary. The last section concludes.    
1.3. Research Background and Rationale:   
Considering the importance of financial analysts in the market, this thesis puts analysts’ 
forecasts as the focal point for investigation. A great deal of the literature examines 
forecasts’ accuracy and rationality in a rather exploratory manner and show that consensus 
forecasts are overall optimistic and are not rational (DeBondt and Thaler (1990), 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999)).  
However, looking at analysts’ performance alone would only explain one side of the story. 
Analysts are surrounded and affected by all sorts of market factors, thus one should be very 
careful when making a judgement regarding their performance and whatever is attributed 
to it. For sure academic articles encounter some restrictions regarding the time and size of 
the research conducted, and this is why a doctorate study such as this, can add value to the 
literature by providing a comprehensive research about financial analysts’ forecast.  
1.3.1. Financial analysts’ performance and rationality:  
The academic field started to show some interest in financial analysts after 1975. Gillis 
(1975) for example, proposes some important points that must be considered when 
forecasting a company’s performance and those include general and economic factors, 
industry factors and firm specific factors. According to the author, any divergence from the 
value of these factors will increase the forecast error. In an empirical study, Patz (1989) 
evaluates analysts’ forecast accuracy for the UK firms depending on few characteristics 
such as size and industry.  Findings show that large companies appear to have better 
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forecast accuracy, and this is mainly due to the bigger attention they receive and more 
information available about them. The author’s findings also suggest that analysts are 
considered accurate if their forecasts are made for 12 months ahead at most.  For longer 
targets, analysts’ accuracy start to deteriorate. The author also finds that industry matters a 
lot when it comes to large forecast errors, suggesting that industry categories must be taken 
into consideration as a control variable. The reason for this is that analysts’ might be 
specialised in some industries and not others, which will make the sample biased if some 
consensus observations are made of very few forecasts. Another study that evaluates the 
performance of analysts’ forecasts is Fried and Givoly (1982). According to Fried and 
Givoly (1982) analysts’ forecasts are better proxies of market prices than time series 
models. This is due to the flexibility of analysts to incorporate a large set of information 
and the timing advantage that they have in forecasting even after the end of fiscal year.   
Despite the superiority of analysts’ forecasts over time series models, they are found to be 
optimistic in most of the studies. DeBondt and Thaler (1990) document that analysts are 
not just optimistic, but also extreme in their predictions. The authors also show that 
anlaysts are irrational as they show a systematic trend in their revisions. The latter was 
attributed to behavioural reasons. Rationality of forecasts imply that analysts react 
efficiently and quickly to new information and incorporate it in their analysis. This type of 
rationality is investigated by Easterwood and Nutt (1999) who study the reaction of 
analysts depending on the nature of information they receive. They find that on average, 
analysts underreact to negative news and overreact to positive ones. Similar to DeBondt 
and Thaler (1990), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) concludes that analysts are irrational when 
it comes to reflecting information in their forecasts. Moreover, this is consistent with 
systematic optimism in responding to new information.   
Furthermore, analysts’ forecasts seem to vary depending on firm-specific variables such as 
last year’s performance. Ciconne (2005) claims that loss firms are different than profit 
firms specially when it comes to forecasting. In a sample of 120,022 firms-quarter, 
Ciconne (2005) finds that firms that announce losses in a specific year become harder to 
forecast during the following year. Contrarily, analysts’ forecasts appear to be smaller for 
firms announcing profits. The relationship between firms specific characteristics and 
analysts’ forecast is also studied by Coen et al. (2009) who find that forecast error is higher 
for companies that either announce losses or show a decrease in their previous earnings. 
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They also find that the consensus forecast error decreases as the number of analysts 
following a certain company increases.  
Henderson and marks (2013) suggests that earnings per share forecasts is not the best 
variable to use in order to judge the performance of the analyst. They suggest that profit 
margin is a better proxy and should be used instead as it incorporates revenues which is a 
reference point of the company’s performance. Contrary to the overall literature, they find 
that earnings and revenue forecasts are overall pessimistic. Furthermore, Baron, Biard and 
Liang (2013) observe the time at which forecasts were made and find that pessimistic 
forecasts are often issued later in the year compared to optimistic forecasts that are issued 
earlier in the year.  
Back to the rationality of analysts, the literature also shows big interest in the relationship 
between financial anaylsts and companies’ managers. A big question mark is raised when 
linking analysts’ forecasts with company’s performance. Das, Levine and 
Sivaramaknishnan (1998) for example, suggests that analysts might issue biased forecasts 
to gain access to private information from managers of hardly predictable companies. 
Their analysis confirms that analysts are significantly optimistic when forecasting hard to 
predict companies. This is consistent with Mest and Plummer (2003) who suggests that 
optimism in earnings forecasts can improve access to management, thus if managers give 
less attention to forecasts, intentional bias in earnings forecasts decreases and become 
more accurate. They prove their hypothesis by showing that optimism in earnings forecasts 
is significantly greater than sales forecasts. Libby et al. (2007) state that not only analysts 
have an advantage in having a good relationship with managers, managers may indirectly 
use analysts to their own favour by forcing them to issue favourable forecasts regarding 
their company. This could explain why a lot of analysts issue optimistic forecasts early in 
the year but lower their forecasts using later revisions to allow managers to meet or beat 
the expectation. The motivation behind this is explained by Bernhardt and Campello 
(2007) who report that firms might, on purpose, generate earnings that exceed analysts’ 
forecasts in order to make a positive surprise and stimulate the stock price after the 
earnings announcement. Using quarterly data for a sample between 1989 and 1999, they 
find that forecasts issued later in the fiscal year have bigger impact on investment decisions 
compared to the early ones. More precisely, stocks earn 69% higher return after earnings 
announcement when the actual earnings meet the latest forecasts, compared to companies’ 
stocks that don’t meet or beat earnings’ forecasts.   
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Nevertheless, gaps in the literature concerning the samples selected and the way the data 
has been managed raises a lot of questions to whether the analysts are excessively 
optimistic as the literature suggests or not. One of these weaknesses is to observe the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts only until the end of the fiscal year. Das et al. (1998), Eams 
and Glover (2003), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) all follow this criterion when they analyse 
the accuracy of financial analysts. According to the FCA (Financial conduct authority) in 
the UK, listed companies are allowed to publish their annual report and financial 
statements until 120 days after the fiscal year end. Moreover, there exists no company at 
all that publishes its accounts in the same month of the fiscal year end. Additionally, 
analysts continue to forecast companies’ earnings until the announcement date and not 
until the companies close their books. This is very important as forecasters tend to be more 
accurate by the end of the period as more information emerges regarding the underlying 
companies.  
Other articles applied some slightly different criteria to the forecasting horizon. Capstaff et 
al. (2001) for example assumes that companies publish their results within 3 months, 
therefore, they set the forecasting window from three months after the previous fiscal year 
end to three months after the current fiscal year end. However, the time taken from the 
fiscal year end until the announcement date is different between companies (chapter 2 
provides full details regarding FTSE all share companies). Similar pitfalls include taking 
companies with fiscal year ending in December only (Larocque (2013), Becker et al 
(2004), among others), or studying a fixed number of public companies surviving over a 
long period in time (Guedj and Bouchaud (2005). Such misalignment can have serious 
implications on the results provided and may not truly represent how accurate these 
forecasts are, leave aside their bias or rationality.     Consequently, this thesis will attempt 
to re-examine the financial analysts’ accuracy and rationality after covering the gaps in the 
literature by providing a detailed representation and a well organised sample data for FTSE 
all share companies in the UK.   
1.3.2. Companies’ managers versus financial analysts:  
As for the managers, their role surpasses putting pressure on analysts, but it also consists of 
managing their own earnings and improve their companies’ performance, or at least, 
improve it in the eyes of the public. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the role of 
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managers and earnings management in this theme to better understand earnings’ forecast 
error.  
Earnings management is one of the most popular tools in accounting management. It is the 
procedure of reshaping the accounting figures, especially the discretionary accounts, in 
order to improve the end of year earnings. From the accruals’ perspective, this could be 
done by recognising sales not yet delivered, changing inventory methods, timing gains and 
losses and many more. From a real activities’ perspective, managers can cut expenses of 
advertisement and research and development, offer lenient credit terms to boost sales in the 
short term, overproduce units to lower the unit cost.  
There exists a lot of incentives that stand behind earnings management. The most obvious 
reason is to boost earnings and meet public expectations (Burgstahler and Eams (2006), 
Carmanis and Lennox (2008), Bernhardt and Campello (2007), among others). As stated 
earlier, Bernhardt and Campello (2007) documents how meeting public expectation can 
increase stock returns following earnings announcement. Others claim that avoiding losses 
is a benchmark for managers thus it is the main incentive behind using earnings 
management (Roychowdhury (2006)).  
Managers are also believed to be driven by financial bonuses. Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) shows that insider ownership is highly correlated with earnings management. They 
find that CEOs are more likely to exercise options in periods of high accruals. Kraft, Lee 
and Lapotta (2014) insider shares trading increases following periods of high accruals.  As 
such, this finding is based on a simple assumption that manager’s wealth is associated with 
company’s performance.  
Perhaps this could be more evident when we compare earnings management with 
manager’s bonus schemes. Fox (1980) reports that 90% of the largest US companies apply 
earnings based bonus plans. Based on this, Healy (1985) observes how companies’ 
accounting procedures change when the bonus plans are modified. The author then argues 
that managers manage their discretionary accounts in the optimal way that maximises their 
utility from bonus awards. Financial stability is another motivation mentioned in the 
literature. Managers try to smooth out earnings by delaying some of today’s profits for 
tomorrow’s losses, or pulling back some of tomorrow’s profits to hide today’s losses 
(DeAngelo et al (1996)). IPOs are also considered a major motivation behind earnings 
management. Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) report that managers try to boost earnings 
around an IPO to attract more investors to trade it.   
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There is some satisfying evidence about the existence of earnings management which 
makes it hard to deny, albeit the main question in this thesis is to how is this linked with 
earnings forecast? As cited above, the literature pictures analysts’ forecasts as part of 
public expectation and one of the incentives behind earnings management. However, 
assuming that managers are not mainly pressured by analysts’ forecasts but by other 
factors, would earnings management have a reversal impact on the accuracy of these 
forecasts? There is no doubt that any unusual alteration in the company’s accounts would 
make the life of analysts much harder to forecast the company’s earnings. As a result, 
forecasters would become less accurate should managers attempt to use earnings 
management.   
Therefore, this research will attempt to study how earnings management contributes to the 
forecast error conceded by the analysts. As earnings might get manipulated by some 
managers at some point in the year, the forecast error will look differently to what it’s 
supposed to be if no earnings management is applied. While man studies have mentioned 
the role of accruals management in various aspects, earnings management has never been 
used as an explanatory variable of analyst forecast error. Besides, it will also study the 
major contributors to the forecast error such as the uncertainty of the company, previous 
performances and number of followers.        
1.3.3. Market sentiment and analysts’ forecasts:  
Taking analysts’ forecasts as a proxy of public expectation triggers behavioural scholars’ 
attention to explore more about the behavioural aspects of this topic. A lot of conclusions 
drawn in the literature links analysts’ irrationality or systematic lack of accuracy to 
behavioural or cognitive bias. This was clearly stated by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) who 
report that earnings forecasts are too extreme to be rational and that analysts overreact to 
previous information when making their forecast revisions. Similarly, Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999) brings up the same point by claiming that analysts’ underreaction or overreaction to 
past year’s earnings should be treated as an irrational behaviour.  
At the same time, the literature attributes public expectation with market sentiment. Brown 
and Cliff (2004) defines market sentiment as the expectation of investors relative to a 
reference, where bullish investors expect returns to be higher than average and bearish 
investors expect returns to be lower than average. Similarly, Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
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define sentiment as the tendency to speculate or the relative demand for speculation. Based 
on this, it is believed that analysts’ forecasts contribute to the market sentiment but the 
literature does not consider these forecasts when estimating the market sentiment index.  
Additionally, evidence regarding the impact of market sentiment on stock returns is quite 
contradicting. For example, while Baur, Quintero and Stevens (1996) find no association 
between future returns and sentiment levels, Baker and Wurgler (2006) show that 
sentiment shifts affect long term future stock returns. Brown and Cliff (2005) also find that 
sentiment level holds a predictive power for long-term stock returns and mainly from 1 to 
3 years ahead. Furthermore, Chen (2010) finds that sentiment level plays a big role in a 
financial crisis, more precisely, the higher the market pessimism the higher the possibility 
of shifting from bull to bear market.  
Furthermore, the value premium anomaly is one of the most popular stock market 
anomalies where value stocks appear to better than growth stocks in most of the financial 
markets. On the one side, the risk-based explanations led by Fama and French (1992b), 
Chen and Zhang (1998) and others, argue that this difference is a compensation to the 
financial risk associated to the high leveraged value firms. On the other side, behavioural 
finance scholars such as Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), argue that it is a result of 
naive investors making their decisions based on past performances. Therefore, investors 
tend to overvalue growth stocks and undervalue value stocks. A linkage between the 
market sentiment and the value premium was discussed by Schmelling (2009) who 
suggests that the impact of sentiment on stock returns is significant on both value and 
growth stocks. The author also finds that this impact is more significant in countries that 
have less regulatory institutions. Additionally, Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that young, 
unprofitable and growth stocks are negatively correlated by the sentiment level, that is, 
when sentiment level increases, stock returns of this type of companies decreases. 
Nevertheless, this result is found to be significant on the long term only.    
Based on the above, it is believed that analysts’ forecast error carries a sentimental 
component which, along with other factors, can have an impact on stock returns. To our 
knowledge, none of the the sentiment indices estimated in previous articles considers 
forecast optimism as a component of market sentiment. Taking forecast error as a proxy of 
market sentiment is not only based on simple definitions. This combination will help 
finding an answer of how a systematic optimistic forecast can still make an impact on 
investors and stock returns. Logically speaking, significant patterns in forecasts found by 
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various articles such as systematic optimism (Bernhard and Campello (2007), Yu and Ke 
(2006) might affect stock returns to some extent but should fade away after some time as 
investors learn from their mistakes, which is not the case. Accordingly, the impact of 
forecast error on stock returns is believed to be reflected in an unavoidable market 
sentiment rather than having a direct effect.  
This research will attempt to study the short term effect of market sentiment, as a function 
of forecast error and other proxies, on stock returns. The literature focuses on the long term 
effect of sentiment levels on stock returns (Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brown and Cliff 
(2004), among others), however, this research assumes that any long term impact is a 
reaction of an initial short term stimulation of the stock price and therefore stock prices are 
better observed on the short run when it comes to market sentiment.       
The discussion made in this section provided a brief summary of the literature surrounding 
analysts’ forecasts. However, there are many questions left unanswered and this thesis will 
try to cover many gaps in an attempt to offer a better understanding to the nature of 
analysts’ forecasts and its implication on the stock market.  
 
1.4. Research questions and key empirical findings:   
A main motivation in this thesis is how the literature frames the analysts as naïve and 
biased on average. What if this was an effect of data mismanagement or external variables 
leading to the wrong conclusions? And if this is the case, what are these variables? 
Moreover, even if these forecasts are systematically irrational, how couldn’t the market 
spot this gap yet keep on absorbing the information released by financial analysts? 
Contradicting results in the literature does not really help but makes these questions even 
bigger and in need of further investigation. These questions and more will be discussed in 
details throughout three empirical chapters concerning financial analysts’ forecasts.  
1- How accurate are financial analysts when forecasting the fiscal year-end earnings 
of FTSE all share companies?  
2- How rational are financial analysts when making errors in forecasting?   
The first two questions are posed to re-examine the accuracy and rationality of financial 
analysts. As stated earlier, analysts are proved to be overall optimistic in the literature in 
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most of the financial markets. However, a lot of pitfalls in the data management is found in 
the literature and this research attempts to cover these gaps to provide an accurate 
investigation regarding the analysts’ forecasts.  
Using all available companies in FTSE all share from 1993 to 2013, findings in the first 
empirical chapter show that financial analysts are overall optimistic, however, not as 
extremely optimistic as the literature claims (DeBondt and Thaler (1990), Capstaff et al. 
(2001), among others). Moreover, the forecasts appear to become more accurate as the 
time approaches the earnings announcement date. Results also indicate that while analysts 
are being optimistic, there seems to be no significant sign of over- or under-reaction to 
available information.  Despite the consistency in the findings with the literature regarding 
the optimism of forecasters, the results show some disparity in the magnitude of forecast 
error compared to previous studies. For instance, the yearly average forecast error shown 
in this study was much lower than Capstaff et al (1995) and Capstaff et al (2001)3. This 
difference difference is partially due to the fact that this study employs precise earnings 
announcement dates as opposed to the fixed three months’ period following fiscal year end 
used by Capstaff et al (1995). Contrarily, Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) report a very low 
forecast error using a sample of only surviving and big companies. Surviving companies 
are the ones listed for on the stock exchange for a long period of time without being 
merged, acquired or delisted from the exchange. The sample employed in this study 
however, doesn’t suffer from survivorship effect hence the forecast error appears to be 
slightly higher since all available companies were included.  
Following DeBondt and Thaler (1990), the rationality of analysts’ forecast is also 
investigated by testing the relationship between forecast changes and actual changes. 
Findings show that analysts revise their forecasts downwards but do not reach a perfect 
accuracy and the average forecast remains above the actual earnings. This result 
contradicts with previous studies suggesting that managers try to convince analysts to walk 
down their forecasts in order to generate a positive surprise by the end of the year 
(Richardson et al. (2004), Libby et al. (2007), among others). The theory of having realised 
earnings meeting or beating the analysts’ forecasts cannot be confirmed in this chapter.      
                                                 
3 Capstaff et al (1995) based their study on a UK sample, whereas Capstaff et al (2001) investigated 
European companies including the UK.   
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A second test of rationality tests whether analysts mis-react to previous year’s earnings. A 
systematic over or under-reaction to previous year’s earnings is considered a type of 
irrationality (Easterwood and Nutt (1999)). However, findings show that irrationality in 
analysts’ forecasts is not statistically significant based on this specific test.   
3- What is the relationship between earnings management and earnings’ forecast 
error?  
4- What is the impact of upwards earnings management on pessimistic forecasts?  
5- What is the impact of the downward earnings management on optimistic forecasts?  
Managers are well documented to to be managing their companies’ earnings using accruals 
and real earnings management tools due to many incentives. Applying such manipulation 
is done internally leaving no possibility for information leakage. If this is true, such 
alteration will make the forecast error look differently to what it should be as realised 
earnings shift unexpectedly.  
Accruals earnings management is estimated following the adjusted model of Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and real earnings management is estimated following 
Roychowdhury (2006). Results show that earnings management positively affect the 
magnitude of forecast error, that is, when earnings are manipulated the forecast error 
appears to be larger.  
After controlling for a set of other variables, the result seems to be dominated by the 
impact of accruals management and not by real earnings management. An extended 
analysis in this study was necessary to control for the endogeneity problem encountered 
from the possible reversal causality between analysts’ forecasts and earnings management. 
The Generalised Methods of Moments GMM is employed to control for this possible 
problem by using lagged independent variables as instruments of the endogenous factor. 
Further analysis show that when earnings are managed downwards, forecasts appear to be 
more optimistic. This is due to the unexpected fall of earnings per share making forecasts 
look more optimistic than usual. The opposite is also true such that when earnings 
management is used to boost earnings, analysts’ forecasts tend to be more pessimistic. 
Additionally, forecast error appears to be negatively associated with company’s 
performance and positively correlated with company’s uncertainty level. Companies with 
higher trading volume appears to have higher forecast error. One possible explanation is 
28 
 
that higher trading volume attracts more followers and more speculation may weaken the 
forecast accuracy.   
While previous studies have mentioned the role of earnings management in various 
aspects, abnormal accruals and real earnings management have never been used as an 
explanatory variable of forecast error. This study contributes to the literature by proving 
how earnings management play an important role in increasing the analysts’ forecast error, 
the same analysts that the literature brands as irrational an extreme.   
 
6- How does analysts’ forecast error contribute to market sentiment?  
7- What is the impact of analysts’ forecast error and market sentiment on the value 
premium anomaly? 
    
As stated in the previous section, it makes more sense taking the forecast optimism as a 
component of market sentiment, which might have an impact on stock returns. following 
Baker and Wurgler (2006), the market sentiment index is estimated using the first principal 
component of seven proxies: Forecast error, Market turnover, Number of IPOs, return on 
the first day of IPO, share of equity issuance, the dividend premium and the discount on 
closed-end mutual funds.  
Findings show that forecast error is a major component of market sentiment and that they 
are significantly positively correlated. Additionally, results show that short term stock 
returns are positively significantly affected by market sentiment. This finding is 
inconsistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brown and Cliff (2005), Baur, Quintero and 
Stevens (1996) who find that future stock returns are negatively affected by stock returns. 
Furthermore, figures from this study prove that stock returns are higher during high 
sentiment levels compared to low sentiment levels.   
Companies are divided depending on their size and Book to Market in order to investigate 
the relationship between the estimated market sentiment and value premium anomaly. The 
analysis show that the value premium shrinks significantly when sentiment level increases. 
This is mainly driven by the sensitivity of growth firms towards sentiment shifts. As a 
result, small stocks, growth stocks and stocks with weak profitability are more prone to 
sentiment changes than value, large and stocks with robust profitability. This finding also 
contradicts with Brown and Cliff (2005) who report that sentiment only affects large and 




1.5. Reasons for choosing the UK market: 
The vast majority of articles in the literature investigating the analysts’ forecasts and 
earnings management are based on the US market. This thesis focuses on London Stock 
exchange in the UK as the main market under investigation for different reasons. There are 
many features that make the UK market special compared to the other markets around the 
world. London Stock Exchange LSE is considered the largest financial market in Europe in 
terms of cumulative market capitalisation of its listed firms, and the third largest in the 
world after New York Stock Exchange NYSE and NASDAQ in the US respectively. 
Moreover, it is the largest international capital market, having almost 3100 companies 
from more than 70 countries around the world with almost 700 of these are international 
(London Stock Exchange Group, 2017). LSE has specifically become very popular among 
Asian companies with 225 Asian equity issuers listed on the exchange, and since 2005, 
growing companies from China have raised over £2.6 billion on the market.  
Many reasons have made LSE to become internationally characterised including its 
position at the heart of the global financial community. In addition, LSE runs several 
markets for listing, giving the opportunity for different sized companies to list, including 
FTSE100, FTSE 250, FTSE small cap and FTSE AIM (London Stock Exchange, 2017). 
Another reason could be the tight regulations imposed by the Securities and Exchange 
commission SEC in the US on public companies which might have led international 
companies seeking capital to choose London over New York. Taking as an example the 
entry requirements for an initial listing, LSE requires companies to have at least 75% of the 
entity’s business supported by a revenue track record for the 3 years’ period, and a 
minimum market cap of GBP700,000 (PWC, 2012). For the same companies NYSE 
requires to meet at least one of the following points (PWC, 2012):  
1- Income before tax continuting operations and after minority interest, amortisation 
and equity in earnings or losses of investees must total at least to $10 million in 
aggregate for last 3 fiscal years, together with a minimum of $2 millin in the most 
recent fiscal year and $2m in the next most recent fiscal year.  
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2- Or, Issuer must have at least $500 million in global market cap, $100 million in 
revenues in the most recent 12month period, and $25 million in aggregate cash 
flows for the last 3 fiscal years with positive amounts in all 3 years.  
3- Or issuer must have at least $150 million in global market cap, and $75million in 
total assets together with at least $50million in stockholders’ equity.  
These requirements highlight the differences between the UK and the US markets. For 
these factors and more, outputs from studies based on London Stock Exchange would most 
likely differ from other research studies about NYSE.  
As regarding the topics covered in this research, forecasting companies’ performances can 
take a different approach due to the different disclosure policies in the United Kingdom. 
Previous studies show a significant association between corporate disclosure and analyst’s 
forecasting accuracy (Lang and Lundholm (1996), Ang and Ciconne (2001), among 
others), as higher amount of accounting disclosure leads to less forecasting error. In this 
manner, La Porta et al (2006) reports the US companies are more extensive and formal in 
their disclosure material compared to UK firms. Ang and Ciconne (2001) find evidence 
that analysts that follow companies with more disclosure material tend to be less volatile in 
their forecasts.   
Moreover, while companies listed on the main market in the UK must comply with the 
International Financial Reporting Standard IFRS, the US has been trying gradually to 
converge to the IFRS ever since the Enron scandal in 2002, but most of its listed 
companies still adopt the US GAAP. According to Fosbre, Kraft and Fosbrej (2009, page 
66), “Many areas of accounting standards remain to be comprised and converged. Other 
differences also exit. Measurement of interpretations includes IFRS standards which are 
for the most part are more broad and principle based as compared to US GAAP. US 
standards contain underlying principles as well as strong regulatory and legal 
requirements”. These differences can partially lead to differences in the way financial 
analysts perceive accounting information. Moreover, earnings management is also believed 
to be perceived differently between the UK and the US.  Frederikslust et al (2007) explain 
that in the UK there exists less fiduciary obligations on directors but more minority 
investor protection than in the US. Less fiduciary obligations might allow managers to be 
more flexible in managing discretionary accounts in order to manage their earnings in a 
favourable way. From a regulatory and environmental perspectives, part of the the existing 
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differences and between the UK and the US markets will eventually lead to different 
results in the research regarding the analysts’ forecast performance. 
1.6. Research philosophy 
According to Ryan, Scapens and Theobald (2002), there are three major issues that could 
be argued upon when trying to define knowledge in research: The nature of belief, the 
basis of truth and the problem of justification or research approach. The debate regarding 
the nature of belief is unavoidable in any research material and this thesis is not an 
exception.  
The philosophy surrounding this research looks at the reality from a positivist standpoint. 
Gill and Johnson (2010) defines a positivist researcher as the one who prefers to collect 
data in order to observe some regularities and causalities that exist thorough relationships, 
and in the end creates a law-like generalisations such as theories. Before them, Friedman 
(1953) explains that the main objective of positive economics is to develop a hypothesis 
that will lead to a valid and meaningful representation of a phenomena not yet observed. 
The research approach applied in each chapter fits very well into this description since it 
follows the process of deduction (testing hypothesis to prove a systematic scenario), and in 
the end it comes back to link the findings and interpretations to the theory through an 
induction stage.  
The main assumption in the positivism philosophy according to Crotty (1998) is that “the 
researcher is value neutral, although absolutist claims that the outcome is totally objective 
and unquestionably certain are made rarely”. As such, the reality is believed to be existing 
and the tool to observe this reality is by acquiring credible and reliable data that reflects it 
the best. This research examines different issues and patterns in the stock market such as 
the rationality of analysts’ forecasts, earnings management and the value premium that are 
believed to exist, then tries to test the hypothesis related to each issue by reaching out to 
quantitative secondary data. The data collected is based on stock market and consists of 
automated trading data such as stock prices, trading volumes and many more. It also 
consists of company’s reports generated by the performance of real activities throughout 
the quarters and fiscal years. Further discussions regarding how suitable the data is for the 
questions posed could be seen in each empirical chapter.    
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Saunders, Lewis and Stonehill (2012) explain that the positivist approach to research is 
value-free. They add that a researcher adopting this philosophy “would claim to be external 
to the process of data collection in the sense that there is little that can be done to alter the 
substance of the data collected”. As a matter of fact, the same applies to the nature of 
analysis conducted in this research.  The dominant method in this research, which is also 
classified under the problem of justification, is based upon empiricism by providing 
empirical chapters to test certain hypothesis. However, it also accepts the distinction 
between observation and theoretical terms. Additionally, it also confirms that assumptions 
are essential before setting a hypothesis of an empirical model, which in turn will lead to 
proving an implication.   
The arguments given in this section reflects to a great extent the research philosophy in the 
area of finance and economics. As it tries to provide the best possible explanation to 
knowledge, this research makes sure that the research questions are unchanged by the 
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Financial analysts are believed to play a major role in driving financial markets. 
Any error or bias in financial analysts’ forecasts is likely to mislead investors who rely on 
these forecasts to make big investment decisions. Previous papers suggested that for many 
reasons, financial analysts might make systematic errors rather than just being a result of 
an unsystematic human being mistake. The rationality and bias of financial analysts are 
investigated in this chapter for UK public companies. In order to study the accuracy of 
analysts on the index overall, FTSE all Share companies are collected individually as 
available for each year from 1993 to 2013. Two measures of forecast accuracy were used. 
First, earnings per share forecast error to show how far forecasts are from actual earnings 
per share. Second, forecast bias that represents analyst’s optimism or pessimism regarding 
company’s performance. In addition, the horizon effect is examined by observing forecast 
errors from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings official announcement date. After setting few 
criteria to control for outliers, results show that analyst forecasts are overall optimistic. 
However, they seem to diverge to a more rational position the closer they get to the 
announcement date. Despite no evidence of relationship is found between forecast error 
and prior year change in earnings per share, analysts are proved to be systematically 
revising their forecasts downwards from the beginning of the year until the earnings 
announcement date. These results prove that forecasts are inefficient and raise more 







Chapter 2: Accuracy and Rationality of 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts in the UK 
2.1. Introduction 
Since earnings forecasts constitute an essential part in the process of stock valuation, 
financial analysts have become an important source of information that directly influences 
the stock floating prices. Almost all the models such as the discounted cash flow valuation 
model and the analytically equivalent residual-income valuation model rely directly or 
indirectly on forecasting. Accordingly, analyst’s forecasts are taken into consideration in 
any investment decision. However, it is almost impossible for an analyst to forecast a 
company’s future earnings with perfect accuracy. The reasons behind this shortcoming 
could be explained by lack of information, companies’ performances being hard to predict, 
or even errors made on purpose by analysts for different motivations. Consequently, such 
topic has attracted many researchers to study the determinants of analysts’ accuracy in 
order to find a reasonable explanation for the error in earnings’ forecasts and its 
implication on stock markets (Becker, Steliaros and Thomson (2004); Capstaff, Paudyal 
and Rees (2001)…). The importance of this topic lies behind the fundamental intermediate 
role financial analysts play in the market. When analysts make big errors in forecasting a 
company’s earnings, they may mislead investors who follow that specific company to 
make the wrong investment decisions based on the analysts’ false recommendation. Add to 
this, if consensus analysts make big forecast errors, this will lead to larger amount of 
related investment decisions that might result in a negative overreaction when the realised 
earnings are released otherwise (due to the overestimation of earnings).     
The literature shows that analysts forecasts are overall optimistic in regards to companies’ 
future earnings (Capstaff et al. (2001), Gu and Wu (2003), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), 
Ciconne (2005), Larocque (2013)). Capstaff et. Al. (1995) argue that financial analysts 
might have the incentives to issue optimistic forecasts in order to increase the trading 
volumes generated after their forecasts. Abarbanel and Bernard (1992) find that stock 
prices drift after earnings announcement are partially driven by inefficient forecasts made 
throughout the year. Mest and Plammer (2003) explain that optimism in analysts’ forecasts 
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facilitate the access to management’s private information especially for hardly predictable 
firms.  
Other studies relate the forecast accuracy to other factors such as the country effect (Ang 
and Ciccone, 2001). The level of development, the growth rate, the economic risk, the 
level of competition between firms, the legal and institutional environments and the 
financial and accounting systems are all found to be sources of influence related to each 
country separately. The industry effect also featured in many studies related to the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Capstaff et al. (2001), for example, find that public utilities 
and health-care sectors have more accurate forecasts than transportation and consumer-
durables sectors. The stability of firms in each industry sector was given as a possible 
explanation of this variable.  
Despite providing statistical evidence of the forecast error made by analysts, a lot of 
articles are prone to data limitation that might have led to many results being spurious.  To 
examine the accuracy and bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts, most researchers use 
consensus forecasts (Average of yearly, quarterly or monthly forecasts) and compare it to 
the realised earnings at the end of the year to see how accurate analysts are. However, past 
UK studies suffer from sample and technical limitations due to several reasons. For 
example, Beckers et al. (2004), Ackert and Athanassakos (2003) and Das et al. (1998) use 
firms with December fiscal-end years only. This is due to the complexity of merging data 
for companies with different fiscal year end. Nevertheless, this study shows that if only 
December fiscal year-end firms were taken into consideration, we would be ignoring 58% 
of the companies that end their fiscal year in different months. Another data weakness was 
shown in Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Larockque (2013) who ignore the first 4 months 
of the year to insure that previous financial report has been announced. Findings in this 
chapter show that different companies release their financial reports in different months. 
More precisely, there exists 11% of FTSE all share companies that take more than 4 
months to release their reports. Additionally, 34.6% of companies take only 2 months to 
release their results and in this case, the literature would be ignoring 2 months of consensus 
forecasts that should’ve been included in the yearly average. Furthermore, Guedj and 
Bouchaud (2005) restrict their sample to a fixed number of US, UK and European firms all 
over the period from 1987 to 2004. Again, the analysis in this study show that only big and 
strong companies survive as public throughout this long period. This means that applying 
such criteria would eliminate small growth companies that are harder to predict.   
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The values generated from such restricted samples, however, can lead to bold conclusions 
that are then referenced across the literature from behavioural finance (DeBondt and Thaler 
(1990), and asset pricing (Larocque (2013), Hribar and McInnis (2012)). This chapter 
focuses on how such a restricted sample can lead to different results, and why having a 
complete and comprehensive sample can rebuff previous conclusions made about analysts’ 
forecasts.  
Therefore, this research uses FTSE all Share companies in London Stock Exchange as the 
main sample under investigation. All available companies in each year from 1993 to 2013 
were collected individually and included in the analysis. In addition to employing a better 
representative sample of the UK firms, the horizon effect in this study is examined by 
observing monthly forecasts from the beginning until earnings announcement date rather 
than the fiscal year-end. Findings show that financial analysts are optimistic, however, not 
extremely optimistic as the literature claims (DeBondt and Thaler (1990), Capstaff et al. 
(1995)). Nevertheless, forecasts are not as precise as Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) shows. 
This is reasonable due to the inclusion of small and harder to predict companies.       
Follwing DeBondt and Thaler (1990), the rationality of analysts’ forecasts is also 
investigated by testing the relationship between forecast changes and actual earnings 
changes. Such test can illustrate if there is a trend in the forecasts throughout the months 
until the end of the year. Results show that analysts revise their forecasts downwards from 
when they start forecasting in month 1 until just before the earnings announcement date. 
However, this is valid for optimistic forecasts only. Albeit, figures for this test are less 
aggressive than findings in Capstaff et al. (1995) who find sharper downward revision 
trend of -14.8% compared to -9.7% in this study. An interesting factor in this result is that 
the forecast remains above the actual earnings released in the last month of forecast, even 
with a steady downward revision throughout the previous months. This result contradicts 
with previous studies suggesting that managers try to convince analysts to walk down their 
forecasts in order to generate a positive surprise by the end of the year. The theory of 
realised earnings meeting or beating the analysts’ forecasts cannot be confirmed in this 
chapter.      
Additionally, a second test of rationality is applied following Easterwood and Nutt (1999). 
Under this test, irrationality is when forecasters show systematic underreaction or 
overreaction to past year’s earnings, which is considered a mistreatment of information and 
therefore defined as irrational behaviour that could lead to serious trouble in financial 
38 
 
markets. Contrary to Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (1992), 
results in this chapter show that irrationality in analysts’ forecasts is not statistically 
significant based on this specific test.  
 
This chapter contributes to the literature of financial analysts’ forecasts in many ways. The 
analysts are often seen in the literature as overly and extremely optimistic (DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990), (Capstaff et al. (1995) and Larocque (2013), among others), and this has led 
many studies to base this suggestion on financial behaviour issues, or link this factor to 
sell-side analysts who aim at increasing the trading volumes rather than being accurate 
(Capstaff et al. (1995)). Results in this chapter using the main analysis in addition to 
robustness checks show that this suggestion doesn’t hold. The high values of forecast 
errors diminish when taking into account all the windows from the start of the year until 
just before the earnings announcement date. The main reason for this decrease was mainly 
assigned to studies not taking into account the last few months before the announcement 
date (by taking the fiscal year end as a closing date rather than the reporting date for 
example). At the same time, analysts are not perfectly accurate regarding the UK 
companies’ performance. The estimations in this chapter show that there is a degree of 
error in their forecasts contrarily to some previous studies such as Beker et al (2004). This 
main difference is believed to be due to the survivorship effect, taking December fiscal 
year end firms only, and other sampling restrictions.  
Furthermore, as other limitations are taken into consideration, a fair and representative 
sample indicates that analysts’ forecasts are not subject to trendy revisions, neither 
irrationality in using past earnings information, leading us to conclude that they are not 
purposefully biased but simply concede errors within acceptable norms. 
The remainder of this report will come as follow. A background of earnings forecasts 
studies and a review of the literature come in the second section. A critical review of 
previous studies will help to set up the hypothesis of this research at the end of the second 
section.  The third section includes Data and Methodology in which sample selected and 
forecast error measures will be explained. Results, tables and figures will be introduced in 





2.2.  A Review of the Literature:  
Forecasting future earnings was never considered an easy job for an analyst since it 
involves a mixture of micro and macro variables that if changed by small fractions, might 
diverge the forecast by a significant proportion and thus harm any investment based on it. 
In 1975 John Gillis published “the legal aspects of corporate forecasts” in a move to 
avoid an exposure to liability and an increase in litigation in the US stock market due to the 
inaccuracy of analysts’ forecasts and legal uncertainties caused by the US Securities Act of 
1933. Gillis (1973) therefore explained some appropriate points that should be considered 
in any forecast. The assumptions are divided into three categories: 
i. General and economic factors:  
a. General economic conditions 
b. National and International conditions 
c. Wage and prices 
d. Monetary policy 
e. Federal budget 
f. Financing costs 
g. Restrictions on corporate dividends 
ii. Industry factors (in which a company operates) :  
a. Growth rate 
b. Availability of raw materials 
c. Continuity of markets 
d. Acceptance of products 
e. Labour status. 
iii. Firm specific and employees’ factors:  
a. strikes 
b. wage settlements 
c. start-up or break-in problems with new products or processes 
d. overestimation of new product demand 
e. cost overruns 
f. construction delays 
 
Ignoring some of these factors might lead to a large forecast error ( Barefield and 
Comiskey (1975)). Since less attention was given before 1975 to earnings forecasts made 
by security analysts, Barefield and Comiskey (1975) study the performance of analysts 
who forecast year-end earnings of 100 company of New York Stock Exchange, and 
compare it to managements’ expectations of earnings per share. They find overestimations 
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in 64% of the cases, in which the average analysts’ forecasts exceed the realised earnings. 
While analysts showed a robust performance by predicting most of the earnings turning 
points, it remained hard to explain the large prediction error since little is known about the 
analysts’ forecasting procedures. 
 While many researchers use a wide set of time-series data in order to make robust 
assessment on the results, Fried and Givoly (1982) claim that earnings’ forecasts based on 
time series models alone are inappropriate since they assume that earnings are stationary to 
form their predictions, thus analysts’ forecasts are considered as better proxies of future 
performance4. Consequently, Fried and Givoly (1982) tend to use FAF “financial analyst 
forecasts” as a surrogate for market expectations. On a sample of 10 years, only NYSE 
listed companies with fiscal year ending on December 31st were included. The companies 
should also have at least 4 forecasts per fiscal year and an availability of monthly return for 
the current year, the following year and the preceding four years. In the end, they find that 
financial analyst estimates are better predictors than the ordinary time-series forecasting 
models and this might be due to two reasons. First, the flexibility to use wider set of 
information including non-accounting information about the firm, industry and general 
economy. Second, the flexibility in the timing of forecast since they can include news 
about earnings released during the forecast period.  
2.2.1. Earnings Forecast Errors: Different Measures and Different 
Perspectives:  
Most of the literature uses the traditional approach which denotes that the analyst 
forecast error is equal to the difference between “actual earnings” and “forecasted 
earnings” at a given time, divided by “actual earnings” or “Forecasted earnings”. However, 
other measures were also used in order to observe analyst forecast accuracy. Brandan and 
                                                 
4 Chapter 3 uses lagged values of earnings management estimations in a Generalised Methods of Moments 
model. Despite not having a unit root existing, a big advantage of the System GMM is that it overcomes non-
stationarity when having a panel data of  N (number of subject observations) being much larger than T 
(number of periods), which is the case in chapter 3.  Moreover, “in the existence of panel data, and 
observations among cross-sectional units are independent, then one can invoke the central limit theorem 
across cross-sectional units to show that the limiting distributions of many estimators remain asymptotically 




Jarrette (1975) summarise these different measures of forecast error. According to the 
authors, the concept of forecast should be approached by estimating the loss function of its 
inaccuracy. They therefore divide the loss function into two: Linear loss and Quadratic 
loss.  
The Linear loss function is the traditional approach which is equal to the difference 
between Actual earnings and forecasted earnings divided by the actual earnings. “Another 
variation of this measure, where the sign of the deviation is of no consequence, is the mean 
absolute error” (Brandan and Jarrette (1975)).  
 
1− 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 = 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇−𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇|𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡|  
2− | 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇| = �𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇−𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 
 
Where FE is forecast error at time t, Ft is the EPS forecast at time t, Et is the actual EPS at 
time t.  
Other people tend to use different denominators such as “Stock Price” (Ali, Klein and 
Rosenfeld (1992)), Forecasted earnings per share (Dreman and Berry (1995)), standard 
deviation of actual eps (Dreman and Berry (1995)).  
The concept of non-linear forecast error (Quadratic loss function) came from the 
implication of non-accurate forecasts on the market. Brandan and Jarette (1975) state: 
“(…) if inaccurate forecasts lead to decisions with dramatic negative consequences (loss), 
then the seriousness of the forecast inaccuracy is equivalently large. In statistics this loss 
criterion has a prominent place, e.g., as a minimum variance estimation where the size of 
the error is universally related to the predictive ability of the estimator”. Accordingly, the 
forecast error will be squared to reflect the implication of such a mistake in the real life 
transactions. 
Mathematically this could be translated by the following:   
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹(𝑃𝑃 − 𝐴𝐴)2 = (𝑃𝑃 − 𝐴𝐴)2 + 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃2 + 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴2 − 2𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 
 
Where MS is the mean square error as a measure of forecast accuracy. MS is a function of 
the mean of the predicted series, its standard deviation and the correlation between 
predicted and actual series. P is the mean of predicted values, A is the mean of actual 
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values. S is the standard deviation and r is the correlation. This quadratic loss function is 
also used by Lim (2001) who developed a model combining private information noise with 
public information available to a financial analyst. In the end, he argued that if an analyst is 
optimistic doesn’t mean irrational, however, it means predictably biased. More 
specifically, if an analyst’s priority is accessing private information through companies’ 
management, and then they are predicted to be associated with more optimistic forecasts 
especially if the sought after companies’ information is vague.  
  In order to address the role of time series correlation in the forecast accuracy of 
analysts, Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992) regress the forecast errors made by analysts at 
time t, to their previous forecast errors in addition to the previous return on stocks. They 
use the traditional approach to calculate the forecast errors (Analysts forecasts of earnings 
minus realised earnings divided by the stock prices when the forecast was made). They 
find that individual forecasts of annual earnings are correlated in adjacent years. According 
to them, “one interpretation compatible with our results is that analysts systematically 
underestimate the permanence of past forecast errors when forecasting future earnings. 
That is, they do not appear to properly incorporate information about the time-series 
properties of earnings into their forecasts” Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992, page 188). 
  A further study on the US market is done by Dreman and Berry (1995) who compare 
66100 consensus analysts’ forecasts, and find that the average earnings forecast is 
significantly different than the actual earnings. In order to analyse 17 years of quarter 
earnings estimates, they calculate a “standardised surprise measure” (known as forecast 
error), by dividing the difference of forecasted earnings and actual earnings, by the 
standard deviation of actual earnings. By doing this, they aim to test the volatility-adjusted 
error on the whole sample and for each industry-yearly sample. Besides, they use four 
measures for the forecast surprise known as error:  
SURPE=Consensus EPS surprise as a percent of absolute value of actual EPS= (actual 
quarterly earnings-Predicted quarterly earnings)/|Actual quarterly earnings| 
SURPF= Consensus EPS surprise as a percent of absolute value of predicted EPS=  
(actual quarterly earnings-Predicted quarterly earnings)/|Predicted quarterly earnings| 
SURP8= Consensus EPS surprise as a percent of past eight-quarter volatility of actual 
EPS= (actual quarterly earnings-Predicted quarterly earnings)/|standard deviation of past 
actual eight-quarter EPS| 
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SURP7= Consensus EPS surprise as a percent of past seven-quarter volatility of actual 
EPS= (actual quarterly earnings-Predicted quarterly earnings)/|standard deviation of the 
past actual seven-quarter change in EPS| 
Moreover, Dreman and Berry (1995) also create a second sample by deleting all the firms 
who have a reported or forecasted EPS between -10 and +10 cents, in other way, deleting 
all firms who have small EPS. They argue that using this technique could prevent potential 
outliers to dominate the result, and control for a large part of this negative bias problem for 
the surprise metrics. Their approach was logically fair since using a small or negative 
actual or forecasted EPS as a denominator would deteriorate the analysis. Nonetheless, 
their results show that the average forecast error is more than 20% of the realised earnings 
per share, which is “(…) too high for investors to rely on consensus forecasts as a major 
determinant of stock valuation” Dreman and Berry (1995, page 39).  They also find that 
the error rates are increasing over time, and are not affected by the industry groupings. 
Using a different database (IEBS database), Brown (1997) find similar results of large 
forecast errors from 1983 to 1996 of quarterly data. However, the author adds that analyst 
forecasting errors have significantly decreased over time except for “S&P 500”, contrarly 
to Dreman and Berry (1995).  
2.2.2. Analyst Forecast Bias and possible explanations:  
An extensive body of the literature tried to examine the information content of earnings 
by studying the relationship between analysts’ forecasted earnings and future stock prices. 
Most of these studies find evidence of the inefficiency of the market after they discovered 
abnormal stock returns following the release of analysts’ results (Foster (1977), Watts 
(1978), Givoly and lakonishok (1979)). Other studies also focus on how accurate analysts 
could be in forecasting future earnings. In a sample of 185 corporations between 1962 and 
1963, Cragg and Malkiel (1968) show that analysts’ predictions are more accurate than 
using past data variables such as past earning growth rates and past P/E ratios. The authors, 
however, argue that they couldn’t directly prove whether these good results were due to 
analysts’ abilities, since only few analysts were able to participate in the study.  
Since forecasting future earnings is affected by private and public news, this will give 
signals to the analyst depending on the time of news given. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) 
attempt to find an explanation why analysts’ forecasts are mostly too optimistic and too 
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extreme in a study of forecasts between 1976 and 1984 of NYSE companies. Two market 
variables are included in the model in order to explain the large forecast error: Market 
value to book value of equity (MV/BV), and earnings growth. However, none of the 
variables explained much of the error. They reach a simple conclusion that behavioural 
bias is behind this error since analysts are decidedly human, and their results could be 
biased in some way or another.    
Chopra (1998) reports that analysts overestimate earnings at the beginning of the fiscal 
year by an average of 9.4% between 1985 and 1992, but they seem to improve their 
forecast accuracy after revising their forecasts every month as they get closer to the end of 
fiscal year. Moreover, Chopra (1998) also discusses the relationship between economic 
growth and EPS growth. The author uses the industrial production growth as a 
measurement of the economic growth and concludes that when this growth accelerates, 
earnings grow slowly and the gap between optimistic growth forecast and actual earnings 
growth narrows, leading to a more accurate forecast.  
Contrary to other studies, Tamura (2002) focuses on individual analyst’s characteristics 
when observing forecast errors rather than taking the consensus of overall analysts. 
According to the author, one should calculate first the forecast error for each analyst who 
follows some firms then take the average of all individual forecast errors calculated to 
regress it and find the reason behind it. The reason behind this idea is that analysts’ 
forecasts are strongly affected by their personalities (optimistic or pessimistic) and the way 
they might underreact or overreact to some news. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) examine the 
forecast accuracy by differentiating three hypotheses regarding the reaction of analysts: 
Analysts systematically underreact to earnings news; analysts systematically overreact to 
earnings news; and analysts are generally optimistic to new information. According to the 
researchers, discriminating between them is important “(…) because it might indicate 
whether analysts irrationally err in processing earnings-relevant information or whether 
their forecast errors are more consistent with their economic incentives”. While the first 
and the second hypotheses are independent of the type of information, their test proves that 
analysts underreact to negative information and overreact to positive information, with an 
overall optimistic interpretation of information. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) also find that 
analysts tend to underreact to abnormally negative news and overreact to abnormally 
positive ones, after they revise their prior year error.  
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Gu and Wu (2003) stress that since analysts aim to produce the most accurate results by 
minimising the mean absolute error, then the median should be used instead of mean 
earnings. Moreover, the writers find evidence that “part of the observed analyst forecast 
bias could be a result of analysts’ efforts to improve forecast accuracy when the earnings 
distribution is skewed”. After regressing skewness over the forecast bias, the results 
showed a significant relationship between earnings skewness and earnings forecast bias at 
1% confidence level. 
Other researches have employed more sophisticated approaches by relating the forecast 
accuracy to the country effects (Ang and Ciccone (2001)) or the industry effect (Capstaff 
et. Al(2001)). The level of development, the growth rate, the economic risk, the level of 
competition between firms, the legal and institutional environments and the financial and 
accounting systems are all sources of influence related to each country aside. In a sample 
of European countries between 1987 and 1994, Capstaff et al. (2001) find that public 
utilities and health-care sectors have more accurate forecasts than transportation and 
consumer-durables sectors. The stability of firms in each industry sector is given as a 
possible explanation of this variable.  
Ciconne (2005) proposes a new idea by separating firms with profits and losses in the 
analysis of forecast error. The final sample includes 120022 firm-quarter , 94194 quarters 
with profit and 25828 quarters with losses. While analyst dispersion and forecast error are 
the dependant variables used in the models; Size, Book-to-Market ratio, a Loss dummy 
variable, and Year dummy variables were used as independent variables. The result from 
Ciconne (2005) shows that loss firms’ earnings are more difficult to predict with a forecast 
error bigger than the ones with profits. In addition, forecast errors are decreasing over time 
and analysts were not as optimistic as the literature proved. Due to the bad reputation they 
may receive when they mislead investors which will affect their future, the incentives to 
receive private information can no more compensate the risk of failure for the analysts 
(Ciconne (2005)). Similarly, Coen et. Al. (2009) specify three factors affecting the forecast 
errors: Country effects, Industry effects and Firm specific effects which include firms’ 
Analyst following, change in earnings, and profits/losses. Their analysis show that forecast 
error of 18% is much larger for firms’ that reported losses than those that reported profits 
(1.8%). These findings are consistent with Ciconne (2005). Moreover, they add that 
analysts forecast performance is much weaker for firms’ that saw a decrease in earnings 
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than those that saw an increase in earnings. Finally, Firms’ followed by more analysts had 
more accurate forecasts.  
Latterly, Henderson and Marks (2013) use the profit margin (including earnings 
and revenues) as an explanatory variable in the forecast error analysis. Contrary to 
previous studies, they focus on the change in profit margins that an analyst is expecting to 
see relatively to previous years’ value. Henderson and Marks (2013) explains that: “The 
underlying idea is that observation of the net profit margin implied by analyst forecasts 
provides a reference point from which earnings and revenue forecasts can be judged to be 
extreme and thus inaccurate”. Their findings show a pessimistic bias in earnings and 
revenues forecasts.        
The time at which analysts release their forecasts was investigated by Baron, Biard and 
Liang (2013). They find that a pessimistic forecast is issued later than the other forecasts 
on average, which may explain why the last quarter of a fiscal year is less optimistic in 
terms of earnings forecast.  
2.2.3. Relationship between managers and analyst forecasts:  
On the one hand, one of the most noticeable reasons behind the change in forecast 
errors is thought to be earnings management. Managers often decide to manipulate the 
reported earnings via intangible accounts such as accruals, in order to get advantage of 
some benefits as an increase in stock price, getting a better reputation or bonuses. 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) for example denote the following:” The rewards to 
a firm's senior executives—both employment decisions and compensation benefits—
depend both implicitly and explicitly on the earnings achieved on their watch (Healy 
1985). But such executives have considerable discretion in determining the figure printed 
in the earnings report for any particular period. Within generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), executives have considerable flexibility in the choice of inventory 
methods, allowance for bad debt, expensing of research and development, recognition of 
sales not yet shipped, estimation of pension liabilities, capitalization of leases and 
marketing expenses, delay in maintenance expenditures, and so on. Moreover, they can 
defer expenses or boost revenues, say, by cutting prices. Thus, executives have both the 
incentive and ability to manage earnings. It is hardly surprising that the popular press 
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frequently describes companies as engaged in earnings management—sometimes referred 
to as manipulation”. 
On the other hand, Mest and Plummer (2003) propose that companies’ managers play an 
important role in the biases of analysts forecast since optimistic forecasts can improve the 
chance for an analyst to access the management. Therefore, if management give less 
attention to the forecasted measures, analysts will turn to be more rational and accurate. 
Accordingly, they test this prediction by examining sales and earnings forecast and find 
that analysts’ forecasts are too high. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Das, 
Levine and Sivaramaknishnan (1998) who point out that since optimism in analysts’ 
forecasts facilitate the access to management’s private information, analyst will demand 
more non-public information for hardly predictable firms by issuing optimistic forecasts. 
Following Kang et al. (1994), Das et al. (1998) use the horizon effect, which consist of 
having four different forecast times during a fiscal year, to forecast the end of this fiscal 
year. For example, horizon 1 will be the farthest forecast from the year-end earnings and 
horizon 4 the closest.  
Therefore, the authors calculated BIAS term for each horizon separately as follow:  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 = 1𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 � 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡93
𝑡𝑡−89
 
Where N refers to the number of forecasts for a specific horizon n between 1989 and 1993;  
A is the reported earnings per share during the year t (which is comes 1989 and 1993) ; AF 
is the forecasted earnings per share at the horizon n for the year t and P is the share price at 
the fiscal year-end t. After calculating the BIAS term, they regress it against the Earnings 
predictability (UNPRED) which represents how hard is to predict firms’ future earnings 
from historical information, and firm size. Results show a negative BIAS for all horizons 
during the studied period, which indicates optimism since Analyst forecasts are larger than 
the realised earnings. The UNPRED was significantly negative for all 4 horizons, insisting 
that when analysts cannot predict future earnings using historical data they tend to be 
optimistic about their forecasts and in need of private information.  
Eams and Glover (2003) re-examine the work of Das et al (1998) by studying the 
association between earnings forecast errors and earnings predictability. After controlling 
for earnings level, they conclud that there was no evidence regarding the association 
between earnings forecast errors and earnings predictability. Besides, they couldn’t prove 
that analysts intentionally issue optimistic earnings.  
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Lately, the relationship between managers-analysts and its impact on analysts’ 
forecasts have been re-examined by Ke and Yu’s (2006), Libby et. Al (2007) and 
Bernhardt and Campello (2007). Ke and Yu’s (2006), Libby et. Al (2007) state that not 
only analysts have an advantage in having good relationship with managers, managers may 
indirectly force analysts to release good reports regarding their company, as a trade off 
with accessing private information. Bernhardt and Campello (2007) report that firms 
might, on purpose, generate earnings that exceed analyst forecasts, in order to make a 
positive surprise and stimulate the stock prices, and this could be done via various 
accounting methods. According to the same authors, it is possible that a company put 
pressure on analysts to issue lower earnings forecasts thus the earnings surprise will also be 
positive. The authors focuse on Quarterly data from Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(IBES), and gather data prior to the US Regulation Fair Disclosure from 1989 to 1999.  
They find that late forecasting news have more impact on investment decisions than early 
ones. Beside, firms for which the forecasts falls just before the announcement date earn far 
higher returns around the announcement period than those which have high earnings 
expectations with an impressive difference of 69%. 
Larocque (2013) investigates whether analyst forecast errors and cost of equity capital 
estimates are related using Ali et al. (1992) model. After estimating the predictable analyst 
errors, Larocque (2013) relates the adjusted forecast error (unpredictable errors) to form a 
better proxy to the market expectation of equity return, which in turn might affect the 
realised return in the future. However, even after this adjustment, no evidence of 
correlation was found between cost of equity estimates and realised returns.    
2.2.4. Simultaneous regression Models: 
 One of the main assumptions of a single-regression model is that analysts’ 
behaviours are treated exogenously, in order to separate it from the behaviour of other 
market participants. However, the relationship between analysts’ accuracy, number of 
analysts and trading volume appears to be endogenous for many reasons. On the one hand, 
the more analysts following a certain company, the bigger the amount of information 
uncovered about this firm. Since more efforts are made on the same company, this will 
result in a better accuracy. On the other hand, trading volume will attract more analysts 
since improving investments will improve liquidity and commissions depending on the 
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reputation, thus analysts’ role will be more valuable in this manner. If this was true, doubts 
will be raised regarding the use of a simple regression model.    
Alford and Berger (1999) criticize the single-regression models by using a simultaneous 
equations analysis including forecast accuracy, analyst following and trading volume. They 
responded that the old single-regression misrepresent the relationship. The use of analyst 
following in their research reflects the amount of information privately gathered about a 
firm which is, according to them, “complements rather than substitute the factors that 
increase certainty about firms’ prospects” (Forecast accuracy). Therefore, the use of 
simultaneous equations was essential in their research. Their results show greater analyst 
accuracy associated with higher analyst following. The impact of accuracy on following is 
also consistent as analysts preferring to follow firms about which there is less uncertainty. 
Moreover, stocks that generate higher brokerage commission has higher analyst following. 
In addition, Alford and Berger (1999) extend the existing literature by adding several new 
explanatory variables to capture the economic changes in a company, these variables 
including “lagged magnitude of special items” and “lagged value of signal based on the 
fundamental variables” which is used by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993)”.  
Another simultaneous regressions model was developed by Ackert and Athanassakos 
(2003) who study how analysts respond to institutional demand of stocks, on a sample of 
72,141 monthly observations for 455 firms collected from Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). The three simultaneous equations were set to model the analyst 
optimism, analyst following and Institutional ownership. The idea of including institutional 
demand of stocks, which is the change in institutional holdings, was explained as follow: 
“Despite their bias or optimism, professional financial analysts act as information 
intermediaries. They provide research reports that are a useful source of information, as 
evidenced by investor demand. At the same time, securities firms use analysts' reports as 
drawing cards. Multi-service firms may attract institutional business through the research 
reports produced by their analysts. Institutions then use this information to make 
investment decisions. Moreover, institutional investors demand analysts' reports in order to 
provide evidence of adequate care and comply with fiduciary responsibilities” Ackert and 
Athanassakos (2003). After conducting the analysis, they report that higher analyst 
optimism leads to higher institutional demand. Moreover, forecasts are less accurate for 




2.2.5. Analyst forecast bias in the United Kingdom:   
Until the second half of the 80’s, little attention had been given about analysts’ 
nature of work and its implication on the stock market in the UK. Arnold and Moizer 
(1984) conduct a survey to discuss the appraisal methods used by UK investment analysts. 
Other than the financial annual reports, relationships with insiders such as company 
management were viewed as the most important source of information used by analysts. 
Furthermore, the analysis of past financial data was seen to be far less useful to analysts in 
the attempt to interpret future price movements (Arnold and Moizer (1984)). Pique et. al. 
(1993) analyse how the implementation of new technology and the “Big Bang” 
deregulation in the UK market have changed the equity valuation approaches used by 
analysts. They find that while fundamental analysis using P/E multiple remains the 
dominant method in the stock valuation, the discounted cash flow and beta analysis 
enjoyed little support.  
       Bhaskar and Morris (1984), Patz (1989) and Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (1995) were 
among the first to address the UK companies in regards to rationality of earnings forecasts. 
Samples used in Bhaskar and Morris (1984) and Patz (1989) are considered relatively 
small compared to nowadays studies. Consistent with the literature in the US, both papers 
reported evidence of analyst’ forecast superiority over naïve forecast methods such as time 
series. Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (1995) also make a contribution by focusing on 
individual forecast rather than taking consensus forecasts. According to the authors, “(…) 
the behaviour of the consensus may not be informative regarding the behaviour of 
individual forecasts as, for example, unsystematic errors made by individual analysts may 
cancel out. In addition, errors in the data such as outliers, or even bizarre forecasts might 
diffuse in the averaging process. The possible reasons behind analysts’ inaccuracy are that 
analysts in some cases may not be motivated to maximise the accuracy, particularly when 
they have incentives to increase the volume of trade generated after their forecasts”. This 
explains the overreaction of market prices after optimistic forecasts discussed in the 
literature. Capstaff et. Al. (1995) then test analysts’ rationality by regressing the forecast 
change to the change of actual reported earnings. They conclude that analysts take into 
consideration previous change in earnings to conduct their analysis, thus turn to be 
optimistic and overestimate the change in earnings.  
A further extended study is conducted by Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) covering 9 
European countries including United Kingdom. Over 500,000 individual forecasts were 
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observed from 1987 to 1994 in order to examine the error of analyst forecasts. Following 
the same methodology as Capstaff et. Al (1995), Capstaff et al (1995) results show that 
forecast accuracy differ among European countries, with Italy recording the highest mean 
error and Ireland the lowest. In their data analysis, they choose to study how the forecast 
error varies over the monthly horizons from -20 (20 months before fiscal year end) to +3 (3 
months after fiscal year end). By doing this, they assume that most of the companies will 
release their reports 3 months after their fiscal year end by the latest.  
2.2.6. Critical review, Rationale and Contributions of this Chapter:  
According to the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority in the UK which complies with the 
Transparency Directive requirements set by the European commission in December 2004), 
companies have 120 days (4 months) from the time they close their books to the time they 
release their annual report. A lot of companies may also have exceptions to publish their 
results even later (as is shown in our sample). Prior to this regulation, companies had more 
flexibility and time in publishing results. The criteria used by Capstaff et al. (2001), and 
Capstaff et al. (1995) to observe the monthly horizons doesn’t allow to cover the whole 
horizon, as it misses all the companies that publish their results later than 3 months of the 
announcement date.  Given that companies’ earnings release dates are different than the 
one another, fixing the announcement date to 3 months for all UK firms is inaccurate.  
Similar to Capstaff et al. (2001), Becker, Steliaros and Thomson (2004) provide a study 
regarding the analyst forecast error in European countries but for a more recent sample 
period (1993-2002). Their main objective was “to identify which (firm) characteristics, all 
else being equal, are associated with higher-than-average consensus earnings forecast 
error and bias. This information will benefit sell-side analysts by enabling them to identify 
which consensus estimates are more likely to be wrong. It will also help investment 
managers identify the companies that have a higher likelihood of being mispriced.” (p. 77, 
Becker et al., 2004). The analysis also included the horizon effect from 24 month before 
earnings announcement date to 1 month before. Consistent with Capstaff et al. (2001), UK 
companies had the lowest forecast errors (1% forecast error one month before earnings 
announcement date).  
Despite employing the announcement date as the end of the event window horizon, Becker 
et al. (2004) restrict their sample to firms that have a minimum market capitalisation of 
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$1Billion, a minimum 7 analyst followers per company where an analyst should be 
following the company for over 10 years, and furthermore, they limit the data to companies 
with December Fiscal year-end only. The final restriction is expected to exclude a large 
proportion of the listed companies (as shown later in table 2.3), thus the statistical 
population would not be fully representative since December fiscal year companies might 
have distinct characteristics from the rest of the companies. This chapter, however, utilises 
the full constituents of FTSE All Share regardless of their fiscal year end dates over a large 
period (1993 to 2013).   
Das et al. (1998) as well restrict their sample to companies with fiscal year ending in 
December only. However, unlike Becker et al (2004), their financial analysts’ observations 
cease at the Fiscal Year End rather than at the release date of the annual report which 
would vary substantially among firms5 (see table 2.3). This would affect the results since 
financial analysts continue to forecast companies’ earnings until the announcement date 
and not until the companies close their books. Hence, setting the last month of the horizon 
to the fiscal year-end would result in the period between the last forecast embedded and the 
published date being uneven across firms. This approach has two adverse effects on the 
consequent results. First, the information of the company’s earnings would continue to 
flow throughout the horizon until the publish date. On average, the fiscal year-end month 
for one firm would reflect more information about its earnings if its announcement date 
sooner than for a firm with a delayed announcement date. Thus, forecast analysts’ errors 
over the fiscal year-end-month are disparate and are not comparable. Second, forecast error 
is expected to decline as more information is released and hence, disregarding the period 
between the fiscal year-end and the announcement date will not reflect analysts’ continual 
revisions prior to the announcement date.  
Prior to these studies, the same criterion had been done by Easterwood and Nutt (1999) 
who top their observations at the date of fiscal-year end. However, it is important to note 
that Easterwood and Nutt (1999) start observing the analyst forecasts 4 months after last 
year’s fiscal year-end as such forecasts could be associated with the previous year’s 
earnings if they were not announced, and to ensure that analysts have had the previous 
realised earnings in hand to include it in their future forecasts.  What is more interesting is 
that different companies have different fiscal year end and also different announcement 
                                                 
5 Eams and Glover (2003) re-examined the work of Das et al. (1998) using a similar sample to study the 
association between earnings forecast errors and earnings predictability. 
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dates which could differ from the fixed four months period employed in their study. The 
same approach is also followed by Ackert and Athanassakos (2003) in their application of 
simultaneous equations model from 1981 to 1996.   
Larocque (2013) also use December fiscal year ending firms to relate forecast errors with 
cost of capital equity estimates. Similar to Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Larocque (2013) 
too ignore the first four months of each calendar year assuming that the previous annual 
report wouldn’t have been released yet.    
In the same manner, the limitation of taking only December fiscal year ending companies 
was pointed out by Ali et al. (1992). In their study, all companies in New York Stock 
Exchange are taken with at least three consecutive years of data for realised and forecasted 
earnings per share. Ali et al., (1992) state: “We do not limit our sample on the basis of 
listing status and/or December fiscal year-end month. Retaining OTC firms allows for the 
inclusion of smaller firms including firms with non-December fiscal year-ends produces a 
sample with a broader number of industries (Smith and Pourciau, 1988)”. However, 
similar to Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Ali et al (1992) stop observing the forecast errors at 
fiscal year-end rather than earnings announcement date. Additionally, they also skip the 
first four months after the fiscal year end.   
An equally critical issue is the treatment of outliers in the dataset of forecasts which has 
always been considered a very important part in testing the bias of analyst forecasts, as it 
could lead to irrelevant results if wasn’t treated correctly. Capstaff et al. (1995), 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Ali et al. (1992) and many other scholars shed the light on 
this issue by eliminating forecast error ratio is higher than 1. Despite the importance of this 
step to prevent the results from being driven by outliers, there is always a possibility that 
figures deleted could be genuine meaning real mistakes were made by analysts. Capstaff et 
al. (2001) treat the unusual figures carefully and eliminate the outliers at 4 different levels 
(100%, 200%, 300% and 400%).  
In addition, they compare the results after elimination with the original results without 
elimination.  
Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) study the bias of earnings forecasts in addition to its herding 
effect in the US, EU and Uk. Their paper covers in details 12 months’ horizons before the 
earnings announcement dates. Nonetheless, the authors study 302 UK companies from 
1987 to 2004. Those 302 fixed firms were always available in the UK stock market 
between 1987 and 2004. Nonetheless, having this fixed number of companies during 17 
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years damage the robustness of the study as it doesn’t take into account the survivorship 
effect. These companies are the biggest, strongest and most stable to survive all this period. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1990) had previously criticised this matter. 
For all that, this research will try to re-examine the UK analyst forecast rationality and 
bias, for FTSE all share companies from 1993 to 2013. The data will be better organised, 
giving insight information month by month before the earnings announcement date 
regardless of the Fiscal year End. The companies will be selected according to each year’s 
specific number of public companies at the time of the observation. This is considered as 
an important contribution to the literature as the companies were collected handily year by 
year from 1993 to 2013. Selecting all the companies year per year will include all types of 
companies (all sizes and industries…), therefore is expected to reflect the true image of 
forecast bias of FTSE all share companies together regardless how big are they or how 
long they survived. In spite of that, size and industries are taken into consideration 
afterward. The impact of horizons and time on the forecast accuracy will be uncovered. In 
the end, the rationality of the analyst forecasts will be investigated.      
Consequently, the following hypothesis questions could be drawn: 
Hypothesis 2.1. Financial analysts are inaccurate when forecasting the fiscal year-end 
earnings of FTSE all share companies 
Hypothesis 2.2. In case of any significant Error, financial analysts are irrational when 
making errors in forecasting companies’ performance.  
 
The aim of this research is to help investors make the best decision when considering the 
set of information available to them, one of which analysts’ forecasts. A big problem arises 
when analysts become biased to their own benefits. Sell side analysts might have the 
incentives to issue optimistic forecasts to motivate investors to buy the analysed stock. 
Another problem appears when the relationship between managers and analysts affects 
earnings forecasts. Additionally, the existence of these abnormal scenarios may harm the 








2.3. Sample Selection and Firms’ distribution  
The data are collected for FTSE all share constituents from January 1993 to December 
2013. The financial reporting standard 3 “FRS3” was introduced in the UK in June 1992, 
therefore observations in this research start from January 1993 in order to ensure that all 
companies have adopted the FRS3 into their reports. Regarding the information content of 
this new standard, Acker et al. (2002) explains that “UK companies are required to provide 
more details in the income statement, distinguishing between continuing, discontinued and 
acquired operations. The income statement must also identify gains and losses on the sale 
or termination of an operation, the costs of fundamental organisation or restructuring, and 
gains and losses on the disposal of fixed assets (…) Furthermore, the Earnings per share 
must now be calculated after taking account of all unusual items, extraordinary and 
exceptional, whereas under SSAP3 extraordinary items were omitted from EPS”. (Acker et 
al., 2002).   
Actual earnings per share (EPS), forecasted earnings per share and number of analyst 
forecasts all were collected from IBES database (Institutional Brokers Estimate System) 
available on Thomson Reuters. Consensus forecasts are monthly data and actual earnings 
are fiscal year-end reported earnings.  
Companies listed in FTSE all Share were collected individually, reflecting the true number 
of companies listed in each year of the sample period. This is important since number of 
listed companies will vary from year to year due to mergers, acquisitions, new entrants or 
companies leaving the index. 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of FTSE all share companies per year. With an average of 
746 firms per year, the highest number of companies listed in FTSE all share was in 1995 
with 903 companies, whereas the lowest was in 2013 with 603 listed companies. Around 
21% of those listed companies were excluded due to unavailability of data, leaving the 
sample with an average of 589 firms per year. The highest number of companies available 
for this study was in 1997 (727 companies) and the lowest was in 2013 with 438 available 
companies. Including all the companies in the analysis was essential to investigate the 





Table 2.1 Distribution of total number of firms listed in 
FTSE all share index, available firms for this study and 










1993 806 625 57751 
1994 862 667 60649 
1995 903 711 60408 
1996 902 718 61624 
1997 896 727 62878 
1998 896 726 62413 
1999 840 686 64349 
2000 814 656 53555 
2001 772 614 32635 
2002 726 588 35958 
2003 702 573 37133 
2004 702 574 42636 
2005 706 580 46279 
2006 685 551 42905 
2007 694 545 46458 
2008 674 524 49239 
2009 616 468 50324 
2010 623 470 54644 
2011 627 470 60169 
2012 622 456 60226 
2013 603 438 57508 
average 746 589 52,369 
total 15,671 12,367 1,099,741 
 
By doing this, the index itself is being under investigation regardless the individual 
constituents. Moreover, survivorship effect of big companies is being avoided. A total of 
12,367 firm-years that have 1,099,741 analyst forecasts over the 21 year sample period is 
analysed in this study. It’s well known that analysts keep on forecasting earnings until the 
earnings actual release date and not when companies close their accounts. Consequently, 
monthly earnings’ forecasts are studied in this research up until results are announced each 
year. In other words, earnings per share forecasts targeting the next fiscal year are observed 
monthly from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings announcement date.  
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However, forecasts collected are monthly average and earnings announcement date might 
fall in the middle of a month, meaning that the first month should be eliminated since it 
contains mixed data belonging to current and previous fiscal year. Companies with less 
than 3 analyst forecasts per month were also eliminated. Table 2.2 shows the distribution 
of firms and analyst forecasts calculated for each horizon over the period of study (from 11 
to 1 month prior to announcement date each year). A total of 12,814 firms per horizon 
during 20 years with over one million analyst forecasts were available for this study. It’s 
worth mentioning that although managing and organising such a big sample is always 
tricky and complicated, however, it is always considered as an advantage in favour of any 
panel data analysis.     
 
Table 2.2 Distribution of firms and analysts’ 
forecasts in monthly horizons during 20 









11 12,814 98,038 
10 12,814 98,995 
9 12,814 99,708 
8 12,814 99,959 
7 12,814 99,917 
6 12,814 100,309 
5 12,814 100,738 
4 12,814 100,328 
3 12,814 100,416 
2 12,814 100,522 
1 12,814 99,899 








In order to discover how long each company takes to release its financial figures, the “End 
of Fiscal year” and “Date of announcement of financial reports” are collected from 
Worldscope database using Datastream Thomson Reuters. According to the financial 
conduct authority in the UK (FCA) (2015), “An issuer must make public its annual 
financial report at the latest four months after the end of each financial year”. 
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of companies according to their fiscal year end, earnings 
release month and how long it takes them to release their reports. d Moreover, to comply 
with FCA rules most companies release their report within 3 months after the fiscal year 
end (87%). This still leaves us with 1,694 companies taking more than 3 months to release 
their reports. In contrast to studies that ignored the first few months (Ali et al (1992), 
Capstaff et al (2001), Capstaff et al. (1995), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and more), results 
in the UK show that not all companies announce their results to public within 4 months. 
While 3.1% of companies released within 1 month, it took 34% of them 2 months to 
announce their earnings. 
2.4. Data Analysis:  
2.4.1. Forecast Bias and Forecast error:  
Two measures of forecast error were used in this study: 
1. 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊|  
Forecast Bias: this is the traditional approach which is equal to the difference between 
Actual earnings per share and forecasted earnings per share divided by the absolute value 
of actual earnings per share. This first measure will help showing the sign of forecast error 
meaning in which direction the bias went. Where 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is forecast error made in horizon 
h for year t and firm I; 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is the EPS forecast in monthly horizon h for year ending t and 
firm I; 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is the actual EPS for firm i at year t; “h” is the monthly distance (11 to 1 





Table 2.3 Distribution of Firms according to the month in which their fiscal year ends, the month in which they 
release their annual report and the number of months they take until they release the annual report. 
Distribution of Firms according 
to their month of fiscal year 
end   
firms distribution according to 
their Earnings release month of 
the year    
Firms distribution 
according to number of 
months a company takes 
to announce its earnings 




















Jan 788 5.1%   Jan 326 2.2%   0 56 0.4% 
Feb 306 2.0%   Feb 1900 12.6%   1 471 3.1% 
Mar 2975 19.2%   Mar 4279 28.4%   2 5213 34.6% 
Apr 834 5.4%   Apr 1108 7.3%   3 7612 50.6% 
May 344 2.2%   May 1518 10.1%   4 1392 9.3% 
Jun 1061 6.9%   Jun 1846 12.2%   5 188 1.2% 
Jul 366 2.4%   Jul 832 5.5%   6 53 0.4% 
Aug 348 2.3%   Aug 249 1.7%   7 37 0.2% 
Sep 1322 8.5%   Sep 916 6.1%   8 11 0.1% 
Oct 363 2.3%   Oct 547 3.6%   9 5 0.0% 
Nov 187 1.2%   Nov 866 5.7%   10 6 0.0% 
Dec 6571 42.5%   Dec 689 4.6%   11 2 0.0% 




𝟐𝟐. | 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊| = �𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 − 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 � 
 
Forecast Error: The second measure is the total absolute value of EPS forecasts minus 
realised EPS over realised EPS. In this measure, the sign of the deviation is of no 
importance but will only help to see the magnitude of the error.  
Observations for which earnings per share is less than 5 pence were excluded because FE 
cannot be defined when EPS is 0, and small values of EPS can result in extreme values in 
FE thus influencing the result. Following Capstaff et al. (2001), data were trimmed in order 
to prevent outliers from deteriorating the result. Forecast errors higher than 400%, 300%, 
and 200% were eliminated once at a time. However, initial untrimmed figures were also 
included in the analysis to allow for comparison.  
Using equation 1 of forecast error, table 2.4 shows how the absolute value of Forecast error 
was changing across the months prior to earnings announcement. As expected, forecast 
accuracy improved as time approached the announcement date and this was demonstrated 
as error decreased from 22.1% to 16% from month 11 to 1 month respectively prior to 
earnings announcement date. The Trimming criteria of minimum 400%, 300% and 200% 
didn’t make a big difference when compared to the original figures suggesting there could 
be limited number of outliers in the dataset.  
The other measure of forecast bias is illustrated in Figure 2.1 to indicate the sign or 
direction of analyst forecast bias and to capture their behavioural intentions. It should be 
noted that figure 2.1 results are different than the ones in table 2.4 since figure 2.1 uses the 
normal forecast bias formula and not its absolute value. The graph shows a clear positive 
bias meaning that monthly mean forecast is greater than actual earnings. In theory, this 
difference could be explained by the optimistic behaviour of forecasters towards the firms 
they are targeting. Albeit this bias significantly shrinks as analysts approach the end of 







Table 2.4  Analyst Forecast Error 11 to 1 month prior to earnings announcement date, Trimmed at 400%, 300% and 200%.    | FEht| = �Fht−EtEt �. Where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑇𝑇  is forecast error made in horizon h for year t and firm I; 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡 is the EPS forecast in monthly 
horizon h for year ending t and firm I; 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the actual EPS for firm i at year t; “h” is the monthly distance (11 to 1 horizon) from 
which the forecast was made until earnings announcement date. 
 
Horizon 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
NO Trimming 22.1% 21.1 20.4 19.7 18.7 17.9 17.2 16.6 16.3 16.0 16.0 
Trimming 400% 21.7% 20.9 20.1 19.5 18.6 17.8 17.1 16.5 16.1 15.9 15.9 
Trimming 300% 21.0% 20.2 19.7 19.1 18.3 17.4 16.7 16.2 15.9 15.7 15.6 








2.4.2. Weighted Average yearly forecasts:  
Since forecasted earnings are sensitively affected by any new information, private or 
public, it is normal to deduce that analysts conducting a forecast at the end of the year have 
an advantage over the ones doing it at the beginning of the year since they have more 
information in hand. Therefore, it was unfair to treat all monthly forecasts equally. 
Instead of calculating the normal arithmetic average, weighted average of monthly 
earnings forecast is used depending on the distance of each month to the end of the fiscal 
year. Hence, a weight of 1 will be given to the first month of the year and 12 to the last 
month just before earnings are announced. Weighted averages as well as normal averages 
are used in regressions where yearly forecasts are needed.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Forecast Bias from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings release date.   FEhT = Fht−Et|Et| . Where FEihT is forecast error made in horizon h for year t and firm I; Fiht is 
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firm i at year t; “h” is the monthly distance (11 to 1 horizon) from which the forecast was 
made until earnings announcement date. 
2.4.3. How Significant Analysts’ forecast errors are? 
So far preliminary results were being discussed without being placed under statistical 
verification. In this section different statistical regressions will be used in order to check 
whether analysts’ forecast errors are significant or not.  De Bondt and Thaler (1990) 
studied the issue by regressing actual change in earnings per share over the change in 
forecasted earnings per share. This study follows De Bondt and Thaler (1990) to test how 
big and how significant yearly mean forecast errors are. Since individual effect was heavily 
present in the data, the use of fixed effect regression analysis was essential to take into 
account companies’ individual characteristics. The following regression will test the size 
and direction of analysts’ forecast error. Data were clustered by individual companies to 
take into account heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems.   
3. 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷 𝑭𝑭𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
 
𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 −  𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏  
 
𝑭𝑭𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 − 𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏   . 
Where ACit is the actual change in EPS from t-1 to t; FCiht, the forecast change, measures 
the deviation of the forecast in year t at horizon h from the previous earnings per share; αi 
is the mean forecast error; and β determines the sensitivity of analysts’ reaction to available 
information at the time of forecast. The regression estimates the analysts’ reaction per each 
horizon month h in the event window. However, when regressing yearly average or 
weighted yearly average, the horizon h is dropped out as FCit indicates annual forecast 
change instead. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) used cross sectional data in their analysis 
consisting of forecasts made in April of each year. They ran a regression for each year and 
presented a pooled sample. In this study, however, panel data is used including monthly 
forecasts and yearly earnings per share in order to check the horizon effect on forecast 
accuracy.   
64 
 
The null hypothesis could be drawn as for an excellent analyst with 100% forecast 
accuracy, α should to be 0 and β equal to 1. The interpretation of this regression could be 
made as follow: α will determine the size of forecast error and its sign will indicate the 
direction of bias. Thus If α is negative, analyst forecast is overall optimistic since earnings 
forecast is bigger than actual earnings. A positive α means analyst forecasts are 
pessimistic. 
A combined explanation of parameters β and α would give a clearer image. In case α is 
negative and β is less than 1, analyst forecasts are considered optimistic and overreacting 
to available information regarding actual earnings. Assuming α is negative and β being 
bigger than 1, this will mean analysts are still optimistic but with a sense of underreaction.    
Table 2.5 exhibits the results of the fixed effect regressions. Panel A reports the results for 
the whole sample and shows that analysts are optimistic when it comes to forecasting, 
however, not as extreme as the literature claims (DeBondt and Thaler (1990), Capstaff et 
al. (2001)). Throughout the whole period, α is statistically negative and it increases 
monotonically from    -14.7% in event month h-11 to -7.7% in event month h-1 indicating 
that the forecast error is reduced towards the earnings announcement date. On the other 
hand, β decreases from 1.008 to 0.897 monotonically over the same horizon. The results 
indicate that analysts were optimistic, however there seems to be no significant sign of 
over- or underreaction to available information since β is not substantially far from 1. All 
results were statistically significant at 1% confidence level. Panel B reports the results for 
the trimmed sample by removing outliers (deleting Forecast errors of more than 200%). 
The findings are similar to the whole sample.  
Despite consistency in the findings of this chapter with the literature regarding the 
optimism of forecasters, the results show some disparity in the magnitude of forecast bias 
among previous studies. For instance, Capstaff et al (1995) report a yearly average forecast 
error of 16% and last month’s error of 10% compared to 11.2% and 7.7% in this study, 
respectively. The difference could be due to the fact that this study employs precise 
earnings announcement dates as opposed to the fixed three months period following fiscal 
year end used by Capstaff et al (1995). Contrarily, Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) report very 
low forecast errors using a sample of only surviving public companies. This study 
however, doesn’t suffer from survivorship effect hence the forecast error appears to be 
higher since all available companies were included.  
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As suggested in section 2.4, the Transparency Directive requirements were changed in 
December 2004 asking “the issuers of securities traded on regulated markets within the 
EU to make their activities transparent, by regularly publishing certain information” (The 
transparency directive 2004/109/EC). 
The information to be published includes: 
• yearly and half-yearly financial reports 
• major changes in the holding of voting rights 
• ad hoc inside information which could affect the price of securities 
This information must be released in a manner that benefits all investors equally across 
Europe including the UK. Further analysis was applied to see if this change had impacted 
the way analysts perform in terms of forecasting earnings per share. Results of this 
analysis are added to appendix 8. Where the forecast errors remain statistically significant 
after the change, there appear a slight decrease in the values of these errors on monthly 
basis. However, this marginal decrease wasn’t a significant one.  
2.4.4. How Rational/Transparent financial analysts are?  
One sort of forecast irrationality is when analysts’ forecasts become biased and 
predictable. For example, if a forecaster’s analysis was easily predicted then one could 
conclude that analysts are following a certain trend and they are not transparent. 
In a perfect world, analysts should rely on a set of information analysed in a rational 
way and issued differently from time to time without following a specific trend. 
Nonetheless, previous findings suggested that forecast revisions could be predicted using 
the first forecast of the year. De Bont and Thaler (1990) raised two clear questions to test 
the issue of analyst rationality: “The first is whether forecast errors in EPS are 
systematically linked to forecasted changes. In particular, are the forecasts too extreme? 
Are most forecast revisions “up” or “down” if the analysts initially projected large declines 
or rises in EPS? Clearly, under rationality, neither forecast errors nor forecast revisions 
should ever be predictable from forecasted changes. The second question is whether the 




Table 2.5   Regression analysis of actual change on forecast change at different horizons. Regression analysis 
showing Analyst Forecast Bias from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings announcement date, including yearly average 
and yearly weighted average. Original regression results are shown in addition to results after deleting forecast 
errors which are greater than 200% (considered as outliers). 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷 𝑭𝑭𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊. Where ACit is the actual 
change in EPS from t-1 to t; FCiht, the forecast change, measures the deviation of the forecast in year t at 
horizon h from the previous earnings per share 
 



















  (t-statistics)   (t-statistics)   (t-statistics) 
11 1.008*** -0.147*** 6,452 0.934 1.033*** -0.120*** 6,366 0.955 98982 
  (38.51) (-17.50) 
 
  (40.84) (-16.24) 
 
    
10 1.006*** -0.141*** 6,475 0.941 1.029*** -0.117*** 6,398 0.961 99695 
  (40.30) (-17.54) 
 
  (42.36) (-16.25) 
 
    
9 0.993*** -0.139*** 6,502 0.946 1.014*** -0.114*** 6,427 0.965 99947 
  (42.91) (-18.81) 
 
  (41.76) (-16.10) 
 
    
8 0.992*** -0.132*** 6,496 0.950 1.013*** -0.107*** 6,424 0.969 99904 
  (46.14) (-19.60) 
 
  (45.69) (-16.89) 
 
    
7 0.987*** -0.130*** 6,494 0.949 1.009*** -0.106*** 6,427 0.969 100297 
  (42.35) (-17.89) 
 
  (47.80) (-17.68) 
 
    
6 0.963*** -0.117*** 6,521 0.936 1.001*** -0.0995*** 6,458 0.968 100725 
  (28.04) (-10.83) 
 
  (47.07) (-16.30) 
 
    
5 0.949*** -0.109*** 6,516 0.946 0.987*** -0.0940*** 6,455 0.978 100314 
  (24.14) (-8.997) 
 
  (94.16) (-31.62) 
 
    
4 0.939*** -0.101*** 6,507 0.948 0.975*** -0.0864*** 6,452 0.979 100401 
  (25.72) (-9.157) 
 
  (101.4) (-32.44) 
 
    
3 0.932*** -0.0946*** 6,499 0.952 0.965*** -0.0790*** 6,445 0.980 100505 
  (27.77) (-9.434) 
 
  (95.74) (-28.65) 
 
    
2 0.906*** -0.0849*** 6,462 0.950 0.941*** -0.0709*** 6,411 0.981 99883 
  (25.09) (-7.984) 
 
  (110.5) (-30.95) 
 
    
1 0.897*** -0.0779*** 6,435 0.949 0.934*** -0.0657*** 6,383 0.983 98946 
  (24.66) (-7.394)     (139.7) (-37.02)       
Average 0.958*** -0.112*** 6,482 0.944 0.997*** -0.0939*** 6,385 0.978 99963 
  (28.04) (-16.42) 
 
  (52.83) (-18.12) 
 
    
weighted 0.943*** -0.102*** 6,472 0.948 0.981*** -0.0833*** 6,389 0.980 99914 
average (24.14) (-15.33)     (69.55) (-22.71)       
t-stat in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Following DeBont and Thaler (1990), the regression could be written accordingly: 
 
𝟒𝟒.𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 𝑹𝑹𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡12 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 
 
Where Forecast Revision 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the difference between mean forecasts made at the last 
month before announcement date, and the first one after previous announcement was 
made. Forecast change 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the difference between mean forecasts 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 made in the 
first month just after the previous announcement for year t was made, and the last reported 
earnings per share 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1. It is good to note that De Bont and Thaler (1990) used the 
difference between December and April forecasts (8 months horizon revision). This study, 
however, covers all companies which have different fiscal years without exception. 
Rationality consists that β should be equal to 0. If β is negative this means that forecasts 
are going downwards after the first forecast. A positive β implies that forecasts are going 
upwards after the first forecast of the year.   
Results regarding regression 4 appear in Table 2.6 including total data, positive forecast 
change and negative forecast change. In general, after regressing revisions made at the end 
of the year with prior forecasts made at the beginning of the year, a negative effect of -
9.71% carried by the first month forecast change appears to be statistically significant at 
1% confidence level. However, this effect was not as strong as the coefficients shown in 
DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Capstaff et al. (1995). In comparison with DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990), the same monthly horizons were applied in this test to allow for comparison 
after they chose to use fiscal year end instead of announcement date as an ending point. 
Results of negative effect remained present but slightly lower by 0.8% and this is normal 
since the last 4 months before the announcement date were excluded by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990). Additionally, it was necessary to separate forecast changes by positive and 
negative in order to see how an optimistic or pessimistic the change in first forecast would 
affect following revisions. An optimistic change in forecast means that the first forecast 
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after the previous announcement was higher than the previous EPS, signalling positive 
expectations regarding company’s future earnings. A negative change in forecast would 
mean a lower earnings forecast than the previous year earnings (yet it doesn’t have to be 
losses). Regarding positive forecast changes, β was clearly negative and statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level. However, negative forecast changes had no significance 
in terms of affecting future revisions.  
 
 
Table 2.6   Regression analysis showing whether Analyst Forecast changes could predict the 
following forecast revisions. Two revision dates/horizons were used in this regression: revisions 
made the last month before the announcement date where previous forecast was made at the 
beginning just after the previous announcement date; and Debont and Thaler (1990) who used 
revisions made just before the end of fiscal year where previous forecasts were made 4 months 
after the end of previous fiscal year.[ 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 𝑹𝑹𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊] 
horizon 
   β                
(t-statistics) 






all         
forecast made by horizon 0 , prior forecast at 
horizon 11 prior to announcement date 




Debont and Thaler: revisions made at horizon 0, 
prior forecast at horizon 8 of FY end  
-0.105*** 0.0135 7,052 0.477 
(-9.556) (1.448)     
Positive Forecast Change         
revisions made by horizon 0, previous forecast at 
horizon 11 prior to announcement date 




Debont and Thaler: revisions made at horizon 0, 
prior forecast at horizon 8 of FY end 
-0.106*** 0.0311*** 5,635 0.485 
(-10.28) (2.735)     
Negative Forecast Change 
   
  
forecast made by horizon 0, previous forecast at 
horizon 11 prior to announcement date 




Debont and Thaler: revisions made at horizon 0, 
prior forecast at horizon 8 of FY end 
0.0950 -0.00783 1,417 0.005 




Nevertheless, the full story wouldn’t be complete without looking at the number of 
observations for each case. Unsurprisingly, positive forecast changes occupied 80% (5541 
out of 6956) of the total pooled observations and in only 20% of the cases forecasters 
predicted lower future earnings compared to previous earnings. With β being significantly 
negative, it is not just that analysts seem to be optimistic as confirmed in previous 
regressions, but they also tend to revise their forecasts downwards by around -9,71% from 
the beginning until the announcement date.  
An interesting factor in this result is that the forecast remains above the actual earnings 
released in the last month of forecast, even with a steady downward revision throughout 
the previous months. This result contradicts with previous studies suggesting that managers 
try to convince analysts to walk down their forecasts in order to generate a positive 
surprise by the end of the year. The theory of realised earnings meeting or beating the 
analysts’ forecasts cannot be confirmed in this chapter.      
All in all, it is possible to claim that the sign of analysts’ revisions could be predicted using 
their first forecast deviation from previous EPS. Consequently, the null hypothesis of 
rational analysts is rejected when forecast changes are positive compared to previous 
earnings which occurred in 80% of the cases for FTSE all share companies during 21 
years.   
2.4.5. Incorporating past earnings in financial forecasts:  
So far one form of irrationality of financial analysts has been discussed in this study and 
this is systematic bias in earnings’ forecasts. Nonetheless, another sort of irrationality was 
mentioned in the literature is when average forecasts systematically miss-react to the 
release of past year’s earnings. In other words, systematic underreaction or overreaction to 
past year’s earnings is considered as a mistreatment of information and therefore defined 
as irrational behaviour that could lead to serious trouble in financial markets. According to 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999), “if markets treat analysts’ forecasts as both rational and 
statistically optimal, then inefficient forecasts could have important implications for the 
efficiency of pricing in securities markets”.   
A formal test proposed by Abarbanell and Lehavy (1992) investigates whether forecast 




𝟓𝟓.𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 − 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷[𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 − 𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟐𝟐] + 𝝐𝝐𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
Where the dependent is the inverse of forecast error, 𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊, 𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 and 𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟐𝟐are the 
actual earnings per share  at time t , t-1 and t-2 respectively;  𝐅𝐅 𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 is the earnings forecast 
for year t and done at horizon h; 𝝐𝝐𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  is the disturbance term. If 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊is efficient enough, 𝜷𝜷 
will be equal to 0. In this case, no relationship between forecast errors and prior year 
change in earnings should be found. An overreaction of forecast will be reflected in a 
negative  𝜷𝜷 and underreaction means 𝜷𝜷 should be positive.  
Contrary to Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (1992), Table 2.7 
confirms that no relationship was found between forecast error and growth in prior year 
earnings as 𝜷𝜷 was almost 0 in all horizons and statistically non-significant in all quarters. 
Although forecasts were found to be generally optimistic as discovered earlier using 
regression 3, table 2.7 shows that such bias couldn’t be described as an overreaction to 
prior earnings change. This overreaction, however, could still be affected and explained by 
other source of information but not particularly by prior year earnings.  
 
Table 2.7  Regression analysis 5 of forecast error inverse at the first month just 
after the previous year earnings were announced and before the end of each 
quarter. In addition, yearly average and weighted yearly average forecast were 
also used as dependent factors.  𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 − 𝐅𝐅𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 = 𝛂𝛂𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃[𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢−𝟏𝟏 − 𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢−𝟐𝟐] + 𝛜𝛜𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 
TIME OF forecast β                (t-statistics) 








            
1 month after prior year 
announcement 0.000458 -0.159*** 5,698 0.000 853 
 (0.377) (-647.8)    before first quarter -0.000100 -0.152*** 5,704 0.000 854 
 (-0.0925) (-698.5)    before second quarter 0.000887 -0.128*** 5,719 0.000 855 
 (0.678) (-478.5)    before third quarter 0.000420 -0.101*** 5,714 0.000 856 
 (0.296) (-346.7)    before announcement 
date 0.000463 -0.0826*** 5,650 0.000 848 
 (0.310) (-257.4)    
Average 0.000647 -0.117*** 5,661 0.000 846 
  (0.530) (-443.2)     
weighted 0.000693 -0.106*** 5,658 0.000 846 
average (0.504) (-357.0)       
t-stat in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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2.4.6. Robustness check: re-estimating the forecast rationality 
using closing-year-end as the end date of forecasts and using 
December-year-end firms:   
To study the rationality of forecasts during a fiscal year it was necessary to take the full 
length of yearly window forecasts from the beginning of the year up until the earnings 
reporting date. However, to allow for comparison with previous studies and to further 
highlight the limitations in the literature, the forecast rationality is re-estimated in this 
section as a robustness check using two different sampling methods.  
The first one is by including the forecasts from the beginning of the year until the fiscal 
year end rather than the earnings announcement date. As highlighted in section 2.2.6, this 
method was adopted by many studies including Das et al. (1998), Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999) and Larocque (2013). The main limitation of this method is that it ignores the fact 
that analysts continue to forecast companies’ earnings until the earnings announcement 
date rather than the fiscal year end. Moreover, when taking the yearly average of consensus 
forecast error, their results would’ve overlooked the months of most accurate forecasts 
(usually the last few months before the earnings announcement date as shown in figure 
2.1).  
Table 2.8 shows the result after applying the same regression analysis as regression n.4, 
with the only difference being using fiscal year end as the last point for the forecast rather 
than the announcement date. Another limitation could be highlighted is that the literature 
often overlooks the first 3 months of the year, to allow the analysts to have learned about 
the previous reported earnings in order to implement them in their following forecasts. 
This can be seen in average2 where the average of all forecast change horizons are taken 
excluding the first 3 months of the fiscal year.  
Table 2.8 shows the same downward trend in the forecast error compared to the previous 
analysis results. This is expected since the forecasts used are the same in essence but with 
difference in the beginning and end of the windows, and forecasts usually get more 
accurate the closer they get to the announcement date or fiscal year end. The main 
difference between the original sample and this robustness sample is the overall accuracy. 
Ignoring the last few months before the announcement date increased the overall average 
of error from 11.2% to 12.8% as can be seen in average 1. Comparing these two numbers 
might show a small difference of 1.6%, however, this is logical since we’re dealing with 




Table 2.8   Regression analysis of actual change on forecast change at different horizons. 
Regression analysis showing Analyst Forecast Bias from 11 to 1 month prior to fiscal year end, 
including yearly average. 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷 𝑭𝑭𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊. Where ACit is the actual change in EPS 
from t-1 to t; FCiht, the forecast change, measures the deviation of the forecast in year t 
at horizon h from the previous earnings per share. Average1 is the average of all 
horizons of forecast change. Average 2 is the average of all horizons of forecast 
change excluding the first 3 months of the fiscal year.   
horizons per month 
   β                   α                n. 
observations R-squared   (t-statistics)   (t-statistics) 
11 1.009*** -0.146*** 6408 0.934 
  (38.74) (-17.61)   
10 1.006*** -0.140*** 6431 0.941 
  (40.52) (-17.64)   
9 0.993*** -0.137*** 6,457 0.947 
  (43.07) (-18.89)   
8 0.993*** -0.131*** 6,450 0.951 
  (46.36) (-19.66)   
7 0.988*** -0.128*** 6,442 0.950 
  (42.67) (-18.00)   
6 0.963*** -0.116*** 6,457 0.937 
  (28.27) (-10.88)   
5 0.950*** -0.118*** 6,416 0.947 
  (24.86) (-9.227)   
4 0.942*** -0.111*** 6,089 0.951 
  (27.23) (-9.691)   
3 0.962*** -0.1089*** 6121 0.983 
  (24.86) (-9.131)   
2 1.010*** -0.105*** 6231 0.923 
  (25.76) (-8.312)   
1 0.676*** -0.101*** 6009 0.914 
  (22.76) (-7.922)     
Average 1 0.968*** -0.128*** 6,408 0.949 
  (28.92) (-11.42)   
Average2 0.942*** -0.109*** 6,408 0.921 
  (28.43) (-11.14)     
t-stat in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
  
The main difference can be seen when comparing the forecast error in last month before 
fiscal year end and the last month before the announcement date. In the original data, the 
most accurate monthly forecast appeared in the last month with 7.7% optimism. The 
robustness sample of fiscal year end shows that the last month forecast error is 10.1%. All 
results were statistically significant at 1% confidence level.  
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Such limitations in the sample can have cumulative effects where previous studies built 
their analysis and results based on it. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) for example report that 
analysts tend to underreact to abnormally negative news and overreact to abnormally 
positive ones. However, based on the reasons highlighted above, the consensus forecast 
error in their study is most probably being overrated (see section 2.2.6) leading to higher 
overreaction in optimistic forecasts.  
The second robustness check is by including a sample of December fiscal year end firms 
only. In section 2.3 we reported that only 42.5% of the overall companies have their books 
closed in December (with the second most common month being March and the rest are 
scattered differently). Therefore, taking December fiscal year end only may not fully 
represent the index under investigation and might lead to sampling bias. Similarly to 
regression n.4, the same regression analysis was run but for a sample of firms with 
December fiscal year ending only and results are shown in table 2.9 below.  
Results in table 2.9 show that analysts tend to be more accurate when forecasting 
companies with December fiscal year end than the average of the overall index. Despite 
not having a statistical significance of the last few months before the announcement date, 
the size of the error decreases to as low as 1% compared to 7% when taking all companies 
into account.  
Having statistically insignificant averages might be due to the insignificance of the last 6 
months. However, the small economical values of forecast error across all horizons (when 
taking December fiscal year only), is quite similar to what the literature reported for the 
UK (see Becker et al (2004), Larocque (2013), Das et al. (1998), among others). The 
general feeling in these studies is that analysts can perform as a strong proxy for market 
returns based on UK companies’ performances through earnings per share. This could be 
misleading when taking into account the overall index.   
The values generated from such restricted samples, however, are believed to be resulting in 
seriously misleading conclusions that are referenced across the literature from behavioural 
finance (DeBondt and Thaler (1990)), to asset pricing (Larocque (2013), Hribar and 
McInnis (2012)). Larocque (2013)’s motivation was to use the adjusted forecast error as a 
proxy for market expectation of future return. Similarly,  Hribar and McInnis (2012) use 
forecast error as a proxy of future returns and find that it is positively significantly 
affecting stock returns and that the impact of sentiment index on cross-sectional returns has 
been overshadowed by the power of forecast optimism. Moreover, Capstaff et al (1995) 
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suggest that the possible reasons behind analysts’ inaccuracy are that analysts in some 
cases may not be motivated to maximise the accuracy, particularly when they have 
incentives to increase the volume of trade generated after their forecasts.  
 
 
Table 2.9   Regression analysis of actual change on forecast change at different horizons applied 
only on firms with December fiscal year end. Regression analysis showing Analyst Forecast Bias 
from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings announcement date, including yearly average and 
weighted yearly average. 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷 𝑭𝑭𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊. Where ACit is the actual change in EPS 
from t-1 to t; FCiht, the forecast change, measures the deviation of the forecast in year t 
at horizon h from the previous earnings per share.  
horizons per 
month 
   β                   α                
n. obs R-squared 
% of Dec 
Firms 
n. of 
firms   (t-statistics)   (t-statistics) 
11 0.683*** -0.0770*** 2,844 0.579 44% 422 
  (6.883) (-2.761)     
10 0.732*** -0.0789*** 2,859 0.630 44% 422 
  (8.019) (-2.966)     
9 0.739*** -0.0773*** 2,878 0.641 44% 423 
  (8.376) (-3.053)     
8 0.753*** -0.0758*** 2,879 0.649 44% 423 
  (8.882) (-3.165)     
7 0.744*** -0.0698** 2,884 0.639 44% 422 
  (9.088) (-2.276)     
6 0.647*** -0.0416 2,896 0.629 44% 421 
  (5.662) (-1.187)     
5 0.577*** -0.0223 2,893 0.649 44% 423 
  (5.938) (-0.766)     
4 0.578*** -0.0176 2,885 0.652 44% 422 
  (5.834) (-0.613)     
3 0.576*** -0.0127 2,884 0.669 44% 423 
  (6.153) (-0.480)     
2 0.533*** 0.000844 2,846 0.642 44% 421 
  (6.243) (0.0355)     
1 0.513*** 0.0119 2,836 0.611 44% 421 
  (6.035) (0.519)         
Average 0.585*** -0.0247 2,858 0.611 44% 424 
  (5.329) (-0.759)     
weighted 0.582*** -0.0180 2,853 0.636 44% 424 
average (5.59)   (-0.60)         
t-stat in 




The analysis and robustness estimations presented above show that every study has its own 
case and limitations. The main conclusion that could be drawn from this is that analysts’ 
forecast cannot be looked at neither being extremely and purposefully optimistic, nor as 
accurate as they could form a strong proxy of future market performance, at least not on 
their own.    
2.5. Conclusion: 
The effort put by financial analysts to provide investors with accurate earnings 
forecasts cannot be considered genuinely transparent all the time. Even though the amount 
of public and insider information available to them nowadays is massive and rapidly 
delivered, personal benefits could tempt any human being to publish biased results. Many 
shortcomings in data management have been found in the literature, however, this research 
controls for them in order to conduct a better forecast error analysis. One of these 
drawbacks is setting the fiscal year-end date as the ending of the forecast period although 
analysts keep forecasting until the announcement date. Another drawback is employing a 
sample of firms with December fiscal year ending only. Such decisions are believed to be 
misrepresenting the consensus of analysts’ forecast errors. 
Using 21 years of monthly forecast consensus data, three types of regression 
analysis were used in order to investigate the rationality of financial analysts towards UK 
listed companies. The first analysis relates forecast change to actual change in order to 
observe how accurate financial analysts are, and if not, in which direction they are biased. 
Consequently, the literature’s common point of “Analyst Optimism” was again found 
statistically significant in this chapter for UK analysts from 1993 until 2013. The second 
one tests whether forecast revisions could be predictable using the first forecast change. 
This will help proving whether analyst forecasts follow some specific trend all the time, 
which in turn would raise a big question mark regarding the transparency of analysts. 
Moreover, Forecasts’ revisions were found to be predictable using the first forecast 
deviation but coefficients were lower than what is found in De Bondt and Thaler (1990), 
Capstaff et al. (1995) and Capstaff et al. (2001). However, after separating negative and 
positive forecast change, positive forecast changes appear to be the dominating force in 
predicting forecast revisions. This result is coherent with forecast optimism which is 
already been proved, making the number of positive forecast change much bigger than the 
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negative ones (5541 to 1415). The last one examines if previous earnings change could 
lead to an overreaction of related future forecast. The findings couldn’t prove any 
relationship between forecast error and previous year earnings. This is inconsistent with 
results in Abarbanell and Lehavy (1992) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999) who found 
significant relationship between previous year earnings change and forecast errors. 
An up-to-date investigation carried out in this study provides a better understanding of the 
financial analysts’ forecasting nature, precision and rationality. The optimistic bias of 
analysts doesn’t seem to be fading away. However, inconsistent results cannot prove 
whether this imprecision in earnings forecasts can move analysts to the level of 
irrationality. Given the lack of a clear cut conclusion regarding this matter, a detailed 
investigation of the determinants of such error is needed, since analysts could also be the 
victims of external variables. Consequently, chapter two takes the debate even further by 




























































Financial analysts are believed to play a major role in driving financial markets. 
Any error or bias in financial analysts’ forecasts is likely to mislead investors who rely on 
these forecasts to make big investment decisions. Furthermore, managers are thought to be 
manipulating earnings in order to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and such manipulation 
would make it harder for analysts to accurately forecast earnings, resulting in higher 
Forecast Errors. While academics focused mainly on the incentives that push managers to 
manage earnings including analysts’ forecast, they missed the fact that this impact 
could’ve originally been reversed. This chapter investigates the relationship between 
Analysts’ Forecast Error and Earnings management based on abnormal accruals and real 
activities, by analysing FTSE all share companies in London Stock Exchange from 1993 to 
2013.  
Preliminary results show that earnings management positively affects the magnitude of the 
forecast error, that is, when earnings are manipulated the forecast error appears to be 
bigger. However, after controlling for a number of control variables such as number of 
analysts following, size, earnings uncertainty, trade volume and a set of performance 
variables, this positive impact appears to be driven by accruals earnings management and 
not by real earnings management. Due to a possible reversed causality between forecast 
error and earnings management, GMM estimation (Generalised Methods of Moments) is 
used in order to provide consistent estimators. Moreover, forecasts appear to be more 
optimistic for companies that manage their earnings downwards through accruals.  These 
findings reveal that analysts may not be as biased as the literature claim, instead, they 










One of the most important requirements to succeed nowadays is to be money driven. 
For some, it is the number one factor that drives our ability to be productive, since we live 
in capitalism. For others, authority could be as important as money or even more 
important, providing money plus the passion of ruling and leading. Nonetheless, more 
power means more responsibility and more pressure to deliver. A typical example of this 
description is what large companies’ managers face nowadays.  
In the present financial markets, companies’ managers are surrounded and monitored by 
investors, financial analysts, suppliers and even the media from everywhere in the world. 
Reasonably enough, their priority lies in optimising shareholders’ wealth along with their 
own position and income. To do so, they have to take advantage of every possible tool 
under their control. Earnings Management is one of the most popular tools in accounting 
management. Earnings management is the procedure of managing the discretionary 
variables affecting a company’s earnings in order to make it look better, stable, sustainable 
or high.  
There are two major categories of earnings management. accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management. On the one side, Accruals earnings 
management is the use of estimated discretionary accounts in order to boost or decrease 
earnings. According to Sloan (1996), earnings consists of two major components: cash 
flows and accruals. As amounts of cash flows are harder to alter, estimated accruals are 
more possible to manage in order to change the final figures. From the accruals standpoint, 
this could be done by recognising sales not yet delivered, changing the inventory methods, 
timing gains and losses and many more. On the other side, real earnings management is 
done through adjustment of real operational activities such as accelerating sales in the short 
term by offering lenient credit terms or surprise discounts; cutting research and 
development expenses; cutting advertisement expenditures; and overproduction to reach 
lower unit costs. 
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There exists a lot of incentives that stand behind earnings management. A lot of todays’ 
companies adopt a compensation plan for their managers which is directly related to the 
yearly performance. Therefore, financial bonuses and managerial compensations is 
believed to be a major reason for a manager to adopt earnings management (Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006)). In this case, a manager might use his authority to accumulate profits 
into one particular period using accruals management, which will give allow him to reach 
his bonus goal. Nowadays, the same incentive could also be exercised differently through 
options or insider trading. Managers would definitely prefer to trade their stocks during 
periods of high performance, thus they might seek earnings management to apply their 
strategy.   
Financial markets highly value earnings stability, which is another motive behind earnings 
management. In this case earnings management is used to smooth out earnings’ 
fluctuations throughout subsequent fiscal periods, in order to build up confidence about the 
company’s performance. For example, managers could decide to defer some of their 
current profits to cover up for anticipated losses resulting from a bad season. Even though 
they are able to use some accounting practices to change some figures, they have to be 
rational in doing so, meaning that they shouldn’t be extra aggressive and commit an 
accounting fraud.   
Apart from the incentives that push managers to make use of earnings management, 
applying such alteration wouldn’t pass without any implications. Assuming that these 
adjustments are done internally and behind the scenes, the most likely affected side would 
be investors, financial analysts and any market spectator following the underlined 
company.     
The general tendency in the literature observes analysts’ forecasts as overall optimistic 
(DeBondt and Thaler (1990), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Larockque (2013), among 
others) and this applies to different eras and to different financial markets. This finding is 
also consistent with this research as proved in Chapter 2 of this thesis that employs FTSE 
all share companies in London stock exchange. Although some of the previous studies 
raise questions about the rationality of financial analysts, it is still obscure as to what 
causes these forecasts to look optimistic in a systematic way. Therefore, one cannot simply 
judge analysts’ professionalism by only observing trends in their forecast error. Based on 
the literature and what was found in the previous chapter, this chapter addresses the 
reasons why analysts’ forecasts look very optimistic and in particular its relationship with 
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earnings management. To our knowledge, Earnings management has never been used as a 
causality variable to analysts’ forecast error. This chapter concentrates precisely on the 
implication of earnings management and other factors on financial analysts forecast. 
Financial analysts are considered a very important source of information that feed the 
market with daily analysis, reports and investment recommendation. These 
recommendations are then considered by investors before taking their decisions. Financial 
analysts’ forecasts and recommendations are based on the likelihood of performance of a 
company, which is estimated using forecasting techniques and fundamental analysis 
concerning the followed company. There is no doubt that unusual and unexpected 
alterations using earnings management techniques would make the life of analysts much 
harder when they attempt to forecast the company’s earnings. This will likely lead to a 
higher forecast error, which is the difference between analyst earnings forecasts and the 
reported earnings per share. Consequently, this research examines the causal effect of 
earnings management on forecast error using an empirical approach of earnings forecasts 
on FTSE all share companies in London Stock exchange between 1993 and 2013.  
Preliminary results show that earnings management positively affects the magnitude of the 
forecast error, that is, when earnings are manipulated the forecast error appears to be 
bigger. However, this result is independent of the sign of the forecast (optimistic or 
pessimistic). After controlling for a number of control variables such as number of analysts 
following, size, earnings uncertainty, trade volume and a set of performance variables, this 
positive impact appears to be driven by accruals earnings management and not by real 
earnings management. 
According to the literature, one of the main incentives of using earnings management is to 
boost their companies’ earnings and meet public expectations. In doing so, many studies 
suggest that managers try to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts (Burgstahler and 
Eams (2006), Caramanis and Lennox (2008)). There is a high probability that not meeting 
these expectations could result in a negative market surprises. Additionally, 
Roychowdhurry (2006) claims the reason managers choose to manage earnings is simply 
to avoid showing losses. Conceding that analysts’ forecasts are part of the market 
expectation which is one of the motives behind the use of earnings management, a possible 
reversed causality could appear between analyst forecasts and earnings management 
because of the way the forecast error is calculated by taking the difference between the 
forecast and the reported earnings. The main assumption behind this error is that analysts 
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don’t acquire any insider information and therefore concede a genuine error in the end. 
However, the opposite may not be true. If the earnings were to be manipulated by 
managers who already know the market expectations of their companies, and push their 
earnings towards the consensus forecasts before being reported, the overall error might 
look smaller than without their interference. If this occurs, the Forecast component of the 
Forecast error will have an impact on the reported earnings per share. Therefore, the 
analysis will be subject to a reversal causality since the earnings management proxies are 
assumed to be independent. In order to control for this problem, a precautionary measure is 
taken by employing System GMM model (Generalised Methods of Moments). The idea 
behind GMM is that it relies on lagged values being the best available internal instruments 
of the endogenous factors (in this case abnormal accruals and real earnings management) 
especially when external proxies are not available. Taking lagged values is very practical 
in the sense that they are highly representative of level variables, but independent of the 
level variables of earnings management (since a lagged variable cannot be affected by a 
future variable).     
After breaking down the forecasts into optimistic and pessimistic, results from the GMM 
regression shows that optimistic forecasts are positively affected by the negative use of 
earnings management (when earnings are managed downwards). This is due to the 
unexpected fall of earnings per share making forecasters look optimistic. Moreover, when 
earnings management is used to boost earnings, reported earnings look higher than usual, 
surpassing the forecasts and making analysts look pessimistic. Results proved to be robust 
even after applying a sensitivity analysis that took into consideration possible biased 
forecasts.  
Additionally, findings prove that forecast error is negatively associated with company’s 
performance. For example, forecast error appears to be higher when previous year’s 
performance is negative and when it is uncertain. This is consistent with Gu and Wu 
(2003) and Ciconne (2005) who suggests that loss firms are harder to predict. Contrary to 
the literature, number of followers are not found to be significantly related to forecast 
error6.  
While previous studies have mentioned the role of accruals in various aspects, abnormal 
accruals and real earnings management have never been used in the literature as 
                                                 
6 This was due to a present multicollinearity found between trading volume and number of followers. 
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determinant factors of analyst forecast error. This study contributes to the literature by 
examining how earnings management could lead to higher analysts’ forecast errors, the 
same analysts that the literature brands as irrational and extreme. Based on results from the 
empirical analysis, it is believed that forecasters were unable to anticipate changes in 
earnings based on accruals management which led to them looking more optimistic. The 
evidence provided on the relationship between analyst forecast error and earnings 
management stresses on the importance of following tighter accounting standards and audit 
control to enforce complete transparency on public companies.   
The remainder of this chapter comes as follow. The next section discusses the background 
and literature review, stating in the end the gaps that are going to be addressed along with 
the research hypothesis. The third section provides full information regarding the sample 
selected and the methodology applied. A discussion about the empirical results is provided 
in section five. The last section concludes.  
 
3.2. Background and Review of the Literature:  
3.2.1. Managers’ authority and incentives to manage earnings: 
The expansion of research in management accounting over the past two decades 
reflects the extent of reliance managers showed on accountants. When it matters the most, 
accountants can work their magic out to reshape the books to look in favour of their 
managers’ requests or simply deferring a loss recurring from a poor yearly performance. 
Despite being committed to the accounting standards, managers do not need a second 
invitation to try and find a gap from which they can manage their company’s earnings. 
However, one cannot claim that managers commit to earnings management without stating 
the motives to do so, which are many.  
So why and when do managers really need to manage earnings? To start with, financial 
temptation of bonuses is believed to be a major reason for managers to take advantage of 
the smallest details in accounting practices to manage earnings. These bonuses depend 
implicitly and explicitly on earnings reported under their control ((Healy (1985), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006)). Fox (1980) reports that 90% of the largest US 
companies apply earnings based bonus scheme. Based on this, Healy (1985) examines how 
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companies’ accounting procedures change when their bonus plans are modified. The 
author argues that the manager tracks what is happening to cash flow from operations and 
non-discretionary accruals throughout the fiscal year, and by the end of each year he would 
select an appropriate accounting procedure and discretionary accruals to maximize his 
expected utility from bonus awards.  Healy adds that such adjustments help managers to 
move earnings from one point in time to another, thus accumulating higher amount of 
profits to one period. Managerial compensation could be exercised using different 
methods: Bonus plans, performance plans, non-qualified stock options, insurance plans, 
stock appreciation rights.  
Second, another reason of earnings management is believed to be meeting public 
expectations, more precisely analysts’ forecasts. For example, regardless whether a 
company is making profit or even having a good earnings growth, the fact that it doesn’t 
meet the public expectations will put its managers under pressure and create a negative 
feeling in the financial market, thus negative impact on the  stocks price. This is all due to 
reputable financial analysts’ who release their reports ahead of the actual earnings report 
date, signalling what could be the performance of the company in the background. 
Forecasts in return will form a certain atmosphere that will affect the investors’ choices 
regarding a particular company. Therefore, a problem might arise when that company 
comes up with lower than expected results compared to what investors had in mind 
(affected by the cloud made out of forecasts). The difference between the reported earnings 
and forecasts is called either a positive or negative surprise. Consequently, managers will 
try their best to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and make a positive surprise to boost the 
stock price. In light of this issue, Burgstahler and Eams (2006) find that managers take 
accounting and operational actions to increase earnings or lower management forecasts in 
order to avoid negative earnings surprise. 
Third, the stability of reported earnings seems to play a major role in earnings 
management. DeAngelo et al. (1996) suggest that when a firm breaks the pattern of 
consistent earnings growth it might face an abnormal drop in stock prices by 14% on 
average. Consistently, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find strong evidence in favour of 
earnings management. Their result show that a change of small loss to small profit will 
lead to big gain in marginal benefits, with 33% to 40% of firms decrease exercise 
discretion to avoid reporting losses. Their test is based on two assumptions. The first is that 
managers prefer not to report a decrease in earnings to avoid the costs imposed on the firm 
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in transactions with stockholders. The second is the prospect theory which implies that the 
fear of reporting in red ink will push managers to manipulate earnings.  
Fourth, the accounting side of earnings management could also be used to send some 
hidden messages to investors regarding the economic performance of the company, such as 
understating earnings in order to give the company a bigger probability to grow financially 
in the future. If so, earnings management would be considered in favour of shareholders 
rather than an attempt to hide the company’s true performance. A, alternative description 
of earnings management was made by Ayra, Glover and Sunder (2003) who call the 
relationship between earnings management and financial statements as a casting 
photography between a model and a photographer. As the model poses and smiles to the 
camera, the photographer takes pictures while changing the camera angle and settings in 
reaction to the model. The same would be applicable to businesses where managers 
manage accruals to come up with better financial figures.   
Fifth, many studies have showed that managers overstate earnings during the year 
surrounding an IPO (Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998), Rangan 
(1998) and Shivakumar (2000)). Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) for example use 
Depreciation and Bad debt provisions to detect earnings management. They report that 
IPOs provide managers with many opportunities to take advantage of, mainly through 
earnings management. According to Teoh et al (1998), managers could manage their IPOs 
earnings upwards to attract more trade and boost the stock price. After analysing 1682 
firms IPO going public between 1980 and 1990, they find that IPO firms use more income-
increasing depreciation methods and provide less for uncollectible accounts receivable. 
Their findings are consistent with studies using abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. 
On November 22nd 2001, “The Economist” reports that many of Standard and Poor’s listed 
companies artificially boost their profits. They add: “operating profits for the S&P 500 
have been inflated by at least 10% a year over the past two decades, thanks to a mix of 
one-time write-offs and other accounting tricks. Such sleights of hand mean that American 
shares may be even dearer than they look”. One of S&P 500 best performers was General 
Electric with $10.7 billion in earnings in 2000 FY. It occupied the index’s biggest 
capitalisation after 100 consecutive increases in quarterly reported earnings until 2001. At 
that particular point, no one could deny the fact that General electric had such business 
diversity and market domination that led to such earnings growth. However, breaking the 
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record of increase in quarterly earnings needed more than just true reflection of business 
activities. It simply needed the magic of earnings management which is done by perfectly 
timing gains and losses to smooth out any fluctuation and avoid a fall.    
But how could managers pre-manage earnings? And to what extent are they able to do so? 
Two ways of earnings management could be employed: Accounting earnings management 
(Accruals-Based) or Operating activities (Real Earnings Management). While operating 
activities are hard to be captured as it depends specifically on the type of business and 
industry each company operates in, the literature focused more on accounting decisions 
that could be used by managers in order to manage earnings. Nevertheless, real earnings 
management has emerged in the last decade as a hot topic in accounting and finance fields.  
3.2.2. Accruals-based earnings management:  
It is by no accident that accruals management is a main factor in determining 
current earnings. Sloan (1996) finds evidence that current earnings persists into the 
company’s future performance, and this depends mainly on the cash flows and accrual 
components. Thus instead of relying on statistically motivated models in order to predict 
future earnings, Sloan (1996) proposed a new model using characteristics of the accounting 
process documented in the financial statement analysis, including accruals and cash flow 
as components of current earnings. According to Ayra et al. (2003), although accruals and 
cash flows are both components of the current earnings, however, they have different 
implications on future earnings. For example, if high future earnings are derived mainly 
from accruals, they are less likely to persist than if they were derived mainly from cash 
flows. Using 30 years of financial data for NYSE and AMEX firms, the authors state the 
following hypothesis: “The persistence of current earnings performance is decreasing in 
the magnitude of accrual component of earnings and increasing in the magnitude of the 
cash flow component of earnings” Sloan (1996, page 291). 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) extend the work of Sloan (1996) by 
focusing on the reliability of earnings persistence and report that less reliable accruals 
result in lower earnings persistence. They also point out that investors do not anticipate the 
reliability of accruals in their valuation of stocks, which leads to significant security 
mispricing. Fairfield, Whisenant and yohn (2003) find that future profitability and firm 
value depend on growth in net operating assets as well as current profitability. Therefore, 
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they argue that Sloan (1996) had overlooked the role of accruals as a component of growth 
in net operating assets. Consistently, as accruals and cash flows were considered 
components of current earnings, growth in net operating assets could also be disaggregated 
in two components: Accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets. After using 
Return on Assets (ROA) as a performance measure instead of net income variable, they 
prove that one-year-ahead ROA is negatively associated with both components: accruals 
and growth in long term net operating assets. Moreover, they find no difference in 
persistence between the two components contrary to what Sloan (1996) had proved. 
Regarding this, Fairfield et al. (2003) then record the following: “the lower persistence of 
accruals relative to cash flows from operations is more likely to result from the 
conservative bias in accounting principles or the lower rate of economic profits that result 
from diminishing marginal returns to new investment opportunities, or both. At the same 
time, the lower persistence of accruals is less likely to result from other features of 
accruals, such as their susceptibility to manipulation by management.” 
According to Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhouser (1999), within generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), managers have significant power in deciding the way some 
accounts are managed. Whenever possible, they could interfere in the following:  
• Choosing inventory methods (LIFO, FIFO, weighted average inventory cost…)   
• Allowance for bad debt 
• Expenses for Research and Development, Advertisement or maintenance. 
• Recognition of sales not yet delivered 
• Estimation of pension liabilities 
• Capitalisation of leases and market expenses 
• Delay in maintenance expenditures 
 
One of the managers’ most effective ways to manage earnings is deferring expenses or 
boosting revenues which could be done by lowering prices or timing gains and losses. For 
example, they could lend some of the big income of today to the future in case they expect 
a big disappointment in the near future. Even though they are able to use some accounting 
practices to change some figures, they have to be rational in doing so, meaning that they 
shouldn’t be extra aggressive and commit an accounting fraud.   
Despite not being officially standardised or agreed on, earnings management is widely 
used and well known among most practitioners and academics who, in fact, describe it 
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using different terminologies: “Income smoothing, Accounting hocus-pocus, Financial 
statement management, The numbers game, Aggressive accounting, Reengineering the 
income statement, Juggling the books, Creative accounting, Financial statement 
manipulation, Accounting magic, Borrowing income from the future, Banking income for 
the future, Financial shenanigans, Window dressing, Accounting alchemy…” 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) also discuss few reasons as to why managers could 
manage earnings. They denote that: “The opportunity to manage earnings arises in part 
because reported income includes cash flows as well as changes in firm value that are not 
reflected in current cash flows. While cash flows are relatively easy to measure, computing 
the change in firm value that is not reflected in current cash flows often involves a great 
deal of discretion. The accruals’ components of income capture the wedge between firms’ 
cash flows and reported income” (Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) p. 4). 
In order to estimate earnings management, Jones (1991) concentrates on how to 
estimate the abnormal accruals arising from managers’ accounting tricks in earnings 
management. Jones (1991) was able in this way to deduct abnormal accruals from total 
realised accruals, after defining what could be total normal accruals, Consistently, 
abnormal accruals will also be equal the difference between discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals.  Abnormal or manipulated accruals is also called unexpected 
accruals. The literature heavily relates unexpected accruals to earnings management due to 
the fine evidence found between management incentives and the use of accruals. 
In a working paper based on the cross sectional model of Jones (1991), Chen and Cheng 
(2002) investigate the causal relationship between abnormal accruals and abnormal stock 
returns. After decomposing abnormal accruals to opportunistic earnings management 
incentives and other incentives, they find that future abnormal returns are positively 
associated with abnormal accruals reported for performance. Similarly, Rangan (1998) 
investigate 712 IPO cases and report that stock market overvalues earnings of the related 
firms during the issuing year, then stock prices drop short after the announcement. Rangan 
(1998) conclude that issuing companies can stimulate their stock prices through earnings 
management. He backed his idea by arguing that: “the market appears to extrapolate 
earnings growth associated with discretionary accruals and hence overvalues issuing firms. 
Subsequent to the offerings, when the reversal of discretionary accruals causes earnings to 
decline, the market is surprised and corrects its valuation errors”. 
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Despite agreeing that accruals and net income are abnormally high prior to an IPO 
announcement, Shivakumar (2000) had an alternative explanation of the share price 
reaction following to the IPO year.  Shivakumar (2000) argues that investors appear to take 
into account earnings management prior to offering announcement, hence share price drops 
at the announcement as a result of correcting overstated earnings using earnings 
management and not because of the reversal of accruals management as Rangan (1998) 
had stated.   
Xie (2001) also examines the reaction of the financial market to abnormal accruals using 
Jones (1991) model. After analysing data of 7506 firms for a sample period from 1971 
until 1992, Xie (2001) find that markets severely overpriced abnormal accruals during the 
investigated sample. Moreover, results show that this overpricing is not exclusive to IPOs 
or seasoned equity offerings as stated by Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998). 
Consistently, Chi and Gupta (2009) provide evidence that stock overvaluation leads to 
higher discretionary accruals, but the latter is associated with negative abnormal future 
stock returns.  
The incentives and consequences of abnormal accruals are discussed by Iatridis and 
Kadorinis (2009), who investigate 239 companies listed in London Stock Exchange in the 
year of 2007. Based on Jones (1991) model, Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) show the 
following:  
• Companies that choose to voluntarily disclose accounting figures tend to use less 
earnings management.  A negative correlation between voluntarily accounting 
disclosures and operating cash flows “would be indicative of earnings management 
as firms would be inclined to increase accruals when operating cash flows are low” 
(Iatridis (2009, p. 169)).  
• Firms seeking to meet or exceed financial analysts’ forecast are more likely to use 
earnings management that is by displaying higher discretionary accruals.   
• Firms that issue debt and equity capital are more likely to have abnormal accruals.  
• The use of earnings management boosts manager’s compensation.  
In a similar manner, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) assess the relationship between 
earnings management and the value of CEO stocks and option holdings, known as insider 
ownership. Their result suggests that CEO’s whose wealth is more sensitive to the firm’s 
share price, lead their companies to higher earnings management. Moreover, “periods of 
high accruals coincide with unusually significant option exercises by CEOs and unloading 
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of shares by CEOs and other top executives”. Recently, Kraft, Lee and Lopatta (2014) 
investigate senior officers’ incentives in meeting managerial forecasts through earnings 
management, particularly accrual based earnings management before selling or buying 
their own shares. Similar to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Kraft et al. (2014) stress on 
the importance of insider ownership and private information and claim that managers 
stimulate earnings in order to meet voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates. Based on EPS 
management forecasts collected from First Call's Company Issued Guidance (CIG) 
database for the period 1996–2010, Kraft et. Al. (2014 ) examine the following two areas: 
The first is whether insiders trade their shares (mainly sell side) depending on their 
anticipation of future returns; The second is the role of accrual based earnings management 
in making reported earnings meet management earnings estimates. They discover that 
insiders sell shares in anticipation of future lower returns. Moreover, their results “indicate 
that only insiders who have the ability to affect financial reporting through earnings 
management can influence the probability of meeting management earnings forecasts 
before they sell stocks”(Kraft et al. (2014) p.120)). 
Another interesting point brought to light by Caramanis and Lennox (2008) as they link 
audit effort to earnings management for Greek companies between 1994 and 2002. While 
auditing hours is used as a proxy of audit efforts, abnormal accruals model based on Jones 
(1991) is used to estimate earnings management. They find that when there is less audit 
efforts, earnings management appear to be used intensively and vice versa. Moreover, the 
authors state that it is highly probable that companies manage earnings upwards to avoid 
falling in negative earnings.  
3.2.3. Real earnings management: 
Research surrounding real activities earnings management has been growing 
simultaneously as key component of earnings but the estimation of such activities appears 
to be hard. Academics and professionals referred to real earnings management as real 
adjustments made to operational activities in order to affect the final earnings figure. 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines “real activities manipulation as departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders 
into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of 
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operations. These departures do not necessarily contribute to firm value even though they 
enable managers to meet reporting goals”. 
As a matter of fact, real earnings management is considered earnings manipulation when 
extensive adjustments on real activities are made putting the company’s value under risk 
on the long run. Even though managers implicitly know about the cost of such adjustments, 
they prefer to carry on rather than relying solely on accruals management of earnings since 
accounting decisions are highly supervised by auditors and regulatory scrutiny. This 
preference is studied by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) who state that managers 
prefer to use operational activities to smooth earnings rather than accounting manipulation, 
even though short operational decisions might have a negative long term impact on the 
performance of the company. After surveying and interviewing more than 400 executives, 
Graham et al. (2005) find that managers opt to delay maintenance and advertising expenses 
or even give up a positive long term investment in order to meet the short term earnings 
expectations as they fear a negative stock market reaction. The authors back their argument 
by saying: “This tendency to substitute real economic actions in place of accounting 
discretion might be a consequence of the stigma attached to accounting fraud in the post-
Enron and post-Sarbanes–Oxley world”.  Similarly, Bushee (1998) investigates whether 
companies owned by institutions tend to reduce research and Development in order to 
boost earnings. On the one hand, their results show that only firms with extremely high 
institutional ownership could decrease R&D costs to boost earnings.  On the other hand, a 
normal proportion of institutional ownership might help monitoring managers to maintain 
a long term positive performance, therefore managers don’t reduce R&D expenses in 
favour of a short term result.  
In order to detect real earnings management, Roychowdhury (2006) believes that managers 
aim to avoid losses in order to manipulate earnings. Therefore, the author attempts to 
investigate abnormal levels of Cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses (sum of 
R&D, advertisement, selling, general and admin expenses) and production costs for firms 
close to the zero earnings benchmark. Roychowdhury suggests that these patterns will be 
caught if there was acceleration in timing of sales, increase in price discounts, reduction of 
discretionary expenditures, increase in production and low COGS reports. A sample of 
4252 companies led to prove the following:  
• Abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses are unusually low for zero 
earnings firms (5.91% lower than normal firms).  
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• Abnormal production costs of zero earnings firms are unusually larger by 4.97% 
than the rest of the sample.   
• Consistent with overproduction, suspect firms are found to have high inventory 
growth compared to other firms.   
 
 
On the 30th of July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act came to light in the US to ensure 
more accurate and transparent financial reports submitted by public companies in NYSE. 
One of the main act’s requirements (section 404) requires from companies to “state the 
responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control 
structure and procedures for financial reporting and contain an assessment, as of the end of 
the recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and 
procedures of the issuer for financial reporting” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, US public Law 
107-204). It also requires that companies must report how these internal controls were 
made by the board according to the standards set. Accordingly, Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2008) examine the evolution of earnings management before and after the SOX act 2002.  
Cohen et al (2008) assume that such SOX act may have had a significant impact on 
companies’ employment of earnings management specially the accounting side of it. After 
analysing 8,157 US listed companies, their results how that while accrual-based earnings 
management were high prior to SOX act, they decreased significantly after 2002. They 
also find that the intensive use of accruals management was consistent with insiders’ 
equity-based compensations. However, managers seem to have relied more on real 
earnings management instead of accrual-based ones after the implementation of SOX. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) study the use of accrual-based and real earnings management 
around seasoned equity offerings (SEO). In a study based on completed US offers from 
NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, their finding shows that the use real operational 
manipulations is the main reason behind the decline in post-SEO operating performance. 
Zang (2012) also delve into the trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings 
management. Zang argues that managers’ decision regarding this trade-off is based on the 
relative cost of each of the two. For example, managers would rely on accruals 
management when their company is not competitive enough in the industry, being in an 
unhealthy financial position or having high current tax expenses. According to the same 
author, managers adjust their accruals levels according to real earnings manipulation 
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realised. Nevertheless, with higher level of monitoring and limited accounting flexibility, 
managers intend to use real earnings management.  
Gunny (2010) claim that accruals-earnings management is costlier and less flexible to use 
thus managers might prefer real earnings management instead. This is because an 
excessive use of accruals management might face the risk of SEC scrutiny (Security and 
Exchange commission) and class action litigation. Moreover, accruals management is done 
after the fiscal year-end leaving managers in less flexible position and facing the restriction 
over which accounting treatments would be allowed by auditors at that time. Therefore, 
Gunny (2010) studies the relationship between real earnings management and future 
performance in the US from 1987 and 2003 by focusing on a sample in which earnings 
management incentives are high (excluding utility and financial industries). Results show 
that Real earnings management is positively associated with companies who just meet their 
earnings benchmark (maintained last years’ earnings) compared to firms who do not use 
earnings management and miss the benchmark by more than 1%.  
3.2.4.  Earnings forecast error:  
An extensive body of the literature investigates the information content of earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendation. A lot of these studies find evidence of inefficiency of 
stock markets after they discovered unusual stock returns following the release of analysts’ 
results. One of the reasons behind this inefficiency was attributed to financial analysts that 
appear to overestimate earnings and stimulate the market. This gap pushed towards more 
research studying forecast accuracy. For example, De Bondt and Thaler (1990) try to find 
an explanation why analysts forecasts are mostly optimistic and too extreme in NYSE 
companies between 1976 and 1984. In their analysis, they focus on two major market 
variables in the in order to explain why forecast errors were large: Market value to book 
value of equity (MV/BV), and earnings growth. However, none of the variables explains 
much of the forecast error. They conclude that behavioural bias is behind this error since 
analysts are decidedly human, and their results could be biased in some way or another.  
Das, Levine and Sivaramaknishnan (1998) find a strong relationship between earnings 
unpredictability and analysts’ forecast accuracy. In an empirical study using time series 
data from 1969 to 1987, the authors construct a score of unpredictability using past 
forecast error, then they apply this score to the main regression analysis formed on 239 
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firms for a period between 1989 and 1993. They also include the number of analysts 
following a company and the size of the company as they might have an effect on forecast 
error. The authors find no relationship between analysts forecast error, number of followers 
and size. However, they state that forecast error was larger for companies with higher 
unpredictability scores.  Similarly, Lim (2001) uses the variability of earnings over 8 
previous quarters in an attempt to explain the forecast error in the US. Despite having a 
significant positive relationship between earnings variability and forecast error, it isn’t as 
strong as the author expected. Beckers, Steliarcs and Thomson (2004) also study the 
relationship of uncertainty around companies’ earnings by adding the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts as a proxy of earnings unpredictability. Their results show that forecast 
optimism increases with higher analysts forecast dispersion and with higher stock returns 
volatility.  
In regards to how analysts perceive earnings news, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) identify 
three hypotheses regarding the reaction of an analyst: Analysts systematically underreact to 
earnings news; analysts systematically overreact to earnings news; and analysts are 
generally optimistic to new information. According to the researchers, identifying these 
hypotheses is very important “(…) because it might indicate whether analysts irrationally 
err in processing earnings-relevant information or whether their forecast errors are more 
consistent with their economic incentives”. While the first and the second hypotheses are 
independent of the type of information, they find statistical evidence that analysts 
underreact to negative information and overreact to positive information, with an overall 
optimistic interpretation of information. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) also find that after 
revising prior year forecasts, analysts tend to underreact to abnormally negative news and 
overreact to abnormally positive ones. Gu and Wu (2003) find evidence that “part of the 
observed analyst forecast bias could be a result of analysts’ efforts to improve forecast 
accuracy when the earnings distribution is skewed”. After regressing Skewness over the 
forecast bias, results show a significant relationship between earnings Skewness and 
earnings forecast bias at 1% confidence level. 
Ciconne (2005) suggests that previous year’s profit and loss might play a major role in the 
accuracy of forecasters. The author uses size, Book-to-Market ratio and Loss dummy 
dummy variables as explanatory variables of forecast errors. Results show that loss firms 
are more difficult to predict. Moreover, forecast error is bigger for firms that saw losses 
than the ones that achieved profit. However, forecast errors are decreasing over time and 
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analysts are not as optimistic as the literature states. In addition, Ciconne suggests that it is 
hard to believe that analysts release favourable forecasts in order to access private 
information, as in this case they are very likely to sacrifice their reputation of submitting 
unreliable reports (in accordance with managers’ preferences), which will slowly harm 
their reputation. The risk of future failure in this case is higher than the return from 
accessing private information according to the author.   
Lately, Baron, Biard and Liang (2013) focus on the timing of release of analyst forecast 
and its impact on trading volume. They find that pessimistic forecasts are issued later than 
other forecasts on average, which may explain why the last quarter of a fiscal year is less 
optimistic in terms of earnings forecast.  
3.2.5.  Relationship between managers and analyst forecasts:  
According to the literature, bias in earnings forecasts is not always genuine as it could be 
driven by the fact that analysts might shift their analysis to suit managers’ preferences in 
return of private information. Mest and Plummer (2003) for example suggest that 
companies’ managers play an important role in the biases of analysts forecast since 
optimistic forecasts can improve the chance for an analyst to access the management. 
Therefore, if management give less attention to the forecasted measures, analysts will turn 
to be more rational and accurate. Accordingly, they test this prediction by examining sales 
and earnings forecast and find that analysts’ forecasts are too high. This theory is 
consistent with findings of Das, Levine and Sivaramaknishnan (1998) who denote that 
those publishing low earnings forecasts have more access to management’s insider 
information thus analysts will demand private information for hardly predictable firms by 
issuing less aggressive forecasts.  
Lately, the relationship between managers and analysts and its impact on analysts’ 
forecasts have been covered in many studies (Ke and yu (2006), Libby et. Al (2007), 
Bernhardt and Campello (2007)). Libby, Hunton, Tan and Seybert (2007) state that not 
only analysts have an advantage in having good relationship with managers, managers may 
indirectly push analysts to release good reports regarding their company, as a trade off with 
accessing private information. Bernhardt and Campello (2007) note that firms might, on 
purpose, generate earnings that exceed the analyst forecast, in order to make a positive 
surprise and stimulate the stock prices, and this could be done via various accounting 
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methods. However, one could also think that a company might somehow convince analysts 
to issue lower earnings forecasts thus the earnings surprise will turn to be positive. 
Therefore, Bernard and Cambello focus on Quarterly data from Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (IBES), gathering data prior to the US Regulation Fair Disclosure from 
1989 to 1999.  They find that forecasts released late in the year have more impact on the 
investment decisions. Beside, firms for which the forecasts fall just before the 
announcement date earn far higher returns around the announcement period than those 
which have high earnings expectations, marking an impressive difference of 69%.  
A more direct approach was applied by Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) who 
investigate the relationship between managers and analysts’ forecasts via managerial 
incentives to sell stocks after earnings announcement. The authors main interest was to 
justify why analysts systematically revise their earnings forecasts downwards until just 
before the announcement day. According to their theory, managers use new equity issues 
in an attempt to sell stocks on behalf of the company or from their personal accounts using 
options. Therefore, as the time approaches the announcement date, managers use their 
relations with analysts to walk down their earnings forecasts to achieve a positive surprise 
in the end by beating the earnings targets. Richardson et al. (2004) use a sample of analyst 
forecasts from 1980s to 2001 from IBES database and insiders’ trades from open-market 
purchases and sales and option excercises from Thomson Financial’s compilation. 
Consistent with their hypothesis, they find that analysts forecast tend to be pessimistic just 
before the announcement day. More interestingly, this finding is “more common for 
companies that are about to issue new equity and whose insiders are net sellers of the 
firm’s stock in the quarter immediately following an earnings announcement” (Richardson 
et al. (2004, p.890)).  
3.3. Hypothesis Development and Research 
contribution:  
Based on the above documentation, managers are well documented to be managing 
earnings using abnormal accruals and real activities management due to many incentives. 
Applying such manipulation is managed internally, leaving no possibility for information 
leakage. As a result, there is no doubt that this unusual alteration would make the life of 
analysts much harder when they attempt to forecast the company’s earnings. As a matter of 
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fact, forecasters will become less accurate when earnings management is present, and this 
difficulty should be reflected in higher forecast error in general. While many studies have 
mentioned the role of accruals in various aspects, abnormal accruals and real earnings 
management have never been used in the literature as an explanatory factors of analyst 
forecast error. This study contributes to the literature by examining how earnings 
management could lead to higher analysts’ forecast errors, the same analysts that many 
studies brand as irrational and extreme.  
Notwithstanding, many would argue that managers do manage earnings in order to meet or 
beat the forecasts. In fact, this reason is comprehensively discussed in the literature as a 
major motive behind earnings management, and surely the existence of this theory should 
lead to lower forecast error. Consequently, this study takes into account this possibility and 
controls for it by separating optimistic forecasts from pessimistic ones. The main argument 
behind this separation is that when managers try to meet or beat the forecast, the forecast 
error will eventually be either zero or negative, since the reported earnings are equal or 
slightly higher than the forecast.  Under these circumstances, optimistic forecasts cannot be 
a result of managers trying to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Besides, earnings 
management is not only used to “meet or beat” earnings forecast, it could also be used to 
push for higher managerial compensations; for insider ownership and insider trading 
purposes; disclosing less information about the company’s performance; boosting returns 
on stocks surrounding an issuance and many more.     
As a starting point, the first hypothesis attempts to provide a broad picture of the 
relationship between forecast error and earnings management which comes as follow: 
Hypothesis 3.1: The use of earnings management will increase the earnings forecast error 
made by analysts.  
This first scenario is achieved by taking the absolute value of earnings management and 
the absolute value of forecast error. The reason of taking absolute values is to check how in 
general the use of earnings management, regardless positive or negative, could affect 
forecast error. A positive significant coefficient is expected to be seen from this 
relationship.  
However, the story wouldn’t have been completed by only taking the absolute values since 
a lot of behavioural aspects are involved in this association and if hidden, could 
misrepresent the true association under investigation. One of these aspects is the forecast 
optimism which occurs when the average forecast falls above the reported earnings per 
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share. Again, the separation of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts is crucial to control for 
accurate forecasts being a result of managers trying to meet or beat these forecasts.  
Consequently, the second hypothesis could be seen from the following: 
Hypothesis 3.2: Managing the earnings downwards will increase the optimism of 
earnings’ forecasts. 
As stated in the literature, there are many reasons to believe that earnings could also be 
managed downwards. Several incentives stand behind negative earnings management such 
as to “smooth earnings over a set of periods”, “banking profit for the future” or “taking a 
Big Bath” and many more. Earnings smoothing is done to strengthen the stability and 
earnings sustainability in firms. Banking profit for the future is to simply delay the 
announcement of a certain profit in order to accumulate larger amount for the future, which 
might lead to higher bonus rates for managers or simply to cover up anticipated bad 
periods. Taking a big bath is well known by practitioners when managers decide to take all 
the negatives in one go rather than splitting the negative earnings over many periods. From 
all the previous examples, the second hypothesis suggests that forecast error increases 
when earnings are managed downwards since the consensus forecast remains unchanged 
while earnings are being altered.  
Hypothesis 3.3: managing the earnings upwards should significantly lead to negative 
forecast errors (showing more pessimistic forecasts).  
The objective of the third hypothesis is to prove what was suggested in hypothesis 3.2. As 
earnings increase due to earnings management, the probability of having pessimistic 
forecasts will increase since forecasts are more likely to fall below the reported earnings 
per share. Therefore, the coefficient from testing hypothesis 3.3 is expected to be 
significantly statistically positive.   
Coming back to the main assumptions set at the beginning of this section, a problem would 
arise if for any reason insider information was leaked. A valid example in the literature is 
when managers try to put some influence on analysts in order to lower their earnings 
forecast by revising their forecasts downwards before the earnings announcement day, 
allowing managers in return to avoid negative surprises. Hypothesis 3.4 takes into account 
these biased forecasts: 
Hypothesis 3.4: After excluding biased forecasts, the use of positive earnings management 
will increase analyst forecast error. 
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The biased sample consists of those companies for which forecasts are systematically 
revised downwards by more than 20% in the last 6 months before the earnings 
announcement date. Since the excluded biased forecasts tend to become more accurate 
than the rest of the forecasts due to the nature of information leakage, using the net sample 
is expected to generate a higher impact of positive earnings management on forecast error.   
The main objective of drawing such a hypothesis comes at the back of a big debate 
regarding the use of earnings manipulation and its consequences on the stock market. This 
study will try to contribute to the literature by pointing out at another negative consequence 
of earnings manipulation which is the extremism of analyst forecasts. While many attribute 
extreme figures of forecast errors to the irrationality of earnings forecasts, in fact, earnings 
manipulation could be a main driver behind these extreme figures. By using quantitative 
analysis and Generalised Methods of Moments to control for possible endogeneity, results 
of such research and relative studies should push towards more transparency and 
rationality in the financial markets.      
 
3.4. Sample selection 
In order to observe the reasons behind earnings forecast error in the UK, all companies in 
London stock exchange are used as available every year from 1993 to 2013. It is important 
to start the sample from year 1993 which is one year after the introduction of the third 
financial reporting standard (FRS3) in the UK. Therefore, to ensure that all companies 
have adopted the FRS3 into their reports, January 1993 is considered as the starting point. 
Regarding the information content of this new standard, Acker, Horton and Tonks (2002) 
explains that “UK companies are now required to provide more details in the income 
statement, distinguishing between continuing, discontinued and acquired operations. The 
income statement must also identify gains and losses on the sale of termination of an 
operation, the costs of fundamental organisation or restructuring, and gains and losses on 
the disposal of fixed assets. Furthermore, the Earnings per share must now be calculated 
after taking account of all unusual items, extraordinary and exceptional, whereas under 
SSAP37  extraordinary items were omitted from EPS”. (Acker, Horton and Tonks (2002, p. 
196)).   
                                                 
7 SSAP 3 represents “Earnings Per share” in Acker et al. (2002).  
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Actual earnings per share (EPS), forecasted earnings per share and number of analyst 
forecasts are collected from IBES database (Institutional Brokers Estimate System) 
available on Datastream Thomson Reuters. Worldscope database is used to collect the rest 
of historical data. Yearly averages of monthly forecasts are calculated in order to calculate 
yearly forecast errors. Since analysts publishing their forecasts later in the financial year 
have more information in hand than others who published earlier, it is not fair to treat all 
months on a same basis. Therefore, weighted averages of monthly forecasts are also used 
depending on the time of forecast but results of both variables (weighted and normal 
averages) were very similar.   
Companies listed in FTSE all Share are collected individually, reflecting the true number 
of companies listed in each year of the sample period separately. This is essential since the 
number of listed companies will vary from year to year due to mergers, acquisitions, new 
entrants or companies leaving the index. Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of public 
companies in FTSE all share index and the ones which are available for this study 
throughout 20 years from 1993 till 2013. With an average of 746 firms per year, the 
highest number of companies listed in FTSE all share was in 1995 with 903 companies, 
whereas the lowest was in 2013 with 603 listed companies. The highest number of 
companies available for this study was for 1997 (727 companies) and the lowest was in 
2013 with 438 available companies. Having all companies from the index in the analysis is 
essential to capture the overall variation of forecast error in London stock exchange. By 
doing this, the index itself is being under investigation regardless of the individual 
constituents’ characteristics. Moreover, survivorship effect of big companies is being 
avoided. The sample included an impressive total sum of 1,099,741 analyst forecasts 
which followed 12,367 firms over 20 years. It’s known that analysts keep on forecasting 
earnings until the earnings actual release date and not when companies close their 
accounts. Consequently, monthly earnings’ forecasts are studied in this research up until 
results are announced each year. In other words, earnings per share forecasts targeting the 
next fiscal year end are observed monthly from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings 
announcement date. The first month is eliminated precautionary since it might contain 
mixed data belonging to current and previous year if fiscal year end date falls in the middle 
of the month. Besides, companies followed by less than 3 forecasters were eliminated due 





Table 3.1 Distribution of total number of firms listed in 
FTSE all share index, available firms for this study and 










1993 806 625 57751 
1994 862 667 60649 
1995 903 711 60408 
1996 902 718 61624 
1997 896 727 62878 
1998 896 726 62413 
1999 840 686 64349 
2000 814 656 53555 
2001 772 614 32635 
2002 726 588 35958 
2003 702 573 37133 
2004 702 574 42636 
2005 706 580 46279 
2006 685 551 42905 
2007 694 545 46458 
2008 674 524 49239 
2009 616 468 50324 
2010 623 470 54644 
2011 627 470 60169 
2012 622 456 60226 
2013 603 438 57508 
average 746 589 52,369 






3.5. Research Design 
For each firm month, analyst forecast error is defined as the difference between the 
monthly forecast and the yearly reported earnings per share, deflated by the reported 
earnings per share. This combination will produce a percentage of error made by 
forecasters when forecasting earnings per share.  
a. 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|  
b. 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 = ∑ 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  
Where FE is forecast error made in month h for year t , Fht is the EPS forecast in monthly 
horizon h for year ending t, Et is the actual EPS at year ending t. “h” is the monthly 
distance (11 to 1 horizon) from which the forecast was made until earnings announcement 
date. Equation b then shows how average yearly forecast error was calculated using 11 
monthly forecast errors.   
 
c. |𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊| = �𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 � 
d. |𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊| = ∑ |𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊|𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  
 
The absolute value of FE in equation c focuses solely on a how far the forecast was from 
the reported EPS regardless the sign of the substitution. The interpretation of the 
relationship between this ratio and the rest of the variables will be straight forward 
regardless of the nature of the forecasts (Optimistic or pessimistic).  
Other studies tend to use the stock price as a denominator (Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld 
(1992)). However, So (2013) states that “because to the extent that equity prices reflect 
earnings expectations created by analyst forecasts, the numerator and denominator of 
forecast error could move in tandem, which can potentially induce spurious cross-sectional 
variation (Ball, 2011; Cheong and Thomas,2011)”. Consequently, using price as a 
denominator was avoided in this study. Moreover, Observations for which earnings per 
share is less than 5 pence were excluded because FE cannot be defined when EPS is 0, and 
small values of EPS can result in extreme values in FE thus influencing the result.  
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Since forecasted earnings are sensitively affected by any new information, private or 
public, it is normal to deduce that analysts conducting a forecast at the end of the year have 
an advantage over the ones doing it at the beginning of the year since they have more 
information in hand. Therefore, it was unfair to treat all monthly forecasts equally.  
Instead of calculating the normal arithmetic average, weighted average of monthly 
earnings forecast is used depending on the distance of each month to the end of the fiscal 
year. Hence, a weight of 1 will be given to the first month of the year and 12 to the last 
month just before earnings are announced. Weighted averages as well as normal averages 
are used in regressions where yearly averages are used.  
3.5.1. Detecting Accruals based earnings management:  
Employed by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Caramanis and Lennox (2008) 
and Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009),Jones (1991) consider the following component as the 
non-discretionary accruals:  
e. 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
f. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
Where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is non-discretionary accruals, TACit is the total normal accruals for firm i at 
time t, β is the slope coefficient for i ε {1,2,3};   Asseti t−1 is the lagged assets of firm i at 
time t-1; ∆Revit is the change in revenue for firm i at time t, scaled by the lagged value of 
assets; PPEit is the plant, property and equipment for firm i at time t scaled by the lagged 
value of assets; εit is the stochastic error term. Consequently, any deviation from NDA is 
used as a proxy estimation of abnormal accruals. In this case it will be measured byεit. 
 
g. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1 − ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1 − ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1 + ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1 
 
Where TACit is total accruals for firm i at time t; ∆CurAit is change in current assets for 
firm i at time t; ∆CurLit is the change in current liabilities of firm i at time t; ∆Cashit is the 
change in cash holdings and short-term investments for firm i at time t; ∆Sdebtit is the 
change in short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt for firm i at time t; Depit is 
the depreciation and amortisation expense for firm i at time t; and Asseti t−1 is the lagged 
assets of firm i at time t-1. 
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However, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) suggest that Jones model is subject to 
earnings management miss-specification by assuming that revenues are nondiscretionary 
since it ignores the fact that earnings could be managed through discretionary revenues. 
Consequently, a modified version of Jones model was proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to 
account for this issue by taking away the change in receivables from the change in 
revenues.  
h. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2(∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
All else being as described above, ∆Recit is the change in receivables from year t-1 to year 
t for firm i.  
3.5.2. Detecting Real earnings management:  
As described by Roychowdhury (2006), most of the evidence in the literature on real 
earnings management discusses the adjustment of Research and Development expenditure 
to boost earnings per share as a short term solution. Nevertheless, real earnings 
management doesn’t solely rely on R&D expenditure and it can take many forms. Cutting 
advertising costs or providing time discounts to increase sales towards the end of the year 
are examples of other ways to manage earnings.  
Three main measures are adopted in this research to estimate real earnings management 
following Roychowdhurry (2006). However, it is important to discuss the main methods of 
real earnings management before showing the calculations:  
- Sales acceleration: in order to boost sales on a short term, managers might tend to 
offer limited time price discounts or more lenient credit terms. Both methods are 
used to stimulate customers in order to boost sales. Despite total earnings in the 
current period are expected to be higher, cash inflows are likely to drop due to price 
discounts and credit sales.  
- Cutting discretionary expenditures: discretionary expenditures here are mainly 
R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures and SG&A expenses (Selling, General 
and Administrative expenses). A surprise cut in these expenses will lead to an 
increase in current earnings. Roychowdhurry (2006) considers SG&A as it includes 
sometimes employee training, maintenance and travel expenses which are mostly 
estimated costs.  
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- Overproduction: in order to manage earnings upwards, managers can decide to 
decrease marginal costs by producing more units than necessary. As production 
increases, average fixed cost decreases. Consequently, as long as the reduction in 
fixed cost is not offset by an increase in variable costs, cost of goods sold will 
eventually be lower than the normal cases. Nevertheless, the company would be 
subject to high annual production and holding costs of the overproduced units. 
Therefore, the higher the amount of inventory from overproduction, the greater the 
increase in earnings but the lower is cash flow from operations.  
 
Consequent with the methods discussed above, the following regressions are drawn in 
order to estimate the abnormal level of each measure which in return will be taken as a 
proxy of real earnings management: 
 
i. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛼𝛼1 � 1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 � 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3 � ∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
j. 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛼𝛼1 � 1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 � 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3 � ∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1�  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
k. 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛼𝛼1 � 1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 � 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3 � ∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1�  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
Where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is cash flow from operation in period t for firm i;𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represents the 
production cost for firm i in period t (equal the sum of cost of goods sold and change in 
inventories); 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represents the discretionary expenditures in period t for firm I (equal 
the sum of R&D, Advertising and SG&A). The abnormal levels of CFO,PROD and DISC 
are computed as the difference between the actual values and the normal levels predicted 
from regressions i j and k.  
Given sales level, firms that manage earnings upwards are expected to report the 
following: 
- Unusually low cash flow from operations 
- Unusually high production cost  
- Unusually low discretionary expenses 
In order to observe the total impact of real earnings management RM1 and RM2 are 





l. 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 − 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 
m. 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀2 = −𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 
Where Aprod, Acfo and Adisc are abnormal levels of production cost, cash flow from 
operations and discretionary expenses respectively. Adisc and Acfo are in negative signs since 
the lower these metrics are the more likely real earnings management is used. The reason why 
all three metrics cannot be merged together is because Aprod and Acfo are reversely correlated 
as explained above.  
3.5.3. Comprehensive System GMM Panel regression:  
The model used in this research is System GMM (Generalised Method of Moment) introduced 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) as an extension of Arellano and Bond (1991). This model was 
chosen as the OLS equation is subject to endogeneity which System GMM mainly deals with. 
According to Wooldridge (2010), endogeneity can appear if any of the following exists:  
- Omitted variables: This problem arises when we want to control for one or more 
additional variables in the equation, but we cannot include them because of data 
unavailability or they are unobservable variables.  
- Measurement error in the dependent or independent variable: Most empirical studies in 
business research use proxies for unobservable or difficult to quantify variables, any 
discrepancy between the true variable and the proxy leads to measurement error.  
- Simultaneity (reversal causality): Simultaneity arises when at least one of the 
explanatory variables is determined simultaneously along with the dependent variable.  
The consequence of this problem will be a correlation between the error term and the 
endogenous explanatory variable, resulting in bias in the OLS estimator. In respect to this 
study, a possible relationship between financial analysts and companies’ managers is very 
likely to produce an endogeneity problem appearing in a shape of reversal causality. One 
example of this relationship is that managers might put pressure on forecasters to issue less 
optimistic forecasts in order to make it easier for the company to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. Another example is when analysts issue more favourable figures for managers in 
order to maintain their relationship and access private information. If this is true, an OLS 
(Ordinary Least Square) estimator will be biased. Since no pure instrument of earnings 
management was found, System GMM is employed relying on lagged variables as 
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instruments of earnings management metrics. The main argument behind the System GMM 
approach is that it relies on lagged values being the best available internal instruments of the 
endogenous factors (in this case abnormal accruals and real earnings management) especially 
when external proxies are not available. Taking lagged values is very practical in the sense 
that they are highly representative of level variables, but independent of the level variables of 
earnings management (since a lagged variable cannot be affected by a future variable). In this 
case the lagged values of independent variables are correlated with present values but not with 
the error term (as long as they are not serially correlated). Furthermore, System GMM mixes 
values in level and first differences to deal with the heterogeneity. Due to the existence of first 
order autocorrelation (Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests can be seen under each of the 
GMM tables 3.4,3.5,3.6 and 3.7), the lags that are used start from lag 2 and end lag 5. Ending 
lags at 5 is important to avoid the problem of over-identification of instruments (further tests 
also presented under the same tables).   
It is worth noting that 2SLS (two stage least square) regression is avoided in this research due 
to two shortcomings. First, according to Blundell and Bond (1998) 2SLS is efficient under 
homoscedasticity. Nevertheless, in case of heteroscedasticity and if first differences are used, 
the differenced error terms might become less independent. Second, the instrumental-variables 
estimators are inconsistent if N (number of observations) is large and T (number of years) is 
fixed. Despite using 20 years in this research seems to be large enough, however, the number 
of companies is much greater (589 yearly average). Additionally, since the panel is 
unbalanced, a lot of firms do not have data throughout all the years which minimises T in 
front of N.  
To test the main hypothesis, that earnings management increases the errors in earnings 
forecasts, the regression n.is estimated as follow:  
n. |𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡| = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽1|𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡| + 𝛽𝛽2|𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡| + 𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽11𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
Regression n uses absolute values of forecast error and earnings management variables in 
order to catch the general impact of the dependant over the independent. This regression is 
meant to test hypothesis 1. However, in order to test the rest of the hypotheses (from 
hypothesis 3.2 to 3.5) where behavioural information have a lot to explain, the signs of FE, 




o. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽11𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
Where FE is forecast error as computed in equation a, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is abnormal accruals estimated 
using regression f and  𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the estimated real earnings management variables RM1 and 
RM2 (used separately in different regressions) for company i in year t. This main 
regression also includes a number of control variables proposed in the literature and proved 
to be significantly related to forecast error. 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the natural logarithm of number of 
followers forecasting a company i in year t (Used by Das et al. (1998), Ciconne (2005), 
Cohen and Zarwin (2010)). This variable is expected to be positively related to forecast 
error as the greater the number of analysts the higher the competition is among forecasters. 
This is likely to lead to more speculative figures such as optimistic earnings forecasts.   
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a proxy of Firm size and is computed as the natural logarithm of yearly trade 
volume. The explanatory power of this variable is to capture analysts’ incentive to generate 
trading commissions based on trading volumes (Hayes, 1998) Due to multicollinearity 
issues between market capitalisation and number of followers, trade volume is used to 
offset the relationship between forecast error and firm size (Hayes (1998)). Since the 
smaller the firm the less information is accessible about it, it will be harder for an analyst to 
forecast smaller firms. If this is true, trade volume is expected to be negatively related to 
forecast error.  
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡represents the uncertainty of company’s performance calculated as the standard 
deviation of 12 months earnings forecasts (Gu and Wu (2003)). When company’s earnings 
are less stable, it will become harder for analysts to accurately predict the performance thus 
forecast error is expected to increase.  Das et al. (1998) argue that when earnings are less 
predictable, it represents a stronger incentive for analysts to issue optimistic forecasts to 
facilitate information acquisition from management.  
Companies’ lagged performance variables were also proved to be related to the accuracy of 
forecasts. Henderson and Marks (2013) highlight the importance of considering 
performance variables and state the following: “The underlying idea is that observation of 
the net profit margin implied by analyst forecasts provides a reference point from which 
earnings and revenue forecasts can be judged to be extreme and thus inaccurate” 
(Henderson and Marks (2013, p.8)). Ciconne (2005) considers lagged profit margin as an 
explanatory variable of forecast error based on the argument that it is harder to predict a 
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future performance of a company that is losing. They report that profitable companies have 
smaller forecast error than losjng companies. Another way of measuring performance is 
through the past year earnings change rather than levelled profit margin. Coen et al. (2009) 
report that analysts forecast performance is much weaker for firms’ that saw a decrease in 
earnings than those that saw an increase in earnings. Consistent with the literature, a 
variety of performance variables were included in this regression. 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 is a 
dummy variable of last year company’s earnings variation, having a value of 1 if earnings 
per share increased between t-2 and t-1 and 0 otherwise (Ciconne (2005)). 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 is 
another dummy of performance taking 1 if the company’s EPS was positive and 0 
otherwise (Ciconne (2005)). Additionally, other performance variables were included such 
as 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 which is the lag of book to market value of company i in year t (So (2013)), 
𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 which is a dummy of whether the company paid dividends last period or not (So 
(2013)) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 which represents the asset growth between period t-2 and t-1 for firm i. 
According to McNichols and O’Brian (1997), firms with good future prospectus are less 
subject to selection bias-induced optimism. To proxy for this bias, the analysis use 
𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 which is the difference between the company’s return on equity and the 
median of industry’s return on equity (Gu and Wu (2003)). All coefficients of performance 
variables are expected to have a negative sign due to the optimistic behaviour of forecasters 
following a good performance.  
A descriptive statistics of the metrics calculated above and the rest of the variables used in 
the main regression are shown in table 3.2 below. The average of FE appears to be high 
with 31.3%, possibly because it’s in absolute value. All proxies of earnings management 
are standardised by total assets. From one side, AA reports a mean of -1.2% suggesting that 
managers on average tend to manage earnings downwards using accruals. On the other 
side, Table 3.2 above shows positive averages of Adisc and Acfo (14.7% and 6% 
respectively) meaning that earnings are managed downwards consistent with the use of 
Abnormal Accruals. Only the average level of production costs had an opposite 
interpretation with a mean of 79.6%, suggesting that earnings are managed upwards using 
abnormally high production costs. This preliminary result (3 out of 4 metrics) doesn’t 
mainly support the assumption that managers use earnings management in order to boost 
their companies’ earnings except when it comes to the use of abnormal production cost. 
However, more detailed empirical analysis will follow to show the relationship between 
forecast error and each of the earnings management metrics.        
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of all variables. 
Variable 
name 
Definition N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FE forecast error  10,201 0.313 0.380 0.00 1.357 
AA Abnormal accruals 7,572 -0.012 0.088 -0.30 0.277 
ACFO Abnormal CFO 8,883 0.060 0.096 -0.249 0.374 
Aprod Abnormal production 
Cost 




7,247 0.147 0.253 -2.653 3.551 
BTM book to market value  11,509 0.587 0.481 0.009 2.703 
N n. of followers 11,395 8.493 6.311 3 37.750 
TV Trade volume 10,772 663,551 2,912,460 
10,000 99,000,000 
AG Asset Growth 9,485 0.115 0.295 0 1.703885 
Uncertain
ty 
Standard Dev of 12 
month Forecasts prior 
to the announcement 
date 
10,434 0.019 0.205 0 11.50155 
ROE-
excess 
ROE minus median 
industry ROE 
10,667 0.009 0.317 -1.5225 1.73625 
Earnings
D 
Last year earnings 
increase dummy 
8,495 0.74 0.439 0 1 
ProfitD Last year profit dummy 11,084 0.886 0.317 0 1 
DivD Last year Dividend 
dummy 
11,075 0.894 0.308 0 1 
sizecatego
ry 
1 for small companies, 
2 for medium 
companies and 3 for 
big companies 
11,770 2.013 0.712 1 3 
SMALL Dummy variable when 
market cap of a 
company in the lowest 
tercile distribution of 
market cap 
2,906 24.6% 0.431 0 1 
MED Dummy when market 
cap falls between 25th 
and 75th percentile of 
the market cap 
distribution 
5,801 49.3% 0.500 0 1 
BIG Dummy variable when 
market cap falls in the 
highest tercile of 
market distribution 
3,063 26.1% 0.439 0 1 
111 
 
Table 3.3 Pearson’s Correlation analysis between all variables 
Variables FE Aaccruals Acfo Aprod Adisc N TV Uncert         BTM excessroe AG earningsD profitD divD 
 FE                             
Aaccruals 0.057*** 1                         
Acfo -0.069*** -0.038* 1                       
Aprod -0.064*** -0.019 0.981*** 1                     
Adisc -0.026* 0.138*** 0.490*** 0.570*** 1                   
N -0.028* -0.146** 0.103*** 0.056*** -0.333*** 1                 
TV 0.076** -0.074** -0.010 -0.051*** -0.362*** 0.589*** 1               
UNCER 0.098*** 0.064** -0.018 -0.009 0.008 
-
0.051*** -0.005 1             
BTM 0.060** -0.069** -0.266** -0.293*** -0.313* 
-
0.097*** -0.010 0.008 1           
excessroe -0.156*** -0.058** 0.194*** 0.207*** 0.033*** 0.129*** 0.060*** -0.123*** -0.295*** 1         
AG 0.002 0.040* -0.008 0.043*** -0.068*** -0.004 
-
0.030*** 0.011 -0.102*** 0.056*** 1       




0.098*** -0.013 -0.137*** 0.110*** 0.110** 1     
profitD -0.121** -0.128* 0.142** 0.166*** -0.026*** 0.106*** 
-
0.034*** -0.069* -0.125*** 0.233*** 0.167** 0.328*** 1   
divD -0.189*** -0.182* 0.176** 0.179*** -0.063*** 0.176*** 0.014** -0.126* -0.077* 0.319*** 0.027* 0.049*** 0.343*** 1 
***Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level                   
 112 
 
In order to catch the size effect on forecast error, companies are divided into three size 
categories using market capitalisation. Small companies are the ones with market cap 
belonging to the lowest tercile distribution of the total market cap. Medium size is when 
the market cap of companies falls between the 25th and 75th percentile in the market cap 
distribution. Big size companies are those that have a market cap within the highest 
quartile of the market cap distribution.  The Pearson’s correlation coefficients between all 
variables could be seen in table 3.3 (above). Forecast error is significantly positively 
correlated with abnormal accruals suggesting that an abnormal increase in accruals would 
lead to larger forecast error. Moreover, forecast error is negatively correlated with Acfo 
and Adisc and supporting the assumption that managers might cut discretionary expenses 
to boost earnings. However, the correlation coefficient between Acfo and Aprod is 0.98 
and significant at 1% confidence level. This result is inconsistent with the theory since a 
higher level of production cost is expected to lead to lower levels of cash flow from 
operations as explained earlier. As expected, a strong positive correlation was found 
between TV and N since more traded companies are likely to be followed by more 
analysts. Furthermore, all performance variables (ExcessROE, EarningsD, ProfitD and 
DivD) had a negative significant correlation with forecast error except for AG. This result 
indicates that when a company performs well during a certain year, analysts appear to be 
more accurate when forecasting its earnings the following year. 
3.6. Empirical results: 
3.6.1. Testing hypothesis 3.1: 
As stated earlier, equation n is used to test hypothesis 1 that the use earnings 
management in any form will increase the absolute value in earnings forecast error. Results 
from regression n can be seen in table 3.4. Fixed effect and System GMM estimators are 
compared in this table. Regression 1 and 2 use AA as a sole proxy of earnings 
management. As expected, abnormal accruals is positively affecting analyst forecast error 
with a coefficient 0.203 significant at 5% confidence level. Fixed effect coefficient still 
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shows a positive relationship but lower coefficient of 0.12 also significant at 5%. The 
difference in the coefficients of fixed effect and System GMM is due to the possible 
endogeneity present in this analysis. Roodman (2012) also finds that fixed effect estimators 
are biased downwards in the presence of endogeneity. In addition to AA, RM1 is added in 
regressions 3 and 4 to represent real earnings management. While the positive impact of 
AA seems to be persistent, no significant relationship between RM1 and FE was found. 
This result suggests that forecasters are not affected by earnings management done through 
real activities. In other words, analysts appear to anticipate real activities applied during 
the fiscal year from overproduction or cutting discretionary expenses. In regression 5 and 6 
RM1 is replaced by RM2 to see whether an abnormal change in cash flow from operations 
and discretionary expenses could have any impact on forecast errors. Similar to Rm1, no 
significant relationship was found between RM2 and FE. The fact that real earnings 
management doesn’t seem to be affecting forecast error could be due to the timing at 
which real activities are done. The decisions taken by managers to manage earnings using 
real activities are usually done throughout the fiscal year allowing analysts to analyse and 
anticipate these adjustments. While real earnings management shift the reported earnings at 
the end of the year, earnings forecasts have already been changed in the same direction as 
the real earnings following the adjustments. As a result, forecast error would become 
smaller and hypothesis 1 would be insignificant. Contrarily, earnings management based 
on accruals is usually done by the end of the fiscal year specifically after closing the books. 
Since this type of adjustments is based on management accounting, managers are careful 
not to be very aggressive thus they wait until the end to know which estimated accounts 
they are able to tweak and by how much. This will leave less room for analysts to 
anticipate such adjustments and forecast error will become larger8. Table 3.4 below also 
presents Arellano and Bond’s test of autocorrelation (at order 1 and 2). As explained in 
section 3.5.3, the lags instruments used start from lag 2 based on the existence of 
autocorrelation at first order AR(1). Moreover, they are capped at lag 5 to avoid the 
problem of over-identification which is very common when using many instruments in 
GMM.  
                                                 
8 Further analysis was applied to check whether the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (2002) in the US 
had any impact on the results in the UK market, but no significant difference was found. A possible 
explanation this is that many British companies appear to be listed through ADRs in the US market. Hostak 
and Lis (2013) report how firms holding ADRs avoided the costs implied by the SOX act.     
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Table 3.4 Regression analysis of FE forecast error and earnings management AA, RM1 and RM2. 
|𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑇𝑇| = 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡−𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡|𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡|  F is the monthly consensus forecasts, E is the realised earnings per share, AA is 
abnormal accruals, RM1 and RM2 are  the first and second proxies of real earnings management 
respectively.   



















Coef                 
(std Error) 
Coef                 
(std Error) 
Coef               
(std Error) 
Coef                          
(std Error) 
Coef                  
(std Error) 
Coef                   
(std Error) 
| AA | 0.120** 0.203** 0.175** 0.199* 0.116 0.125 
  (0.0540) (0.0970) (0.0755) (0.109) (0.0788) (0.114) 
|RM1|     -0.00437 -0.0256     
      (0.0171) (0.0229)     
|RM2|   
 
    0.105 0.123 
    
 
    (0.0832) (0.0869) 
N -0.000361 -0.0136 -0.000526 -0.0287 -0.000432 -0.0276 
  (0.00115) (0.0162) (0.00116) (0.0239) (0.00116) (0.0239) 
TV 0.0218*** 0.0237*** 0.0223*** 0.0289*** 0.0219*** 0.0279*** 
  (0.00665) (0.00801) (0.00670) (0.0106) (0.00669) (0.0107) 
Uncertainty 0.113*** 0.140*** 0.113*** 0.139*** 0.113*** 0.141*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0344) (0.0188) (0.0339) (0.0188) (0.0351) 
BTM 0.0650*** 0.0547*** 0.0657*** 0.0458** 0.0650*** 0.0477** 
  (0.0127) (0.0177) (0.0128) (0.0192) (0.0128) (0.0191) 
excessroe -0.0460*** -0.0392*** -0.041*** -0.0351*** -0.0460*** -0.037*** 
  (0.00767) (0.0109) (0.00773) (0.0113) (0.00774) (0.0114) 
AG 0.0374*** -0.00240 0.0310** -0.00663 0.0358*** -0.00700 
  (0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0121) (0.0167) (0.0119) (0.0167) 
EarningsD 0.00138 -0.00613 0.000173 -0.00548 0.00118 -0.00672 
  (0.00684) (0.00690) (0.00686) (0.00689) (0.00685) (0.00688) 
profitD -0.0393*** -0.0338** -0.041*** -0.0369** -0.0400*** -0.0396** 
  (0.0123) (0.0165) (0.0124) (0.0172) (0.0123) (0.0169) 
divD -0.0278 -0.106*** -0.0299 -0.0951*** -0.0287 -0.099*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0282) (0.0189) (0.0278) (0.0189) (0.0280) 
Observations 5,190 5,592 5,190 5,548 5,191 5,549 
R-squared 0.071  0.071  0.070  
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) 
 0.002  0.000  0.000 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) 




 0.136  0.136  0.110 
Sargan-Hansen 
Exogeneity test 
 0.696 (AA)  0.665 (for AA) 
0.270 (for RM1) 
 0.706(AA)- 
0.173(RM2) 





Consequently, Hansen’s over-identification test is presented in the table, with a P-value of 
J statistics above 10% in all three GMMs, this confirms that the null cannot be rejected 
assuring the joint validity of the specified instruments. According to Baum (2006), the 
Hansen test of overidentification evaluates the entire set of overidentifying restrictions. 
However, to make sure about the validity of a subset of instruments, the Sargan-Hansen 
difference exogeneity test can be used. Results of this test can also be seen under the GMM 
figures in the table, giving a value for the subset of instruments of the endogeneous factors 
(AA, RM1 and RM2). The test confirms the exogeneity of the subsets as the P-values 
exceed 10% and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Similar results about the 
autocorrelation, overidentification and exogeneity can be found in each of the GMM tables 
performed in this chapter.  
Regarding the rest of the variables, the number of followers N wasn’t found to have any 
impact on forecast error. As this could be due to the correlation between trade volumes 
(TV) and N, TV was withdrawn from the regression (in a separate test) but this robustness 
test didn’t change anything and N remained insignificant. 
Nevertheless, trade volume appears to be positively and significantly affecting forecast 
error with a coefficient of 2.3% in regression 2. This result suggests that analysts would 
make more error when forecasting firms that are traded more. The Uncertainty of firms’ 
earnings has a positive impact on forecast error. The coefficient is 0.14 significant at 1% 
confidence level. This result is sensible since more volatile earnings are harder to predict. 
Regarding the performance variables, if a company makes a profit the previous year, 
forecast error decreases the following year. This is proved by the negative significant 
coefficient between profitD and FE (-0.0338 significant at 5%).  Similarly, the coefficient 
of ExcessRoe is -0.0392 is significant at 1% level suggesting that if a company performs 
better than the industry median earnings, forecast error decreases the following year. The 
third significant performance variable was the dividend Dummy (DivD). The relationship 
between FE and DivD appears to be negative and significant at 1% stating that if a 
company announces dividends the previous year, forecast error decreases the following 
year. This is consistent with Ciconne (2005) who find that losing firms are harder to 
predict.  Despite finding the association between forecast error and earnings management 
being significant, however, using absolute values cannot fully explain why earnings 
management is positively affecting forecast error. Is it because earnings are increasing 
surprisingly due to earnings management making the forecasts fall below actual earnings? 
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Or is it simply because analysts insist on being overly optimistic or pessimistic making the 
error always big? In order to read between the lines and understand better the reasons 
behind the forecast error, the next sections allow for forecast error and earnings 
management variables to be signed. The new hypothesis will explain whether boosting 
earnings will make forecasters look pessimistic, or managing earnings downwards will 
make forecasters look extremely optimistic.    
3.6.2. Testing hypothesis 3.2:  
Should earnings management be used in order to decrease earnings (Big Bath or 
earnings smoothing), forecast error is expected to increase making analysts look more 
optimistic. Table 3.5 displays results of regression O that includes optimistic forecasts only 
(when FE is positive) and negative AA, RM1 and RM2 assuming they are proxies of 
negative use of earnings management used to decrease earnings. This regression aims to 
test hypothesis 2 stating that negative use of earnings management should lead to more 
optimistic forecasts. Results in table 3.5 confirms hypothesis 2. The relationship between 
AA and FE is now turned to be negative with a coefficient of -0.203 significant at 10% 
level. This negative coefficient indicates that the higher the use of earnings management (a 
more use of abnormal accruals in a negative sign) the higher the forecast error is. The fact 
that earnings management this time is used to decrease earnings, the downward shift in 
reported earnings opens a gap between the forecasts and earnings making analysts look 
more optimistic.  
Once more, real earnings management RM1 and RM1 were not found to be significant. 
Nevertheless, the main assumption made by Roychowdhury (2006) is that real earnings 
management is used to boost earnings. This assumption holds after testing hypothesis 2 
since it includes only negative forms of earnings management assuming it’s used to 
decrease earnings. The number of analysts N continues to be insignificant. The impact of 
trade volume on forecast error has disappeared. This is somehow unexpected since analysts 
are more likely to issue optimistic forecasts for firms that are highly traded. The negative 
coefficients of performance variables excessroeD and divD remain the same in this test 
implying that a positive last year’s performance would make analysts less optimistic the 
following year. The coefficient of Uncertainty was large and highly significant indicating 
that the more uncertain the company, the higher the forecast error is.   
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Table 3.5 Regression analysis of positive forecast error FE and negative earnings management AA, 
RM1 and RM2. 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|  F is the monthly consensus forecasts, E is the realised earnings per share, AA is 
abnormal accruals, RM1 and RM2 are  the first and second proxies of real earnings management respectively.   
Dep : FE > 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES fixed-AA GMM-AA 
Fixed-              
AA and RM1 
GMM-                      
AA and 
RM1 
fixed-                  
AA and 
RM2 




Coef         
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
AA < 0 -0.242* -0.203* -0.169 -0.196* -0.100 -0.208** 
  (0.141) (0.110) (0.183) (0.105) (0.165) (0.0894) 
RM1 < 0     -0.0250 0.0101     
      (0.0210) (0.0223)     
RM2 < 0         -0.176 0.0619 
          (0.140) (0.106) 
N -0.00195 0.0109 -0.00198 0.0324 -0.000289 0.0286 
  (0.00253) (0.0231) (0.00335) (0.0301) (0.00324) (0.0285) 
TV 0.0165 0.0140 0.0150 0.00648 0.00948 0.00690 
  (0.0155) (0.00850) (0.0189) (0.0104) (0.0188) (0.0101) 
Uncertainty 0.542 1.316*** 0.534 1.546* 0.549 1.493* 
  (0.563) (0.501) (0.521) (0.803) (0.526) (0.788) 
BTM 0.105*** 0.0377 0.0882* 0.0169 0.0977** 0.00891 
  (0.0385) (0.0274) (0.0476) (0.0299) (0.0480) (0.0327) 
excessroeD -0.0426** -0.0275* -0.0453** -0.0296 -0.0523** -0.0316* 
  (0.0174) (0.0157) (0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0217) (0.0183) 
AG 0.0731** 0.00606 0.0463 0.00250 0.0633* -0.000807 
  (0.0301) (0.0223) (0.0370) (0.0288) (0.0370) (0.0271) 
EarningsD -0.00287 0.00364 0.00289 0.00343 0.000200 0.00486 
  (0.0141) (0.0117) (0.0174) (0.0152) (0.0170) (0.0155) 
profitD -0.0359 -0.00383 -0.0359 -0.0163 -0.0449 -0.0196 
  (0.0283) (0.0270) (0.0337) (0.0295) (0.0337) (0.0298) 
divD -0.107 -0.0858* -0.0975 -0.119** -0.111 -0.112** 
  (0.0801) (0.0511) (0.0904) (0.0534) (0.0898) (0.0519) 
Observations 3,229 2,457 3,259 2,353 2,330 2,486 
R-squared 0.078  0.079  0.076  
Observations 5,190 5,592 5,190 5,548 5,191 5,549 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) 
 0.01  0.003  0.003 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) 




 0.291  0.504  0.313 
Sargan-Hansen 
Exogeneity test 
 0.922(for AA)  0.743 (for 




***Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.6. Regression analysis of negative forecast error FE when earnings management AA, RM1 
and RM2 are positive. 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|  F is the monthly consensus forecasts, E is the realised earnings per 
share, AA is abnormal accruals, RM1 and RM2 are  the first and second proxies of real earnings management 
respectively.   
Dep : FE < 0 1 4 2 5 3 6 
VARIABLES fixed GMM-AA 
Fixed-                   
AA and 
RM1 
GMM-                       
AA and RM1 
fixed-                       
AA and 
RM2  




Coef         
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
Coef                  
(std error) 
AA > 0 -0.00577 -0.382*** -0.0401 -0.597*** -0.00338 -0.499*** 
  (0.0527) (0.125) (0.0653) (0.168) (0.0695) (0.174) 










RM 2 > 0 
    
-0.0148 0.122 
  
    
(0.0312) (0.131) 
N 0.00205 -0.00194 0.00113 0.000158 0.000920 0.000197 
  (0.00218) (0.00380) (0.00148) (0.0433) (0.00165) (0.0420) 
TV 0.00203 -0.00991 -0.00602 -0.0114 0.00107 -0.0233 
  (0.00602) (0.0195) (0.00541) (0.0191) (0.00550) (0.0203) 
Uncertainty -1.008** -0.211 -0.721** -0.0415 -1.008** -1.396 
  (0.402) (0.672) (0.345) (0.741) (0.461) (1.340) 
BTM -0.0204 -0.0612* -0.0338* -0.0102 -0.0383 -0.0525 
  (0.0135) (0.0338) (0.0180) (0.0406) (0.0232) (0.0514) 
excessroeD 0.00353 -0.0165 0.000732 -0.00234 0.00144 -0.0424 
  (0.00703) (0.0186) (0.00794) (0.0206) (0.00911) (0.0269) 
AG 0.0109 -0.0149 0.00611 0.0634 -0.00781 -0.0454 
  (0.0137) (0.0275) (0.0147) (0.0449) (0.0158) (0.0416) 
EarningsD 0.00200 0.0181 -0.00360 0.0450** -0.00173 0.0558** 
  (0.00630) (0.0164) (0.00797) (0.0222) (0.00791) (0.0250) 
profitD -0.00357 0.0812** 0.00855 0.0587 -0.00548 0.0619 
  (0.0186) (0.0387) (0.0274) (0.0586) (0.0240) (0.0560) 
divD -0.0107 0.0378 -0.0412 -0.0939** -0.0448* -0.0740 
  (0.0265) (0.0413) (0.0253) (0.0462) (0.0234) (0.0583) 
Observations 
            
3,688  
                  
4,262  
            
4,176                      4,642  
                     
4,057  
                    
4,593  
R-squared 0.185   0.157   0.322   
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) 
 0.192  0.067  0.028 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) 




 0.331  0.913  0.949 
Sargan-Hansen 
Exogeneity test 
 0.425 (AA)  0.827 (for AA) 
0.994 (for RM1) 
 0.877AA)- 
0.997(RM2) 




3.6.3. Testing hypothesis 3.3:  
Building on the argument set in hypothesis 2 that managing earnings management 
downwards lead to higher forecast error, this section studies the impact of positive earnings 
management on negative forecast error (pessimistic forecasts). If it is true that one of the 
main incentives to use earnings management is to boost earnings, increasing earnings 
could lead to negative forecast error since earnings are driven upwards and analysts are 
assumed to be uninformed about earnings management.  
More specifically, Hypothesis 4 examines the idea that positive AA, RM1 and RM2 should 
lead to more negative FE. 
The coefficients shown in Table 3.6 support hypothesis 4. GMM estimator results in a 
negative coefficient of AA of -0.382 significant at 1% confidence level. After RM1 and 
RM2 were added, the AA coefficient changed respectively to -0.597 and -0.499 but stayed 
highly significant. Contrarily, real earnings management variables RM1 and RM2 were 
insignificant leading us to the initial interpretation that forecasters were able to anticipate 
real earnings management but not accruals management. This result supports the main 
argument that when earnings management (specifically accruals-based) is used to boost 
earnings, analysts seem to look pessimistic as their forecasts fall below the reported 
earnings.    
3.6.4. Sensitivity analysis-hypothesis 3.5:  
It is important to mention again the main assumption that no insider information is 
accessible and analysts are rational in conducting their forecasts. Nevertheless, all previous 
hypothesis testing would be unreliable if analysts are proved to be irrational or if for any 
reason insider information was leaked. One very important example studied in the 
literature is when managers try to put pressure on analysts to lower their earnings forecast 
allowing them to avoid a negative surprise (De Bont and Thaler (1990, Capstaff, Paudyal 
and Rees (1995), Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001)).  
To do so, analysts would have to revise their forecasts downwards the closer they approach 
the earnings announcement date. Analysts’ motivation in this case could be maintaining a 
good relationship with insiders in order to access more private information in the future. 
The movement of forecast error throughout 11 months before earnings announcement date 
is illustrated in figure 3.1. The sample used for figure 3.1 includes positive forecast errors 
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only indicating that only optimistic forecasts are used. The lines of trimmed and 
untrimmed data clearly show a systematic decrease in the forecasts towards the end of the 
year.  
H5: After excluding biased forecasts, the use of earnings management will increase analyst 
forecast error.  
 
Figure 3.1 Variation of forecast error from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings announcement 
date, forecast error is the difference between consensus forecasts and actual earnings per 
share divided by absolute value of actual earnings per share. 
 
In this specific case, biased forecasts are more accurate than the rest of the forecasts due to 
information leakage reaching the analysts especially towards the end of the period. 
Therefore, using a sample net of biased forecasts is expected to show a higher impact of 
earnings management on forecast error. From a different perspective, forecasters are no 
more mislead by earnings management since forecasts are no more random.  
A sample portfolio of suspect firms is created to exclude biased forecasts. A biased 
forecast of a certain firm is a monthly optimistic forecast that was revised downward by 
more than 20% from 6 to 1 month before earnings announcement date. For example, 
assuming a firm’s announcement date is December of every year. The firm’s yearly 
forecast will be excluded if its monthly EPS forecast was downgraded by more than 20% 
between June and December. The choice of the last 6 months window was due to two 










11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1





the second half of the year compared to the first half unless an outside variable emerged 
surprisingly (one of which is a request from insiders). Second, the first half of the season is 
usually harder to predict and it is less likely that managers would ask analysts to pull down 
their forecasts with half of the period is yet to be completed.     
    
Table 3.7 Regression analysis of forecast error over abnormal 
accruals before and after exclusion of biased forecasts. |𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊| =
𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|  F is the monthly consensus forecasts, E is the realised earnings per 
share, AA is abnormal accruals, RM1 and RM2 are  the first and second 
proxies of real earnings management respectively.   
Dep :| FE | 1 4 
  Before Exclusion After Exclusion 
VARIABLES 
Coef                                 
(std error) 
Coef                                          
(std error) 
| AA | 0.203** 0.312*** 
  (0.0970) (0.0966) 
N -0.0136 -0.000334 
  (0.0162) (0.00224) 
TV 0.0237*** 0.0280*** 
  (0.00801) (0.00919) 
Uncertainty 0.140*** 0.308 
  (0.0344) (0.225) 
BTM 0.0547*** 0.0573*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0195) 
excessroeD -0.0392*** -0.0364* 
  (0.0109) (0.0213) 
AG -0.00240 -0.00400 
  (0.0143) (0.0157) 
EarningsD -0.00613 0.00573 
  (0.00690) (0.00693) 
profitD -0.0338** -0.0379** 
  (0.0165) (0.0170) 
divD -0.106*** -0.0691** 
  (0.0282) (0.0311) 














***Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 




Table 3.7 shows results of the sensitivity analysis before and after exclusion of the suspect 
forecasts. As expected, the coefficient of AA is highly significant and increased from 0.203 
to 0.312 after excluding biased forecasts. The result suggests that abnormal accruals have a 
higher impact on forecast error after excluding biased forecasts. In other words, earnings 
management have less impact when part of the overall forecasts is biased.  
Furthermore, the second main assumption in this study is that managers do not manage 
earnings upwards in order to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Releasing this assumption 
would lead to a reversal causality between earnings management and analyst forecast error. 
Many studies suggest that high public expectation encourages managers to manage 
earnings upwards (Burgstahler and Eams (2006), Caramanis and Lennox (2008)). Figure 
3.2 illustrates the distribution of firm-years surrounding intervals of forecast error from -
100% to +100%. This figure shows that the distribution is skewed to the right, implying 
that most forecast errors are positive. This means that forecasters are optimistic in general 
as the majority of forecasts fall above EPS. Alternatively, Roychowdhury (2006) states that 
managers engage in earnings management mainly to avoid losses. The later found evidence 
that the benchmark for managers is to report at least zero income before extraordinary 
items. Figure 3 shows a clear difference in the number of companies that report 0 or 
greater earnings and the ones reporting losses. This difference confirms Roychowdhury’s 
findings.  
Although figures 2 and 3 don’t provide clear-cut evidence about the direct incentives 
behind earnings management, however, they are used in this research to see whether there 
could be reversal causality between earnings management and forecast error. While 
companies do not appear to be reporting earnings that meet or beat the forecasts, their 
priority lies in avoiding losses. They appear to be overwhelmingly reporting earnings at 
zero or just above. These findings diminish the impact of public expectation on earnings 




Figure 3.2 Distribution of firms-years over forecast error depending on the level of forecast error 
from -100% to +100%, forecast error is the difference between consensus forecasts and actual 
earnings per share divided by absolute value of actual earnings per share 
 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of firms-years over IBEI/assets, IBEI is the income before extraordinary 


















This chapter argues that analysts’ forecast error is affected by earnings 
management. Earnings management is the procedure of managing the discretionary 
variables affecting a company’s earnings in order to make it look better, favourable, 
stable or sustainable. More precisely, managers could possibly manage their 
companies’ earnings upwards to avoid losses, meet public expectations or to seek 
financial bonuses. They may also manage earnings downwards to smooth out earnings 
over a set of financial periods or take a big bath (report all possible losses in one period 
since a negative news cannot be avoided in any way). These techniques are employed 
using accruals-based or real activities earnings management. One the one side, accruals 
management is done through recognition of sales not yet delivered, timing gains or 
losses, estimation of pension liabilities, capitalisation of leases and market expenses 
and inventory methods. On the other side, real earnings management is done by 
adjusting real operational activities such as reducing R&D and advertising 
expenditures, sales acceleration and overproduction. Assuming that managers apply 
this manipulation internally and secretly, there is a big probability that such 
unanticipated alteration will make forecast errors look larger. Accordingly, this study 
examines the impact of earnings management on forecast error. There exists a lot of 
studies that link managers with analysts forecasts (Richardson et al. (2004), Mest and 
Plummer (2003)…). However, to our knowledge, the causal effect of earnings 
management on forecast error has never been covered before.  
Using a UK sample of FTSE all share companies from 1993 to 2013, earnings 
management appear to be positively affecting analysts’ forecast error.  After 
controlling for number of control variables such as analysts following, size, earnings 
uncertainty, trade volume and a set of performance variables, this positive impact 
appears to be driven by accruals earnings management and not real earnings 
management. A possible explanation to this phenomenon is that managers modify real 
activities to manage earnings throughout the fiscal year which could be spotted by 
analysts earlier. However, accruals based earnings management is mainly done secretly 
after closing the books by the end of the fiscal year leaving analysts with almost no 
time to anticipate such changes.  
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Nevertheless, knowing that analysts’ forecasts are part of the market expectation which 
is one of the motives behind earnings management, a possible reversed causality 
between earnings management and analysts forecast could be present. Accordingly, 
this requires extra measures in order to control for the endogeneity problem. GMM 
estimators were seen as the best fit to control for such problem using lagged values as 
valid instruments. After breaking down the forecasts into optimistic and pessimistic, 
GMM coefficients show that optimistic forecasts are positively affected by the negative 
use of earnings management (when earnings are managed downwards). This is due to 
the unexpected fall of earnings per share making forecasters look optimistic. Moreover, 
when earnings management is used to boost earnings, reported earnings look higher 
than usual, surpassing the forecasts and making analysts look pessimistic. Furthermore, 
robustness checks show that managers focus mainly on avoiding losses rather than 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. Apart from earnings management, loss 
companies appear to have bigger forecast error than profit companies, which is 
reasonable since loss companies are harder to predict (Ciconne (2005)).   
Based on the above documentation, this chapter shows that external factors such as 
earnings management explain a major part in analysts’ forecast error. Consequently, It 
stresses that analysts cannot be branded as extremely optimistic simply because their 
forecasts appear to be so different from the realised earnings. By proving so, this 
research highlights on the importance of tighter accounting standards and audit control 


















































Chapter 4: Analyst forecast error and Investor 
sentiment in cross sectional returns. 
 
Abstract: 
Financial analysts are considered to be overall optimistic regarding their forecasts 
in most of the financial markets. At the same time, according to behavioural scholars, 
Investor Sentiment tends to be highly correlated with stock returns. Although the 
incentives and characteristics behind both behavioural biases may vary between the two 
market participants, it’s very likely that one contributes to the other. This research studies 
whether financial analysts’ error is related to investor’s sentiment in the UK. Additionally, 
it examines how Investor sentiment, as a function of forecast error, affects stock return and 
the value premium phenomenon.  Using all companies listed on London Stock exchange 
from 1992 until 2015, results show that analysts are overall optimistic. Furthermore, 
analysts releasing higher than average earnings per share forecasts lead to higher sentiment 
levels. While stock returns are significantly positively affected by sentiment levels, small 
stocks, growth stocks and stocks with weak profitability are more prone to sentiment shifts 
than value, large and stocks with robust profitability. This research highlights how bias in 
analysts’ forecasts, reflected in the market sentiment, can lead to serious effects on the 











Chapter 4: Analyst forecast error and Investor 
sentiment in cross sectional returns. 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters discuss two important aspects of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
The first one is the magnitude and direction of the forecast error and whether analysts 
show any sign of bias. The second one focuses on the external factors that affect the 
forecast error and in specific earnings management. This chapter takes the topic a step 
further to investigate the implications of forecast error on the stock market. Based on the 
definition of forecast which is the expectation of market participants, it examines the 
consequences of forecast error from a behavioural finance perspective.  
Behavioural scholars in finance show a strong belief in sentiment as a major player in 
stock markets (Brown and cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006)). Market’s expectation 
is a key factor in their argument regarding the existence of sentiment. According to Brown 
and Cliff (2004, p. 2), “Sentiment represents the expectations of market participants 
relative to a norm: a bullish (bearish) investor expects returns to be above (below) average, 
whatever average may be”. This leads to divergence from the intrinsic value making 
market prices look vulnerable and prone to behavioural bias. Many aspects in finance have 
been investigated from a sentiment perspective. Daniel et al. (1998) suggest that market 
price momentum is partially driven by investor’s overconfidence. Schmelling (2009) and 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that investor sentiment affects negatively future stock 
returns. Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that a firm’s board is likely to change 
its disclosure policies depending on the market sentiment level. 
In light of this matter, one cannot talk about market expectations without mentioning 
analyst forecasts. Financial analysts are an important source of information briefing the 
market with rich analysis and recommendations on a daily basis. Such source had a fare 
share of academic studies investigating its role and consequences. Most of previous studies 
report that analysts are overall optimistic regarding companies’ future earnings (Capstaff et 
al. (2001), Gu and Wu (2003), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Ciconne (2005), Larocque 
(2013)). Capstaff et. Al. (1995) argue that financial analysts might have the incentives to 
issue optimistic forecasts in order to increase the trading volumes generated after their 
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forecasts. Abarbanel and Bernard (1992) finds that stock prices drift after earnings 
announcement are partially driven by inefficient forecasts made throughout the year. Mest 
and Plammer (2003) explain that optimism in analysts’ forecasts facilitate the access to 
management’s private information specially for hardly predictable firms. Baron, Biard and 
Liang (2013) focused on the timing of the analyst forecast depending on its type. They 
found that a pessimistic forecast is issued later than the other forecasts on average, which 
may explain why the last quarter of a fiscal year is less optimistic in terms of earnings 
forecast.  
Consequently, this chapter investigates the association between forecast error, 
market sentiment and the value premium anomaly. More precisely, it starts by testing 
whether the forecast error made by financial analysts is a major component of sentiment in 
London Stock exchange.  The idea is that when forecast error is positive, that is having an 
optimistic forecast, sentiment is likely to be high due to the high expectation been built by 
analysts. Sentiment, thereafter a function of forecast error, plays an important role in 
affecting stock returns documented in previous studies. The main argument in this analysis 
is that the reaction of stock prices can hardly be attributed to sentiment levels on the long 
run, in the sense that a fast-integrated market reflects the sentiment proxies very quickly 
making its impact evident on a short-run. Based on this argument, forecast error is believed 
to be play a big role in affecting short-term stock returns. Furthermore, as the nature of 
growth firms is different than value firms specially when it comes to forecasting, the 
relationship between investor sentiment and the long standing value premium phenomenon 
will also be examined. The value premium is a well-documented phenomenon where value 
stocks appear to earn higher returns than growth stocks (Fama and French (1992)). Why 
this phenomenon occurs is an open debate between scholars and professionals alike. This 
study contributes to the literature by introducing forecast error as a major player in 
explaining the value premium. The analysis also attempts to see how stock returns and the 
value premium behave in low and high sentiment moments.  
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), sentiment index is estimated using principal 
component analysis based on seven proxies: Forecast error, market turnover, number of 
IPOs, return on first day of IPO, Share of equity issuance, the dividend premium and the 
discount on closed-end mutual funds. The sample starts from January 1992 to December 
2015 and covers all companies listed in London stock exchange. Analysts’ forecasts were 
collected using IBES dataset available on Thomson Datastream.  The rest of the data is 
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collected from different databases including Bloomberg Terminals, Thomson Reuters 
Eikon and Worldscope databases.  
Results show that forecast error is a major component of market sentiment and they are 
positively correlated. Contrary to Baker and Wurgler, Brown and Cliff (2005) and Baur, 
Quintero and Stevens (1996) who finds that future stock returns are negatively affected by 
sentiment levels, results in this research show that short term stock returns are positively 
affected by sentiment levels. Stock returns during high sentiment levels are higher than the 
ones during low sentiment levels. Furthermore, the value premium shrinks significantly 
when sentiment become high. This is due to the significant impact of sentiment on growth 
companies rather than value companies. As a result, small stocks, growth stocks and stocks 
with weak profitability are more prone to sentiment shifts than value, large and stocks with 
robust profitability. Such result contradicts with Brown and Cliff (2005) who report that 
Sentiment only affects large and institutional companies. These findings support the theory 
that growth firms are harder to value thus show a significant positive change when 
sentiment shifts from low to high.  
The remaining of the chapter comes as follow: the second section discusses the 
background, literature and rational of the study. The third section explains the sample and 
methodology used. The fourth section navigates through discussions and interpretations. 
The fifth section presents a robustness check and the last section concludes.  
 
4.2. Background and Literature Review  
4.2.1. Forecast error and Stock returns 
The wide roles undertaken by financial analysts in the stock market allowed finance 
scholars to explore and investigate diverse cases associated with behavioural finance, 
corporate finance, asset pricing and many more. Different aspects were discussed in the 
previous chapters related to the topic of analysts’ forecast error. As stated above, this 
chapter will take a look at a likely consequence of forecast errors done by financial 
analysts which is the famous phenomenon of “Value premium”. However, before 
reviewing the value premium literature, it is worth discussing some important 
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consequences of forecast error in the stock market particularly asset pricing reported in 
previous studies.  
Bernhard and Campello (2007) report that following downward forecast revisions, 
abnormal returns appear to be large following earnings announcement. Bernhard and 
Campello claim that this is true because as aggregate analysts revise their forecast 
downwards, the probability of getting positive surprise after the announcement increases 
(probability of having the actual earnings per share being higher than the forecasted 
earnings per share). The authors claim that such systematic downward revisions are very 
likely being managed by the firms’ board themselves by “talking-down” analysts’ forecasts 
and this claim is supported by few results. First, a greater positive earnings surprise 
appears to have a significant positive impact on stock returns. Second, firms that 
successfully manage their earnings forecasts downwards in the last two weeks before the 
earnings announcement date earn more than double the stock returns than the ones that 
don’t. Third, firms that still have a positive earnings surprise at the end of the year but 
without having a downward forecast revisions trend report smaller abnormal returns than 
the ones that did have.   
Consistent with Bernhard and Campello (2007), Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) claim 
that firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (previously referred as a positive surprise), 
report higher stock returns over the quarter compared to the ones that fail to meet their 
forecasts. Moreover, Bartov et al. (2002) add that such premium is possible to be achieved 
through earnings management and could be used as a strong indicator of future 
performance. Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2006) also document a price drifts after 
earnings announcement for firms that record a positive earnings surprise. Additionally, 
Doyle et al (2006) findings show that firms with large positive earnings surprise continue 
to outperform financially, institutional interest increases, transaction costs decrease and the 
underpricing is eliminated. Ke and Yu (2006) touch on a different aspect of financial 
analyst bias by suggesting that biased earnings forecasts are often issued to gain access to 
management and secure their jobs by providing more precise estimations yet making sure 
positive earnings surprises are achieved by the end of the period.    
Clearly, a lot of effort was made in the past to understand the nature of analysts forecast 
error and whether this error is systematic or random. The behavioural side of the 
systematic bias in forecast revisions was covered by De Bondt and Thaler (1990) who 
report that earnings forecasts are too extreme to be rational and that analysts’ forecast 
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revisions show a trend of overreaction to previous information. A very important element 
in De Bondt and Thaler (1990) is the use of IBES estimates produced by Lynch, Jones & 
Ryan, member of the New York Stock Exchange which is also used by a lot of 
professional investors. This element, combined with their results of analysts’ extreme 
optimism, allowed the authors to extrapolate the following: “there are many reasons to be 
sceptical that actual investors are subject to the same biases as student subjects in 
laboratory experiments” (De Bondt and Thaler (1990 p.52)), in referring to a result which 
had been reached initially by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) after experimenting on 
laboratory students related to the psychology of predictions. De Bondt and Thaler conclude 
that analysts are subject to overreaction and that behavioural explanations of anomalous 
trends should be taken seriously.   
De Bondt and Thaler’s conclusion is further confirmed by Hribar and McInnis (2012) who 
studies the association between analysts’ earnings forecast and investor sentiment and their 
impact on stock returns.  Hribar and McInnis (2012) argue that forecast error is positively 
significantly affecting stock returns and that the impact of sentiment index on cross-
sectional return diminishes by 49% (for small versus large portfolios) when forecast error 
variable is introduced to the equation. Therefore, Hribar and McInnis (2012) indicates that 
“it appears that analyst forecast errors are significant intermediating variable in the cross-
sectional patterns documented between sentiment and stock returns” (Hribar and McInnis 
(2012 p. 306)). Such relationship requires deeper review of the “investor sentiment” 
literature which is covered in the following section.   
4.2.2. Market Sentiment 
Sentiment surrounding the stock market is considered a very important factor in 
affecting investment decisions. As human beings, investors are subject to sentiment and it 
sometimes leads them to inappropriately translate given information. Sentiment is applied 
in various areas of finance literature and found to have various implications. For example, 
Daniel et al (1998) suggests that market price momentum is partially driven by sentiment 
such as investors overreact to private signals and underreact to public information. 
Similarly, Schmelling (2009) finds that sentiment is negatively related to future returns and 
mostly in the short and medium term horizons. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) claims that 
investors’ overconfidence plays a big role in bubble markets by stimulating prices 
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volatility and trading volume, that is, by creating more speculative trading driven by 
heterogeneous beliefs. Consistently, Odean (1998) had found that overconfident traders 
trade more aggressively than rational ones and this is due to their superior self-belief in 
private information. As a result, trading volume and price volatility increase. According to 
the author, investors do not only overvalue their private information but they also 
misinterpret it. Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that firms even change their 
disclosure policies depending on the market sentiment level.  
In short, behavioural market watchers seem to believe in the impact of market sentiment or 
at least the existence of one of its attributes. But what is exactly “sentiment”? According to 
Brown and Cliff (2004), “sentiment represents the expectations of market participants 
relative to a norm: a bullish (bearish) investor expects returns to be above (below) average, 
whatever average may be”. (Brown and Cliff (2004)). Baker and Wurgler (2006) also 
defines sentiment in the context of financial markets as the tendency to speculate, such that 
it drives the relative demand for speculative investments.  
Investor’s sentiment is investigated by Neal and whealley (1998) using three measures: 
Closed-end fund discount, ratio of sales to purchases and net mutual fund redemptions. 
Using data from 1933 until 1993, Neal and whealley (1998) report that fund discounts and 
net redemptions can predict the difference in returns between small and large firms but no 
significant relationship between sentiment and future earnings growth or inflation. 
Moreover, Brown and Cliff (2005) test the predictive power of sentiment on future stock 
returns. According to the authors, if sentiment levels push stock prices to higher levels 
surpassing the intrinsic values, stock returns of the following periods should be negative. 
Using a survey data to construct a sentiment index, their analysis show that market returns 
could be predicted over a period of 1 to 3 years using the sentiment index. It also confirms 
previous findings suggesting that future market returns are negatively associated with 
sentiment levels. In an attempt to explain the 1987 crash, Baur, Quintero and Stevens 
(1996) find no significant association between future returns and sentiment levels. Baur, 
Quintero and Stevens (1996) use closed-end-fund-discount as a sole proxy of sentiment 
index and concluded that either their variable is faulty or that sentiment levels preceding 
the crash had nothing to do with asset valuation during the crash event.    
The relationship between investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns is 
further investigated by Baker and Wurgler (2006). In an indirect quantitative approach, the 
authors construct a sentiment index using principal component analysis based on six 
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proxies: Closed end fund discount, return on IPOs, number of IPOs issued, turnover ratio, 
share of equity issued and dividend premium. Results from their analysis show a negative 
impact of investor sentiment over subsequent returns. In particular, when sentiment level is 
low, subsequent stock return appear to be high for small stocks, young stocks, non-
dividend paying stocks, highly volatile and distressed stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
base their interpretation on the assumption proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
that is, since asset mispricing is a result of a demand shock, a shift in sentiment levels 
would mostly affect stocks that are more sensitive to speculative demand, harder to value, 
and stocks that are riskiest and costliest to arbitrage.    
The choice of model to estimate investor sentiment has always been considered a 
dilemma to most of the academics. Attempts to estimate this behavioural issue varied 
between direct (survey primary data) and indirect (quantitative market proxies-secondary 
data). Brown and Cliff (2004) provide a comprehensive study about the different measures 
of investors sentiment. They found that both methods (direct and indirect) provide 
common features. However, they add that past returns are also a very important 
determinant of sentiment. Contrary to Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brown and Cliff (2004) 
results show that sentiment seems to be affecting large and institutional stocks rather than 
small and individual stocks.  
Another popular proxy of investment sentiment is consumer confidence surveys. This 
variable is used by scholars to fit into different research questions. Bergman and 
Roychowdhury (2008) for example, use the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index to 
study how US firms change their disclosure policies depending on investor sentiment 
levels. They note that managers would try to maintain optimistic estimates about their 
company’s performance over a long horizon. Consistently, their findings show that 
managers attempt to issue more voluntary management forecasts during low sentiment 
periods in order to “walk up” public expectations, but lower their forecasting activities in 
high sentiment periods. Likewise, Chen (2010) uses the same consumer index to 
demonstrate how a lack of market confidence could affect stock returns specially in bear 
periods such as 2008 financial crisis. After controlling for macroeconomic variables, Chen 
(2010) finds that the greater the market pessimism the higher the possibility of shifting 
from bull to bear market.  
The use of consumer confidence by academics as a proxy of investor’s sentiment is not 
only backed theoretical but also empirically. A closer look on how the state of consumer 
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confidence could be related to investor’s sentiment is discussed by Fisher and Statman 
(2003). Using Michigan Consumer Confidence index and the American Association of 
Individual Investors, the authors find a positive relationship between the change in 
individual investor’s sentiment and change in consumer confidence. However, this isn’t the 
case when institutional investors sample is used instead (Based on the Wall street 
strategists Survey). Fisher and Statman (2003) argue that this might be because Wall Street 
strategists understand well that the stock market is a leading indicator of the economy. 
Furthermore, they find a positive significant relationship between individual investor’s 
confidence and returns on small stocks. In the same manner, Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006) find that the sentiment component of consumer confidence can forecast returns on 
stocks primary held by individuals. Nevertheless, they report that this behavioural result is 
not valid before 1977, arguing that “one possible explanation is that the dynamics of 
participation of households in the equity markets has changed over time” (Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006),p.1527). On an international scale, Schmeling (2009) finds that 
investor sentiment negatively predicts stock returns in 18 developed countries. 
Interestingly, Shmeling’s results appear to be robust for value stocks, growth stocks, small 
stocks and for different forecast horizons. It is worth noting that Schmeling (2009) uses 
Consumer sentiment survey as a proxy of investor’s sentiment since it is the most 
comparable proxy across countries because of the similarities in surveys conducted in 
different countries and its availability over different time horizons. 
4.2.3. The Value Premium anomaly 
 
The “value premium” is a well-documented phenomenon where stocks with high 
B/M ratios (Value Stocks) tend to earn higher returns than stocks with low B/M ratios 
(growth stocks). The reasons behind such anomaly is still an ongoing debate between 
finance scholars despite having a good deal of papers addressing this topic. In line with this 
debate, two theories were eventually born: the behavioural-based theory standing against 
the risk-based theory. 
On the one hand, Risk-based explanations led by Fama and French (1992b and 1993) argue 
that higher return of value firms is a compensation for the risk held by the investor. Chen 
and Zhang (1998) also report that value firms are riskier since they have high financial 
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leverage and face substantial uncertainty in their future earnings. On the other hand, 
Behavioural-based explanations, supported by De Bondt and Thaler (1987), Lakonishok 
shleifer and vishny (1994), Baker and Wurgler (2006) and many others, argue that naïve 
investors make their investment decisions based on past performances. Therefore, as naïve 
investors misprice stocks, they overvalue growth stocks and undervalue value stocks based 
on past performances.  
Researchers took the matter a bit further by discussing the importance of market sentiment 
in explaining returns on value stocks and growth stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006) for 
example denote that young, unprofitable and extreme growth stocks are harder to value and 
therefore are more affected by shifts in sentiment levels. Contrarily, Schmelling (2009) 
finds that the impact of sentiment on returns is significant for both value and growth firms 
but economically stronger for value firms than growth firms. The author denotes that 
sentiment negatively predicts stock returns, that is, when sentiment level increases, 
subsequent aggregate stock returns tend to decrease and vice versa. Besides, Schmelling 
adds that this impact is significant for countries that “are culturally more prone to herd-like 
investment behaviors as well as countries that have less efficient regulatory institutions” 
Schmelling (2009 p.406).  
Investor sentiment and short term returns is also studied by Waggle and Agrrawal (2015) 
who used the percentage of “bullish” investors out of aggregate investors as a measure for 
market sentiment. For a sample of monthly stock returns between 1992 and 2010 and a 
monthly sentiment averages from the American Association of individual investors, 
Waggle and Wagrrawal (2015) show that sentiment is significantly negatively related to 
the following three and six months returns. Moreover, they report that this result is driven 
by growth firms rather than value firms, and holds for small, medium and big stocks. 
Contrary to previous suggestions, Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find no evidence in 
support of the relationship between sentiment and value premium. By using consumer 
confidence as a measure of investor sentiment, they find that returns on stocks with low 
institutional ownership are weaker than the ones with high institutional ownership. Their 
finding is consistent with the noise-trader hypothesis proposed by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 
(1991) which argue that stocks that are dominantly held by individuals are more likely to 
be affected by sentiment shifts, which is also true to small versus big companies. Similarly, 
Ciner (2014) results prove that when sentiment index is high, aggregate stock returns are 
positive on the short run, but negative on the long run. This finding is only significant for 
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small firms. Nevertheless, after using a frequency dependent regression framework, Ciner 
(2014) reports that stock market indexes and consumer confidence work in reverse 
causality.    
 
4.3. Rationale and Research contributions: Analysts’ forecast 
error and the value premium anomaly through market 
sentiment.  
The combination of forecast error and market sentiment, and their impact on the value 
premium anomaly has never been studied before. While it is true that the literature 
surrounding market sentiment and stock returns has been well documented, there exists no 
previous study that considers the forecast error as a contributor of market sentiment, nor 
their relationship with the value premium anomaly.  
The rationale behind this chapter is based on the belief that analysts’ earnings forecasts 
should be considered an essential contributor of the market sentiment as they form 
significant expectation in the market surrounding the companies. At the same time, where 
it is true to some extent that earnings forecast error seems to affect stock returns, it cannot 
be this simple that investors blindly follow analysts’ recommendation even after knowing 
the existence of such pattern. For example, how come investors who know already the 
significant repetitive optimistic forecasts and systematic downward forecast revisions 
found in many papers (Bernhard and Campello (2007), Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002), 
Yu and Ke (2006) and many more), yet still fall in the trap of earnings surprise and push 
prices upward. Therefore, this chapter proposes that the impact of forecast error on cross-
sectional patterns of stock return cannot be observed directly, however, it would make 
more sense if forecast optimism was taken as a component of investor sentiment which in 
return might directly affect the cross-sectional return patterns such as value premium. This 
rationale is further supported by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) who state that overreaction is 
a pattern that can pervade even the most professional of predictions even though “market 
professionals are experts in their field and they have much at stake” (DeBondt and Thaler 
(1990 page 52)). 
It is also strengthened by results shown in Hribar and McInnis (2012) who find that adding 
forecast error as an independent variable weakens the impact of sentiment on cross-
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sectional returns by 49% for small versus large firms. They also conclude that analyst 
forecast errors are significant intermediating variable in the cross section-patterns. The 
hypothesis in this research is drawn differently. Rather than taking forecast errors as an 
intermediating variable, investor sentiment index is calculated as a function of forecast 
error using the principal component analysis in order to capture the common component 
between forecast optimism and Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment variables. The value 
premium is then tested using the new sentiment proxy.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it proposes a new 
measure of investor sentiment index that embeds analysts forecast errors for all London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) companies from 1992 to 2015. This is motivated by the fact that the 
forecast error contributes to the overall market sentiment. Second, it addresses the 
relationship between investor sentiment, as a function of forecast error, and patterns in 
cross-sectional stock returns. The sentiment effect is distinguished relative to firm 
characteristics to examine whether it plays a part in exacerbating return anomalies, such as 
value premium.    
In line of these contributions, the chapter attempts to answer the following research 
question: What is the impact of forecast error and market sentiment on the Value premium 
anomaly.  
4.4. Methodology and sample selection:  
4.4.1. Forecast error:  
The first step in the analysis is to calculate analysts forecast error. For simplicity, 
the following equation is used:  
a) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑇𝑇 = 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡−𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡|𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡|  
Where FE is average forecast error made in month h for year t, F ht is the EPS forecast in 
monthly horizon h for year ending t, Et is the actual EPS at year ending t. “h” is the 
monthly distance (11 to 1 horizon) from which the forecast was made until earnings 
announcement date. The forecast error is calculated monthly to fit into the time series 
analysis. For each month, forecast error is simply defined as the difference between 
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monthly forecast and the yearly reported earnings per share, deflated by the reported 
earnings per share. This will produce a percentage of error made by forecasters when 
forecasting the end of year performance. It’s important to remind about the purpose of this 
research which is to find how the aggregate forecast error made each month in LSE can 
contribute to the sentiment level, regardless whether this error is subject to biasness. Note 
that the denominator is kept in absolute value in order to save the sign of the nominator, 
which would tell whether the forecast is optimistic or pessimistic.  
4.4.2. Investor Sentiment: 
The next step is regarding investor sentiment index. There are number of different ways in 
which sentiment could be estimated.  
The direct approach requires a survey analysis through which primary data are collected. 
This way consists of collecting data via questionnaires or interviewing individual investors 
then grading each answer to form a sentiment index. Glaser and Weber (2007) for example 
questioned around 3000 German online broker investors who had opened their online 
account prior to January 1997 and had at least one transaction from January 1997 until 
2001. Their questions are designed to measure investor’s overconfidence and come as 
follow:  
- “What percentage of customers of your discount brokerage house have better skills 
(e.g. in the way they interpret information; general knowledge) than you at 
identifying stocks with above average performance in the future? (Please give a 
number between 0% and 100%)” 
- “What percentage of customers of your discount brokerage house had higher 
returns than you in the four-year period from January 1997 to December 2000? 
(Please give a number between 0% and 100%)”   
This research, however, follows an indirect approach in order to estimate investor 
sentiment index. There are many reasons why surveys are avoided in this analysis. First, 
the efficiency of data collected through surveys are usually hard to confirm specially when 
investigating behavioural aspects of individuals. A degree of suspicion will always be 
present because people may respond to surveys different to how they behave. Second, 
there exists one investor confidence survey collected by Lloyds Banking Group but 
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available for a limited period. Since investor confidence surveys are rarely found, many 
studies used consumer confidence surveys to proxy for investor sentiment, and these are 
usually collected by governments or specialised research departments on monthly basis 
such as the University of Michigan in the US and the GFK consumer confidence index 
available internationally. Finally, and most importantly, the main aim is to observe the 
contribution of forecast optimism on investor sentiment, and this wouldn’t have been 
possible if ready survey data are used. Therefore, an indirect approach is employed in an 
attempt to quantify sentiment levels using sentiment proxies. this approach consists of 
using secondary quantitative data of particular sentiment proxies. Prior work suggests a 
number of different proxies as stated in the previous sections. However, there is no definite 
answer to such behavioural estimation. This research follows a popular index proposed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) who use six proxies in order to estimate the investor sentiment 
index: closed-end fund discount, LSE share turnover, the total number of IPOs issued 
monthly, the monthly average of first day return on the IPOs, the share of equity issues in 
LSE, and dividend premium. Additionally, the analyst forecast error is added as the 
seventh proxy.  
Closed-end fund discount (CEFD) is the average difference between net asset value (NAV) 
of closed-end fund stocks and their market prices. As opposed to open-ended fund, a 
closed end fund is a company that issues a fixed (closed-ended) number of stocks, then 
invests its capital in other projects. These stocks are then traded on stock exchanges. The 
fund is called at a discount (premium) when the market price of the stock is lower (higher) 
than the net asset value of the fund, which is the actual value of total investments. CEFD 
has a long history with market sentiment analysis. Many scholars including Lee et al. 
(1991) and Neal and Wheatley (1998) claim that CEFD is a proxy for sentiment. This is 
because when retail investors are bearish, fund discount increases. Therefore, CEFD is 
expected to hold a negative sign.  
The Share Turnover (Turn) is the ratio of reported trading volume over the number of 
shares listed in LSE. This ratio performs as a liquidity measure. Liquidity is often seen as a 
sentiment indicator. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) argues that “with short selling 
constraints, an asset buyer acquires an option to sell the asset to other agents when those 
agents have more optimistic beliefs. Agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of 
future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay 
even more”. According to the authors, this gradually leads to bubble periods and larger 
 141 
 
trading volumes. Consequently, trading volume possesses a positive indication of investor 
sentiment. The sign of Turn is expected to be positive.  
Initial Public Offerings IPOs also play an important role as a sentiment indicator. Demand 
on IPOs is believed to be very sensitive to sentiment state and this is reflected in first day 
return on IPO issues. Baker and Wurgler (2006) state that it is very hard not to involve 
investor’s sentiment specially when first day returns on IPOs reach an extremely high 
figures. RIPO is included in this analysis as the average first day return on IPOs and is 
expected to be positively related to sentiment. Similarly, the number of IPOs issued in a 
month NIPO is another measure of sentiment. For a company to decide whether to go 
public or not is undoubtedly a very critical decision to make. Logically speaking, the 
period in which it decides to go public in is as crucial as the initial decision, such that, 
having an IPO in a high sentiment period differs significantly than having an IPO issued 
during low sentiment periods such as a financial crisis. Therefore, conceding that the 
number of IPOs are expected to be higher in high sentiment periods, NIPO is expected to 
be positively correlated with sentiment index. Another measure of investment sentiment is 
the share of Equity issues over total equity and debt issues (SE). This is the aggregate 
issues of equity financing and not just IPOs. Similar to IPOs, this measure is a sign of 
market strength and is expected to bear a positive sign.  
The sixth proxy is dividend premium Divp, which is the difference in market to book ratio 
MTB between firms that pay dividend and those that don’t. This proxy is believed to be 
inversely correlated to sentiment levels according to Baker and Wurgler (2007). In most 
cases, dividend paying stocks are based on a stable income stream transferring safety to 
investors. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that dividend payers are generally larger, more 
profitable but with lower growth opportunities. When MTB value of dividend payers is 
lower than MTB values of dividend non-payers, this is seen as a growth opportunity thus 
sentiment index is expected to be high in this case and vice versa. Given these 
characteristics, Divp is expected to be negatively correlated with sentiment index.   
The last proxy of sentiment is FE (forecast error) which is the difference between average 
forecasted earnings per share EPS and actual reported earnings per share at the end of the 
year, divided by absolute value of reported earnings per share. Analysts forecasts are 
considered an important source of information and believed to affect investor’s level of 
expectations about companies’ performance. When the forecast is higher than the reported 
EPS the forecast is called optimistic and when it is lower it is called pessimistic. 
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Meanwhile, investor sentiment index is all about future expectations. In the immediate 
effect, forecast error is expected to share a positive relationship with sentiment index. This 
suggests that optimistic earnings forecast contributes to higher sentiment levels and 
pessimistic earnings forecast leads to lower sentiment levels.  
All public companies listed in London Stock Exchange were used as available from 1992 
to 2013. Starting from 1992 was important to insure that analysts had adopted the third 
financial reporting standard (FRS3) in the UK. As stated in the previous chapter, the 
introduction of FRS3 has forced public companies to disclose more detailed information. It 
was clear that such introduction had an impact on financial analysts, specially when it 
comes to earnings per share forecasts (Acker, Horton and Tonks (2002)). Moreover, 
companies listed in LSE were collected as available in each year and this is important in 
order avoid the survivorship effect as each year the number of listed companies vary due to 
mergers, acquisitions, new entrants or companies leaving the index. At a particular month, 
companies followed by less than 3 forecasters were eliminated due to reliability issues and 
consistent with the literature.  
As documented in Chapter 2, analysts’ forecasts are proved to be optimistic to some extent 
and this is consistent with most of previous studies. An alternative illustration of this case 
is provided in Figure 4.1. This graph compares the yearly frequency (in percentage) of 
optimistic and pessimistic forecasts, where optimistic is the number of optimistic forecasts 
(Forecast error>0) per year divided by the total observations and pessimistic is the 
frequency of pessimistic forecasts (Forecast error<0) per year divided by the total 
observations. The bars clearly show the dominance of optimistic forecasts each year. The 
margin difference between optimistic and pessimistic forecasts reaches is peak in 2000-
2001, which is due to the stock market bubble. However, pessimistic forecasts significantly 
increased as the financial crisis emerged in 2007-2008 then gradually recovered after 2009.  
Figure 4.2 shows the yearly average percentage of forecast error made by consensus 
analysts. Results from this figure is consistent with Figure 4.1 regarding the dominance of 
optimistic forecasts. While Figure 4.1 shows that the number of analysts releasing 
optimistic forecasts is much higher than the number of times analysts are releasing 
pessimistic forecasts, figure 4.2 explains the sign each forecast is taking.  The Moving 
Average Line shows that forecast errors are mostly positive meaning that analysts are 
overall optimistic. Again, the lowest optimism level is recorded in 2009 during the 





Panel A shows the frequency in percentage of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts per year; where 
optimistic is the number optimistic forecasts (Forecast error>0) per year divided by the total 
observations, pessimistic is the number of pessimistic forecasts (Forecast error<0) per year divided 




An explanation of all the proxies used in the principal component analysis is provided in 
table 4.1. The table also provides information for the control variables.  Variables related 
to CEFD and NAV are collected using Thomson Reuters Datastream.  Bloomberg 
Terminals database is used to get the IPO data as well as debt and equity issuances. 
Variables related to Divp including BTM and dividend payout ratios are available from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. EPS forecasts data are downloaded from IBES which is 
available through Thomson Reuters Datastream. The control variables are collected from 
the UK office for national statistics and the UK General Affair of finance. They are used to 






























Panel A: Frequency (in %) of optimstic and pessimistic 
observations per year






Average of forecast error FE (in percentage) per year from 1993 until 2013.  [ 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|  






















Panel B: Yearly average of Consensus forecast error 







Table 4.1  
Definitions, expectations and sources of variables used in the estimation of Sentiment as well as the control variables.   
variable explanation Expected Sign Source 
CEFD Value weighted average of Closed-End fund discount negative Datastream 
Turn Share turnover positive Datastream 
Ripo First day returns on IPO  positive Bloomberg 
Nipo Number of IPOs  Positive Bloomberg 
Se Share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues Positive Bloomberg 
Divp Dividend Premium: difference in market to book ratio between 
dividend payers and nonpayers 
negative EIKON Thomson Reuters 
FE Forecast error  positive EIBES- Datastream 
        
Control variables:        
Recession a consecutive 2 quarters of negative growth in GDP   UK office for national 
statistics  
Industrial production index estimated index on industrial production levels  UK office for national 
statistics  
Consumer Durable + nondurable  estimated index on durable + nondurable products level  UK office for national 
statistics  
Consumer services estimated index on consumer services level  UK office for national 
statistics  
Consumer confidence index Survey on consumer's confidence in the economy  EIKON Thomson Reuters-UK 
General Affair of finance 
Business confidence index Survey of manager's confidence in the economy   EIKON Thomson Reuters 
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The choice of time at which each proxy is expected to have an impact on investor’s sentiment 
is another challenge since some variables might reflect a shift in sentiment earlier than others. 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), the first stage is to run the principal component 
analysis using each proxy and its lagged values and this results in a preliminary index with 14 
loadings, one of each variable and its lagged proxy. After computing the correlation between 
the preliminary index and all 14 variables, the second stage consists of choosing the variables 
that are the most correlated with the index either lead or lagged, then run again the first 
principal component using the chosen variables. The seven proxies chosen are then 
standardised so that the index has unit variance. 
b) 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = − 0.2698 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 0.4493 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.4439 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 +0.3986 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 +0.2419 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 0.3125 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.4617 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1 
 
Equation b is the result of the second stage analysis. First thing to notice is that the sign of 
each loading appears as expected. Nevertheless, as the sample is withdrawn from a long 
period of time, it is a must to distinguish between business cycles and investor sentiment 
cycles. To do so, a third stage principal component analysis is run after controlling for 
macroeconomic factors. Therefore, each of the six chosen proxies is regressed on growth in 
consumer durables; consumer nondurables and consumer services; a dummy variable of 
recession (A consecutive 2 quarters of negative GDP); and growth in industrial production 
index. These macroeconomic variables are collected from the UK office for national 
statistics.  
The residuals of each regression are then taken as the orthogonalised variables and used to 
run the first principal component.  
 
c) 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = −0.2798 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 0.4473 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 0.4422 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 +0.4042 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.2423 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 0.304 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.4603 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1 
Notice that the coefficient of each factor did not change much compared to the previous 
equation and the correlation between Sentiment index of equation c and b is 93%. More 
importantly, the first principal component captured 49% of the sample variance and only the 
first eigenvalue was above 1 meaning that the combination of these seven proxies mainly 
explains one factor which is the sentiment index.
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Table 4.2  
Summary statistics and correlations of sentiment index and sentiment components. Sentiment is the index estimated using the first principal 
component based on seven proxies: CEFDt is the monthly, value-weighted average discount on closed-end mutual funds. The second measure TURNt is 
the detrended natural log Turnover (5 years moving average) which is the ratio of reported trading volume over average shares listed in LSE. The third 
measure NIPOt is the monthly total number of initial public offerings issued in LSE. The fourth measure RIPOt-1 is the average monthly first-day returns 
of initial public offerings, issued the previous month. The fifth measure SEt is the share of monthly equity issuance to total equity and debt issuance. 
The sixth measure DIVPt-1 is the lag of natural log of the value-weighted average ratio of market-to-book ratio of dividend payers to non-payers. The 
last proxy FEt-1  is the analyst forecast error as a ratio of the difference between earnings per share monthly forecast and end of year reported 
earnings per share, divided by end of year reported earnings per share.  Each of the seven components are regressed against the growth in industrial 
production, the growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, and a dummy for recession (2 consecutive negative growth of GDP). The 
orthogonalised proxies are then used  
in this analysis.  
 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
   Summary Statistics Correlation matrix 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max sentiment CEFD TURN RIPO NIPO SE DIVP FE 
sentimentt 258 0.000 0.864 -3.356 2.417 1 
       CEFDt 288 -4.137 1.191 -27.544 30.321 -0.1679* 1 
      TURNt 288 7.063 3.862 2.709 41.182 0.6121** -0.1367 1 
     RIPOt 288 4.066 23.975 -10.556 259.000 0.8041*** -0.0141 0.3911*** 1 
    NIPOt-1 288 7.191 6.676 0.000 31.000 0.8257*** -0.0982 0.3513*** 0.4165* 1 
   SEt 280 30.928 3.665 0.000 100.000 0.2467** -0.184** 0.1276 0.2068** 0.032 1 
  DIVPt-1 288 -19.121 22.606 -1.016 0.473 -0.3184** 0.0812 -0.1312 -0.2321* -0.1093 -0.201** 1 
 FEt-1 288 9.911 6.357 -3.451 35.553 0.4227*** -0.416** 0.3094*** 0.1432 0.2451** 0.1334 -0.275* 1 
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Table 4.2 above provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of each 
component as well as the estimated sentiment. The first thing to notice in the correlation 
matrix is the low coefficient of CEFD (-16.7%) compared to previous studies such as 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Hribar and McInnis (2012)). This difference is normal since 
this study covers a more up to date sample and considering that open-ended funds became 
much more popular in recent years than closed-end fund (in the UK, open-ended funds 
occupy 69% of total mutual funds). Another interesting point is the high correlations 
between RIPO and sentiment (80.2%) and NIPO with Sentiment (82.5%). This is further 
illustrated in Figure 4.3 that clearly shows how the number of IPOs for example was 
seriously depending on the sentiment index. The year with the highest number of IPOs was 
2000, during which it recorded the highest level of standardized sentiment as well at 1.61 
on average. Similarly, 2009 recorded the lowest number of IPOs issued (total of 5) in a 
year where sentiment index was at the lowest figures (-1.47 on average). Another point to 
raise is the significant correlation between RIPO and NIPO (41.6%). Such correlation is 
expected since the more offerings listed in a year the more likely it is to increase the 
overall average of first day return. This correlation, however, does not harm the analysis as 
the variables will be used in a principal component analysis which seeks linear 
combination of variables such that the maximum variance is extracted, resulting in 
orthogonal uncorrelated factors.  
Additional comparative figures between Sentiment index and the rest of the proxies are 
provided in the Appendices (Appendix 1 to 4).  
As noted previously, it seems evident for many scholars that consumer confidence index is 
a powerful proxy for investor’s sentiment index (Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), 
Chen (2010), Fisher and Statman (2003), Schmelling (2009)). Therefore, figure 4.4 
compares the Sentiment index calculated in this study with consumer confidence survey 
conducted by the UK General Affair of Finance (accessed through Thomson Reuters 
Eikon). 
The correlation between the two indices is 51%. The time series plot in figure 4.4 
illustrates how both indices show signs of optimism during the internet bubble period 
(between 1995 and 2000), with another side of pessimism during the latest financial crisis 
between 2007 and 2012. Among the whole sample of study (290 months), there are 141 
months of negative sentiment (Periods of optimism), 149 months of positive sentiment 
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averages (periods of pessimism). If consumer confidence index was considered as the 





Figure 4.3  
Total number of IPOs issued yearly from 1992 until 2015, compared to the sentiment 
index SENT. Sentiment is the yearly average of monthly sentiment index estimated 
using the principal component analysis, based on seven sentiment components : 
Closed end fund discount, Forecast error, Number of IPOs, return on first day of IPOs, 
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4.5. Empirical Tests and discussion:  
The new index is believed to have an impact on stock returns and the value premium 
phenomenon in particular. In order to statistically test for such phenomenon, firms are 
sorted first depending on size, BTM (Book to Market ratio), profitability and investment 
aggressiveness, then compared during periods of different sentiment levels. For the BTM 
ratio, B is book value of equity at the end of fiscal year ending in year t-1 and M is market 
cap at the end of fiscal year t-1. Investment is the percentage change in total assets between 
the end of fiscal year t-1 and t-2. Profitability is the operating profitability divided by book 
equity.  Size is the market cap at fiscal year end t. For each month, firms are sorted to 5 
value-weighted portfolios of book-to-market quintiles, with low book-to-market firms 
which belong to the first quintile are called growth firms and value firms are the ones 
belonging to the fifth book-to-market quintile. The same sorting is applied using 
Figure 4.4  
Time series plot of consumer confidence index and investor's sentiment index from 1992 until 2015 in 
the UK. Consumer confidence index is a survey data collected monthly by the UK General Affair of 
Finance (accessed through Thomson Reuters Datastream). Investor Sentiment is a monthly sentiment 
index estimated using the principal component analysis, based on seven sentiment components : 
Closed end fund discount, Forecast error, Number of IPOs, return on first day of IPOs, Turnover, 
Divident premium, percentage of equity issues over total equity and debt issues. 
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investment and profitability quintiles. Regarding size, firms are sorted into three different 
portfolios using 33% and 66% as breakpoints, as well as 5 portfolios of size quintiles. The 
Sentiment index follows a slightly different procedure where months are divided into low 
(months during which sentiment percentile is less or equal to 33%), and optimistic (months 
during which sentiment percentile is above or equal to 66%). Sentiment is called neutral if 
its percentile is between 33% and 66%.  
 
Table 4.3 
Average monthly percent of returns for portfolios formed on size and BTM ratio (Book to market), from 
January 1992 until December 1995 (288 months). Where B is book value of equity at the end of fiscal year 
ending in year t-1 and M is market cap at the end of fiscal year t-1. Stocks are sorted into five size groups 
(small to big) taking the market cap quintiles as breaking points. Stocks are also sorted according to the BTM 
quintiles from low to high. The combination of the two sorting produces 25 value weighted portfolios.  
  Book-to-market quintiles     
Size quintiles Low 2 3 4 high HML Average 
small -3.8610 -3.36626 -2.59356 -1.80512 -0.81516 3.04591 -2.48823 
2 -1.6657 -1.48035 -0.73735 -0.29106 0.4823 2.14805 -0.73844 
3 -0.0443 -0.02775 0.45653 0.56164 1.27611 1.32041 0.444446 
4 0.62727 0.86072 1.08581 0.85486 1.64943 1.02216 1.015618 
big 0.67046 0.74106 0.69115 0.84927 1.70973 1.03927 0.932334 
        
 
Table 4.3 shows the percentage of stock returns on size and BTM portfolios using the 
quintile sorting for both variables (5 x 5). Consistent with the literature, the value premium 
can be clearly seen in this analysis as high BTM firms produce higher returns on average 
than low BTM firms. In every size row, most of stock returns gradually increases from low 
to high BTM but on a different rate or change. Fama and French (2015) find that the value 
premium is more evident in smaller firms. Results in table 4.3 also show a similar trend as 
smaller firms record higher differences in returns between firms with high and low BTM 
ratios. Moreover, HML monotonically decreases as firm size increases. For example, the 
average monthly return for big companies increases from 0.67% to 1.709% between 
growth and value companies respectively. Nonetheless, stocks that are extremely small 
(the first row) appear to have a very low return. Even more, the worst average return is 
recorded for the extremely small companies that have an extremely low BTM ratio (-
3.861% monthly return).   
Preliminary results regarding the impact of sentiment on stock returns could be seen in 
table 4.4. Returns in neutral periods are very hard to interpret as they they consist of mixed 
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signs and no unique features. Consequently, the main focus in this research is on the 
extreme sides of Sentiment index which are low and high. Concerning size, panel A show 
that big companies outperform small ones during all sentiment periods. This difference, 
however, is slightly lower during high sentiment than low sentiment. By looking at each 
column separately, while small companies improve on average by 1.03% (between low 
and high sentiment levels), big companies improve by 0.34%. As a result, stock returns 
appear to be higher during high Sentiment periods for all firm sizes, but small companies 
are more prone to sentiment shifts than big ones. This is not consistent with Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) who report negative change of stock returns for small companies following 
an increase of sentiment level from low to high, but no impact whatsoever on big 
companies.  
Panel B indicates how a shift in sentiment level can affect returns of growth and value 
firms. Despite an average return being higher in high sentiment compared to low 
sentiment, HML (High minus Low) seems to be stronger in low sentiment periods. By 
looking at the first column in panel B, growth firms have higher returns during high 
sentiment periods compared to low sentiment periods, with an average difference of 
0.608% per month. Value firms, however, don’t seem to be affected by the sentiment 
conditions as there was almost no difference between their average stock returns during 
high and low sentiment periods. The fact that returns on value firms remained unchanged 
between low and high sentiment levels followed by an increase in returns of growth firms 
during high sentiment levels, led HML to appear smaller in high sentiment periods. This 
result indicates that investors move away from growth stocks during low sentiment periods 
and if they are willing to invest at all, they would rather invest in value stocks. However, 
as the level of sentiment improves, the demand for growth stocks accelerates faster than 
the demand for value stocks, creating a bigger difference for growth stocks from low to 
high sentiment levels. The uncertainty surrounding growth stocks is a major factor in 
making this difference. This comes in line with the Baker and Wurgler (2006)’s theory 
stating that sentiment levels affect mostly stocks that are more sensitive to speculative 
demand and harder to value, however, the current result suggests that stock returns are 
positively affected by a positive shift in sentiment, which is the opposite of what is 
reported by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Baker and Wurgler (2006) compares portfolio 
returns with the last year-end sentiment level, and show that the long term stock returns are 
negatively correlated with sentiment levels (we reach similar results of the long term effect 
for small companies following the same approach, results are shown in appendix 7).  
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Table 4.4  
Average monthly percent of returns for portfolios formed on Sentiment and BTM ratio (Book to market); 
Sentiment and investment; Sentiment and profitability, from January 1992 until December 1995 (288 months). 
Where B is book value of equity at the end of fiscal year ending in year t-1 and M is market cap at the end of 
fiscal year t-1. Investment is the percentage change in total assets between the end of fiscal year t-1 and t-2. 
Profitability is the operating profitability divided by book equity. Stocks are sorted according to the BTM 
quintiles from low to high. Months are sorted into three groups of sentiment (using 33% and 66% as the break-
point percentiles). The combination of BTM and Sentiment groups produces 18 value weighted portfolios. The 
same thing applies to Investment with Sentiment, and Profitability with Sentiment. SMB is small minus big. 
HML is high minus low BTM. CMA is conservative minus aggressive investing. RMW is robust minus weak 
profitability.  
  Panel A: Size     
Sentiment small 2 3 4 big SMB average 
low -2.46338 -0.66039 0.49567 1.15282 1.07723 -3.54061 -0.07961 
neutral -2.71936 -1.34725 -0.01231 0.37549 0.29082 -3.01018 -0.682522 
high -1.42511 0.24133 0.89495 1.53112 1.41984 -2.84495 0.532426 
Difference 1.03827 0.90172 0.39928 0.3783 0.34261 
  
 
Panel B: Book-to-market quintiles 
  Sentiment Low 2 3 4 high HML average 
low 0.59172 0.79329 0.81657 1.22577 2.16002 1.5683 1.117474 
neutral 0.28357 0.24532 0.46127 -0.34028 0.6437 0.36013 0.258716 
high 1.20036 1.50352 1.11016 1.74054 2.19409 0.99373 1.549734 
Difference 0.60864 0.71023 0.29359 0.51477 0.03407 
  
 
Panel C: Investment quintiles 
  Sentiment Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive CMA average 
low 0.8215 1.10511 0.83745 0.67244 1.84281 -1.02131 1.055862 
neutral 0.2115 0.26301 -0.0649 -0.14191 0.08825 0.12325 0.07119 
high 1.32989 1.28986 1.2771 0.989 1.12014 0.20975 1.201198 
Difference 0.50839 0.18475 0.43965 0.31656 -0.72267 
  
 
Panel D: Profitability quintiles 
  Sentimen
t weak 2 3 4 robust RMW average 
low -0.65238 1.08359 0.58851 1.18647 1.21728 1.86966 0.684694 
neutral -0.45799 -0.4738 -0.2353 0.10438 0.43305 0.89104 -0.125932 
high 1.04171 0.20369 1.14792 1.20611 1.4304 0.38869 1.005966 
Difference 1.69409 -0.8799 0.55941 0.01964 0.21312 
          
 
Results in table 4.4 of this study show the positive short term effect of sentiment levels on 
stock returns. More precisely, stock returns are higher when sentiment level of the same 
month (or the previous month at most) is high. The main argument in this analysis is that 
reaction of stock prices can hardly be attributed to sentiment levels of the previous year, in 
the sense that a fast integrated markets reflect the sentiment proxies very quickly. 
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Additionally, the use of forecast error as a seventh proxy of sentiment is believed to have 
contributed to this impact.  
Panel C of the same table provides a different pattern that is regarding the investment ratio. 
Investment quintile is a measure of investment aggressiveness having 1 (conservative 
investing) and 5 (aggressive investing). Firms having a conservative month of investment 
appear to have lower returns, only in low sentiment. During high sentiment, firms that are 
investing aggressively have a slightly lower returns than conservative firms with a monthly 
difference CMA of 0.209% (conservative minus aggressive). Consistent with Lakonishok 
shleifer and vishny (1994). the theory of overreacting and herding could be clearly seen in 
this panel. The fact that aggressive firms earn more during low sentiment might be a sign 
of strength specially during a period of general pessimism, resulting in an overreaction to 
this sign.  
Panel D presents figures concerning the return on profitable companies during different 
sentiment levels. In this panel, profitable firms barely improve their monthly return when 
sentiment shifts from low to high. Contrarily, returns on firms with weak operating 
profitability jumps significantly from -0.652% to 1.04171% after sentiment index 
improved from low to high. As a result, RMW (robust minus weak) drops from 1.87% to 
0.388%.  
This finding supports the theory that unprofitable firms are harder to value and tend to be 
more affected by Sentiment. Results in chapter 4 also confirm this suggestion as forecast 
error was found to be negatively correlated with firms’ performance, meaning that forecast 
error is higher when firms reporting losses, decrease in their earnings, or firms that did not 
distribute dividends.  
Equation d examines the robustness of the effect of sentiment on value premium, where 
excess returns are used as a dependant variable and the regression is run for value firms 
and growth firms separately in order to compare the coefficients of each panel apart.  
𝐴𝐴) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the return on portfolio of growth stocks or value stocks, Sentiment is the 
sentiment index; MP is the market premium (market return minus risk free rate); SMB is 
return on small minus big companies; RMW is return on robust companies (companies 
with high operating profitability) minus return on weak companies (firms with low 
operating profitability); CMA is return on conservative (companies with low investment 
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rates) minus return on aggressive companies (firms with high investment rates); 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the 
residual term.  
 
 
Table 4.5  
Regression analysis of excess returns on Sentiment index, and Fama 
and French (2015) factors using OLS and Newey-west robust standard 
errors. Where excess return is return on portfolio of growth or value 
stocks minus risk free rate (one month treasury bill), Sentiment is the 
sentiment index; MP is the market premium (market return minus risk 
free rate); SMB is return on small minus return on big companies; 
RMW is return on robust companies (companies with high operating 
profitability) minus return on weak companies (firms with low 
operating profitability); CMA is return on conservative (companies 
with low investment rates) minus return on aggressive companies 
(firms with high investment rates); 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the residual term.  
Panel A: OLS 
Excess  Growth  Value 
Return coef se coef se 
     Sentiment 0.228*** (0.0394) 0.145*** (0.0338) 
MP 0.827*** (0.0426) 0.833*** (0.0365) 
SMB -0.0987** (0.0430) -0.186*** (0.0369) 
RMW -0.00461 (0.0394) -0.0850* (0.0338) 
CMA -0.00553 (0.0376) 0.0738* (0.032) 
Constant -0.0788** (0.0371) -0.0732 (0.0318) 
R-squared 0.655 0.596 
          
  Panel B: Robust SE/Newey-West 
Excess Growth  Value 
Return coef se coef se 
     Sentiment 0.228*** (0.0525) 0.145*** (0.0435) 
MP 0.827*** (0.0641) 0.833*** (0.0507) 
SMB -0.0987 (0.0670) -0.186*** (0.0419) 
RMW -0.00461 (0.0623) -0.0850* (0.0438) 
CMA -0.00553 (0.0517) 0.0738* (0.0434) 
Constant -0.0788 (0.0771) -0.0732 (0.0642) 
          
se: standard errors 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Using Newey-West regression is essential in order to control for the serial correlation 
present in the sample. Coefficients, raw standard errors and robust standard errors can be 
seen in table 4.5 above. Panel A represents the OLS regressions where coefficients of 
growth and value firms’ samples can be seen. Panel B shows the same coefficients, but 
with Newey-west robust standard errors. In all regressions, MP, SMB, RMW and CMA are 
used as control variables following Fama and French (2015). 
Interestingly, Sentiment coefficient in the growth panel is greater than the sentiment 
coefficient in the value panel. The slope of the relationship between sentiment and excess 
returns on growth stocks is 0.228 compared to 0.145 for value stocks. Both coefficients 
being statistically significant at 1% confidence level, this finding supports the hypothesis 
that growth firms are more sensitive to sentiment than value firms, which is reflected in 
stock returns as a result. It is important to note again that the impact of sentiment index on 
stock return is a short term one since this index consists of two proxies set at time t, and 
another four components that are lagged to one-month (FE, Turn, RIPO and DivP). Taking 
for example the coefficient of RIPO, combining figures from equation c and table 4.5 
allow us to say that the average monthly return on IPOs affected positively subsequent 
monthly stock returns of companies in LSE. This short term impact of RIPO was also 
evident in forecast error FE. Since sentiment index affects positively stock returns; and 
since sentiment index is positively significantly correlated with forecast error (lagged to 
one month), an increase in forecast error is likely to lead to an increase in excess returns. In 
other words, excess returns are more likely to be positive following a month of optimistic 
consensus forecasts. 
In table 4.6 below a separate regression of excess return is run for each BTM quintile. This 
gives more detailed coefficients about the role of Sentiment in each panel of companies. 
Consistent with previous results, excess returns of Panel 1 appear to be the most affected 
by Sentiment index with a coefficient of 0.228 significant at 1% level. Sentiment 
coefficient decreases almost monotonically when BTM increases from quintile 1 to 
quintile 5. Moreover, one can also induce that a shift in forecast error have a higher impact 
on growth firms than value firms. A possible reason is that growth firms are harder to 
predict and followed by less analysts than value firms, which is consistent with the theory 
that growth firms are harder to value. 
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Table 4.6  
Regression analysis of excess return on Sentiment index, and Fama and French (2015) factors 
Newey-west robust standard errors. Data was divided into five BTM panels from 1 to 5 (low 
to high). Where excess return is return on portfolio of growth or value stocks minus risk free 
rate (one month treasury bill), Sentiment is the sentiment index; MP is the market premium 
(market return minus risk free rate); SMB is return on small minus big companies; RMW is 
return on robust companies (companies with high operating profitability) minus return on 
weak companies (firms with low operating profitability); CMA is return on conservative 
(companies with low investment rates) minus return on aggressive companies (firms with high 
investment rates); 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the residual term. 
 
 
Results in this study adds to findings of some previous studies but contradicts with others. 
Few articles such as Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), support the idea that sentiment index 
affects negatively future stock returns (in the long run), this study finds that sentiment 
affects positively stock returns (in the short run) on a monthly basis. Overall, it is 
consistent with Ciner (2014) who states that sentiment affects positively stock returns in 
the short term and negatively in the long term but only for small firms.  
In addition, this study shows that this pattern is significant in the UK for growth and value 
firms, but stronger for growth and small firms. However, it contradicts results in Brown 






1 2 3 4 5 
Sentiment 0.228*** 0.223*** 0.228*** 0.163*** 0.145*** 
 
(0.0525) (0.0441) (0.0420) (0.0501) (0.0435) 
MP 0.827*** 0.839*** 0.830*** 0.778*** 0.833*** 
 
(0.0641) (0.0633) (0.0603) (0.0795) (0.0507) 
SMB -0.0987 -0.165*** -0.114*** -0.0632 -0.186*** 
 
(0.0670) (0.0405) (0.0436) (0.0557) (0.0419) 
RMW -0.00461 0.00757 -0.185*** -0.126*** -0.0850* 
 
(0.0623) (0.0593) (0.0495) (0.0463) (0.0438) 
CMA -0.00553 -0.0691 0.0901* 0.0526 0.0738* 
 
(0.0517) (0.0499) (0.0501) (0.0491) (0.0434) 
Constant -0.0788 -0.0650 -0.0914 -0.0820 -0.0732 
 
(0.0771) (0.0687) (0.0652) (0.0679) (0.0642) 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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owned companies. It is also inconsistent with Schmelling (2009) who report that sentiment 
impact is qualitatively more powerful on value firms than growth firms.  
Furthermore, this study doesn’t agree with McInnis and Hribar (2012) regarding the use of 
forecast error as an intermediary between sentiment and stock returns. As a reminder, 
McInnis and Hribar (2012) report a positive relationship between forecast error and stock 
returns and claim that forecast error is an intermediary of sentiment as it absorbs most of 
the impact power shown by sentiment alone on stock returns. One possible reasons could 
be the common component shared between sentiment index and forecast error, resulting in 
forecast error being collinear with sentiment index. In fact, this particular point is 
addressed by the present research as the correlation between forecast error and sentiment 
index proved to be significant and equal to 42.2%. Based on this argument, this study 
shows how sentiment index, as a function of forecast error and other traditional 
components, has a powerful impact on stock return without one replacing the other. 
 
4.6. Sensitivity analysis:  
4.6.1. Re-estimating Sentiment index without Forecast Error:  
As a robustness check, the sentiment index is re-estimated this time after excluding 
Forecast error. This extra step is essential to the analysis for three different reasons. First, it 
will allow us to see whether forecast error has really contributed to the sentiment index or 
not. Second, it will explain whether the significant results related to stock returns were 
mainly driven by the inclusion of forecast error in the sentiment index or simply by the 
other variables. Third, it will enable us to properly compare results with other studies.  
The following equation is obtained after running the principal component analysis based 
on six proxies: 
e) 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴∗𝑡𝑡 = − 0.2003 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 0.4968 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 +0.5419 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 0.468 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 +0.2863 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 0.3441 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 
 
Sentiment* is the new index estimated without including forecast error. Where all 
variables are as explained earlier, the sign of each coefficient remains unchanged. 
However, the exclusion of forecast error affected the coefficients themselves (in absolute 
value), with the biggest change occurring for the coefficients of NIPO (+0.0997) and 
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CEFD (+0.0795). Nevertheless, the first principal component of equation e captured only 
33.4% of the sample variance compared to 49% when Forecast error was included 
(equation c). Furthermore, the correlation between Sentiment* and the consumer 
confidence index is 0.47 compared to 0.51 with Sentiment. 
In order to see the impact of Sentiment* on excess return and value premium, Newey west 
regression is run again as seen in the following equation:      
𝐴𝐴) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 
Where Sentiment* is the sentiment index obtained from the principal component analysis 
based on six proxies (excluding forecast error), the rest of the variables are the same as 
explained in equation d.  Results of regression e are presented in table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7  
Regression analysis of excess returns on Sentiment* index, and 
Fama and French (2015) factors using Newey-west robust 
standard errors. Where excess return is return on portfolio of 
growth or value stocks minus risk free rate (one month treasury 
bill), Sentiment* is the sentiment index without the forecast 
error; MP is the market premium (market return minus risk free 
rate); SMB is return on small minus return on big companies; 
RMW is return on robust companies (companies with high 
operating profitability) minus return on weak companies (firms 
with low operating profitability); CMA is return on 
conservative (companies with low investment rates) minus 
return on aggressive companies (firms with high investment 














Robust SE- Newey West of Sentiment* 
 
Growth   Value 
Excess 
Return coef se coef se 
     Sentiment* 0.1827*** 0.0495 0.166*** 0.0442 
MR-RF 0.7968*** 0.0599 0.7608*** 0.0699 
SMB -0.1134* 0.068 -0.0717 0.0526 
RMW -0.0143 0.0576 -0.1288*** 0.0465 
CMA -0.006 0.0524 0.0503 0.0506 
Constant -0.0728 0.078 -0.0794 0.0671 
          
se: standard errors 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficient of Sentiment* remained positively significant meaning that Sentiment* 
index has a positive impact on Excess return even after excluding the forecast error. 
However, excess returns of growth stocks appear to be affected more by Sentiment rather 
than Sentiment*. This is reflected in a decrease of the coefficient from 0.228 (for 
Sentiment) to 0.1827 (for Sentiment*). Both figures are significant at 1% confidence level. 
Where the only change made between both was the exclusion of forecast error, such result 
implies that forecast error is significantly affecting excess returns on growth stocks.  When 
Forecast error is invited to the equation, the coefficient appears to be higher. Excess 
returns on value stocks, however, remain unaffected by the change.  
To check in details whether this difference is statistically significant or not, regression g 
estimates the impact made by the difference between Sentiment and Sentiment* on excess 
returns of growth and value stocks. This difference is meant to represent the inclusion of 
forecast error.   
𝐸𝐸)𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
Everything else remains as explained earlier, Difference is the difference between 
Sentiment and Sentiment*. Table 4.8 shows a positive coefficient significant at 1% for 
growth companies only (BTM quintile equal to 1). This significant difference implies that 
the introduction of forecast error to the Sentiment showed a significant positive impact on 
stock returns but only growth companies’ stock returns. The coefficient of Difference 
could not be found significant on the rest of the BTM quintiles.  
 
4.6.2. Sensitivity analysis: Re-estimating the relationship between 
the long-term stock return and sentiment levels. 
 
As stated earlier, Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brown and Cliff (2005), Ciner (2014) and 
others claim that stock returns are affected by the sentiment levels in the long term. As a 
robustness check and to allow for comparison, the same was re-estimated in this research 
using the sentiment index lagged by one year. Results in appendix 5 show a very minimal 
change in stock returns for growth stocks when the sentiment level increases from low to 
  161 
high (with an increase of 0.17% on a monthly average). Similarly, the change in returns of 
small companies was even smaller with a decrease of -0.05% on a monthly average when 
sentiment increases from low to high. The magnitude of change in stock returns of big and 
value companies was higher than small and growth companies.  
This finding contradicts with the claim that the sentiment changes affect stock returns on 
the long term. However, it supports the main argument in this analysis that the reaction of 
stock prices can hardly be attributed to sentiment levels of the previous year, in the sense 
that a fast integrated markets reflect the sentiment proxies very quickly. Additionally, the 
use of forecast error as a seventh proxy of sentiment is believed to have contributed to this 
impact. 
 
Table 4.8  
Regression analysis of excess returns on Difference, and Fama and French 
(2015) factors using Newey-west robust standard errors. Where excess return 
is return on portfolio of growth or value stocks minus risk free rate (one month 
treasury bill), Difference is the difference between Sentiment and Sentiment*. 
MP is the market premium (market return minus risk free rate); SMB is return 
on small minus return on big companies; RMW is return on robust companies 
(companies with high operating profitability) minus return on weak companies 
(firms with low operating profitability); CMA is return on conservative 
(companies with low investment rates) minus return on aggressive companies 
(firms with high investment rates); 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the residual term.  
 




1 2 3 4 5 
      Difference 0.1002*** 0.063 0.0505 0.0478 0.0036 
 
0.0349 0.042 0.037 0.0298 0.0389 
MR-RF 0.7822*** 0.77*** 0.7803*** 0.7984*** 0.7267*** 
 
0.0670 0.0706 0.0683 0.0525 0.0603 
SMB -0.134*** -0.123* -0.190*** -0.201*** -0.0861* 
 
0.0460 0.0703 0.042 0.0394 0.0492 
RMW -0.226*** -0.0477 -0.03 -0.1120** -0.158*** 
 
0.0526 0.0635 0.0579 0.0440 0.050 
CMA 0.1103** 0.0135 -0.0507 0.0861* 0.0650 
 
0.0539 0.0558 0.0493 0.0463 0.0527 
Constant -0.070 -0.0577 -0.0442 -0.0600 -0.0661 
 
0.0771 0.0855 0.0778 0.0682 0.0705 
           
se: standard errors 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2. Conclusion:  
In this study, the relationships between sentiment, analyst forecast error and stock 
returns are examined. Previous studies concerning the impact of market sentiment do not 
consider the role of analysts’ forecasts. This research contributes to the literature by taking 
into consideration the forecast error as a major component of investor sentiment, motivated 
by its importance in setting the market expectation in the stock market, and investigates its 
effect on the short term stock returns and the value premium anomaly.   
Accordingly, the sentiment index is estimated using principal component analysis based on 
six market proxies following Baker and Wurgler (2006) and including the forecast error as 
the seventh proxy. All companies in London Stock exchange are investigated from January 
1992 until December 2015. The first stage analysis show that sentiment index is positively 
significantly correlated with forecast error, that is, when monthly aggregate earnings 
forecast is optimistic, investor sentiment tends to be high in the following month and vice 
versa.  
More interestingly, sentiment index proves to be positively related with stock returns 
meaning that stock returns increase when sentiment index is higher. While big and value 
companies appear to have larger returns in general, small and growth companies seem to 
be more prone to sentiment shifts than big ones. When the sentiment level shifts from low 
to high, stock returns of growth companies appear to increase significantly.  Furthermore, 
firms having a conservative month of investment appear to have lower returns, only in low 
sentiment periods. During high sentiment, however, firms that are investing aggressively 
tend to have lower returns than conservative firms. Even more, stocks with high operating 
profitability barely improve their monthly return when sentiment increases from low to 
high. These findings are inconsistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Brown and Cliff 
(2005) who find that the sentiment index negatively affects stock returns on the long run.  
Having a significant positive correlation between forecast error and sentiment index, it 
becomes possible to interpolate that stock returns and forecast error share a positive 
relationship as well, such that, stock returns increases when earnings forecasts are more 
optimistic.    
To conclude, this research provides a different dimension of the role of analyst forecast 
error in stock markets. Even more, it doesn’t support the idea that earnings forecast affects 
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directly stock returns, instead, it offers a valid argument that aggregate sentiment should be 
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusion 
 
Financial analysts are considered essential to the existence of the financial markets 
and the global economy. Their intermediate role consists of feeding the market with 
analysis, reports, forecasts and investment recommendations. As a result, the market digest 
what they release of information which reflects to some extent companies’ performances 
based on fundamental analysis. Therefore, the accuracy and reliability of the figures 
generated by analysts might have serious implications on the stock market.  
Motivated by the importance of financial analysts’ forecasts in the stock market, this 
research provides an all around investigation of the nature, causes and consequences of 
analysts’ forecasting errors made by financial analysts targeting companies listed on 
London Stock Exchange. There are three empirical studies provided in this research and 
addressing every issue surrounding analysts’ forecasts separately, but offered in an order 
that follows a logical reasoning in order to fulfil the aim of the research. The first empirical 
study aims to build a better understanding about financial analyst forecasts, their accuracy 
and rationality. While doing so, it highlights few weaknesses found in data sampling 
provided in previous studies. One of these drawbacks is setting the fiscal year-end date as 
the ending of the forecast period, whereas analysts keep forecasting until the 
announcement date which is usually between 1 to four months after the fiscal year end. 
Another drawback is including a sample data of firms that have their fiscal year ending in 
December only. Such weaknesses are believed to be misrepresenting the relevant 
aggregate error made by financial analysts’ forecasts. Using 21 years of monthly consensus 
forecasts data, analyst forecasts are proved to be generally optimistic. This is evident when 
comparing the forecasts made by analysts to the reported earnings per share released by the 
company at the end of the fiscal year. Findings show that analysts forecasts are optimistic, 
but not as optimistic as the literature suggests. Further robustness analysis confirms this 
disparity when applying the closing year end as the last forecasting date as well as 
December year only firms.  
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Moreover, despite that preliminary results show that forecast error decreases as it 
approaches the end of the year, this downward trend could not be proven statistically. This 
trend is a well-documented phenomenon in the literature (Debondt and Thaler (1990), 
Capstaff et. al (1995) and Capstaff et. al (2001)). Moreover, the last forecast in the year 
seems to stay above the realised earnings. Such result defies that managers try to walk 
down the analysts’ forecasts in order to create a positive surprise after the announcement 
date. Contrary to previous studies such as Easterwood and Nutt (1999), this study couldn’t 
find any evidence about the relationship between forecast error and previous years’ 
earnings. This implies that previous year’s earnings do not lead to an overreaction of 
related future forecasts and that analysts are not proved to be irrational.  
The second empirical study argues that analysts’ forecast error may be misled by external 
forces that are hard to observe, in particular earnings management. Managers use earnings 
management as a tool in order to make short term adjustments to their company’s earnings, 
by using accruals management or direct changes in real activities expenditures (real 
earnings management). There are many motives as to why managers may seek such 
methods. They may manage earnings downwards or upwards to smooth out earnings over 
a set of fiscal periods. Another reason could be to boost earnings so avoid reporting losses.  
Following the Modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
accruals-based earnings management, and Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate real earnings 
management, the second chapter examines the same sample used in chapter 2 over a period 
from 1993 to 2013. Additionally, chapter 3 controls for a possible endogeneity using 
Generalised Methods of Moments. This is mainly due to a likely reversal causality 
between analysts’ forecasts and and earnings that are managed in order to meet or beat the 
forecast. Moreover, a sample of suspicious firms is filtered to further control for this 
problem. Nevertheless, robustness tests show that managers rely on earnings management 
mainly to avoid losses rather than meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.   
 Findings show that earnings management affects positively forecast error. This means that 
as managers manage earnings, analysts do not seem to anticipate these changes thus the 
error appears to be increasing. However, this is statistically significant only for accruals-
based management and not real earnings management. A possible explanation for this 
difference is the timing in which both adjustments are done. While accruals earnings 
management are often done by the end of the fiscal year to get a better picture of what is 
expected, adjusting real operational activities require an interference during the fiscal year 
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which gives an time advantage for analysts to capture and reflect the changes in their 
analysis.   
The third empirical chapter attempts to examine the consequence of analyst forecast errors, 
specifically its impact on the value premium anomaly through market sentiment. This is 
achieved by using investor sentiment index as an intermediate variable. The main rational 
of chapter 4 lies in the definition of investor sentiment as the market expectation towards a 
norm. As the same applies to earnings forecasts, a common component could be observed 
between forecast optimism and investor sentiment level. Consequently, the analysis in this 
chapter introduces a new index of investor sentiment using a principal component analysis 
based on seven proxies of investor sentiment, one of which is Forecast Error.  
The sample in this chapter is expanded to all companies listed in London Stock Exchange 
and to a period starting from 1992 until 2015. This is essential to gather enough data 
required to conduct the statistical analysis. Results show a positive correlation between 
investor sentiment and forecast error. This indicates that when analysts’ forecasts are 
optimistic, investor sentiment is more likely to be high. Moreover, the chapter tries to 
explain the popular value premium phenomenon based on investor sentiment and forecast 
error. Consistent with Fama and French (2014), results show that value firms beat growth 
firms in general. However, the value premium seems to be decreasing when sentiment 
level increases from low to high. This is true because growth firms appear to be more 
sensitive to shifts in sentiment levels than value firms. Moreover, sensitivity analysis show 
that sentiment shifts do not affect stock returns on the long run, which is inconsistent with 
previous studies (Baker and Wurgler (2006), Ciner (2014), among others). A possible 
explanation is that the reaction of stock prices can hardly be linked to sentiment levels of 
the previous year, in the sense that a fast integrated markets reflect the sentiment proxies 
very quickly. The contribution made in the third empirical chapter consists of showing the 
impact of forecast error on short term stock returns, by proposing a different behavioural 
dimension based on investor sentiment. Therefore, it offers a valid argument that aggregate 
sentiment should be looked at as a function of forecast optimism due to the common 
components they share.  
Despite all the effort put to conduct a robust research project, this study is still 
subject to many pitfalls that can be addressed in future studies. First, the data used in this 
research is based on consensus forecasts that are gathered on a monthly basis which helps 
to gain a broad picture of the nature of these forecasts together. Nevertheless, further 
analysis regarding the individual characteristics of analysts can better address the issues 
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surrounding the performance and rationality of financial analysts. The cross sectional 
features of analysts such as their ranking, size of the company they belong to, their 
experience, level of education and others, can explain a lot of the patterns that were 
discussed earlier. Second, the model of estimation of earnings management proposed first 
by Jones (1991) and later adjusted by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) faces a lot of 
criticism by academic accountants as to how effective this could be in detecting earnings 
management, especially that this model might capture other shifts in discretionary accounts 
that are not mainly done under the objective of managing earnings. While this could be 
true to some extent, the research can be improved by applying and comparing different 
models that are capable of capturing earnings models such as “Benford’s law”. Third, the 
sentiment index is estimated based on 7 variables that are believed to be the best proxies of 
investor’s sentiment in the market. Nevertheless, this is considered a limitation as it’s an 
indirect way in estimating the investor’s sentiment by capturing the variability of its 
proxies. A further improvement would be to conduct a survey analysis targeting financial 
market practitioners, managers and investors in order to directly estimate the market 
sentiment. The American Association of Individual Investors AAII in the United States 
collect similar surveys on a monthly basis, however, there exists no similar repetitive 
surveys in the UK.  Such approach is time consuming and costly thus restricted this 
research to stick with a rather indirect method.  
To conclude, the combination of all empirical studies offers an all around 
investigation of the areas surrounding analysts’ forecasts. While it contributes to the field 
of finance by pointing out at weaknesses and shortcomings that could be exploited among 
market participants, it opens the door for other research studies in finance and other social 
science disciplines to further investigate and improve the efficiency of the financial 
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Appendix 1 
A comparison between yearly averages of FE and sentiment index from 1992 to 2015. FE 
is is the yearly average of forecast error. Both values are standardised. 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊−𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊|  . 
Where F is the earnings forecast at time t and E is the reported earnings per share at time t. 
Sentiment is the yearly average of monthly sentiment index estimated using the principal 
component analysis, based on seven sentiment components : Closed end fund discount, 
Forecast error, Number of IPOs, return on first day of IPOs, Turnover, Divident premium, 
percentage of equity issues over total equity and debt issues. The values in the figure are 
standardised 
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Appendix 2 
A comparison between yearly averages of Turnover ratio and sentiment index 
from 1992 to 2015. Both values are standardised. Turnover ratio is the yearly 
de-trended natural log Turnover (5 years moving average) which is the ratio of 
reported trading volume over average shares listed in LSE. Sentiment is the 
yearly average of monthly sentiment index estimated using the principal 
component analysis, based on seven sentiment components : Closed end fund 
discount, Forecast error, Number of IPOs, return on first day of IPOs, Turnover, 
Divident premium, percentage of equity issues over total equity and debt 
issues. The values in the figure are standardised 
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Appendix 3 
A comparison between yearly averages of SE and sentiment index from 1992 to 
2015. Both values are standardised. SEt is the yearly average of share of monthly 
equity issuance to total equity and debt issuance. Sentiment is the yearly average of 
monthly sentiment index estimated using the principal component analysis, based on 
seven sentiment components : Closed end fund discount, Forecast error, Number of 
IPOs, return on first day of IPOs, Turnover, Divident premium, percentage of equity 
issues over total equity and debt issues. The values in the figure are standardised 
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Appendix 4 
A comparison between yearly averages of CEFD and sentiment index from 
1992 to 2015. Both values are standardised. CEFDt is the yearly average of 
monthly values of discount on closed-end mutual funds. Sentiment is the 
yearly average of monthly sentiment index estimated using the principal 
component analysis, based on seven sentiment components : Closed end 
fund discount, Forecast error, Number of IPOs, return on first day of IPOs, 
Turnover, Divident premium, percentage of equity issues over total equity 
and debt issues. The values in the figure are standardised 
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Appendix 5 
Average monthly percent of returns for portfolios formed on lag Sentiment and size, lag 
Sentiment and BTM ratio (Book to market); from January 1992 until December 1995 
(288 months). Where Months are sorted into three groups of Sentiment which is the 
sentiment index at the end of the previous fiscal year, including Forecast Error as a 
seventh proxy (using 33% and 66% as the break-point percentiles). B is book value of 
equity at the end of fiscal year ending in year t-1 and M is market cap at the end of 
fiscal year t-1. Size is the Market capitalisation. Stocks are sorted according to the BTM 
quintiles from low to high, and according to size quintiles from small to big. The 
combination of BTM and lag Sentiment groups produces 18 value weighted portfolios. 
The same thing applies to size with Sentiment. SMB is small minus big. HML is high 





Panel A: Size 
 
    
Sentiment* small 2 3 4 big SMB average 
low -1.91423 -0.34435 0.98744 1.3586 1.18691 -3.10114 0.254874 
neutral -2.49782 -0.92283 0.21894 0.54752 0.23652 -2.73434 -0.48353 
high -1.9646 -0.30097 0.41134 1.39762 1.47516 -3.43976 0.20371 
Difference -0.05037 0.04338 -0.5761 0.03902 0.28825     
 
 
Panel B: Book-to-market quintiles 
 
  Sentiment* Low 2 3 4 high HML average 
low 1.07255 0.95171 1.34977 0.9623 1.81751 -0.74496 1.230768 
neutral 0.18433 -0.04307 -0.05713 0.24003 1.55507 -1.37074 0.375846 
high 1.24779 1.56699 1.45022 1.89372 1.60494 -0.35715 1.552732 
Difference 0.17524 0.61528 0.10045 0.93142 -0.21257     









Average monthly percent of returns for portfolios formed on lag Sentiment and Investment 
ratio; lag Sentiment and profitability, from January 1992 until December 1995 (288 
months). Where Months are sorted into three groups of Sentiment which is the sentiment 
index at the end of the previous fiscal year, including Forecast Error as a seventh proxy 
(using 33% and 66% as the break-point percentiles).  Investment is the percentage change 
in total assets between the end of fiscal year t-1 and t-2. Profitability is the operating 
profitability divided by book equity. Stocks are sorted according to the Investment 
quintiles from conservative to aggressive. The combination of investment and lag 
Sentiment groups produces 18 value weighted portfolios. The same thing applies to 
profitability with Sentiment. CMA is conservative minus aggressive investing. RMW is 
robust minus weak profitability.  
 
        
 
Panel A: Investment quintiles 
 
  Sentiment* Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive CMA average 
low 1.47334 1.1684 0.79475 0.99802 2.39939 -0.92605 1.36678 
neutral -0.0754 0.2981 0.27842 0.18063 0.42597 -0.50137 0.221544 
high 1.35973 1.43967 1.68102 1.5676 0.90034 0.45939 1.389672 
Difference -0.11361 0.27127 0.88627 0.56958 -1.49905     
 
 
Panel B: Profitability quintiles 
 
  Sentiment* weak 2 3 4 robust RMW average 
low 1.44183 0.45705 0.88343 1.40357 1.39606 0.04577 1.116388 
neutral -1.21568 -0.05598 0.4628 -0.0472 0.50588 -1.72156 -0.07004 
high -0.23627 0.74375 1.06464 1.62821 1.94633 -2.1826 1.029332 
Difference -1.6781 0.2867 0.18121 0.22464 0.55027     








Stock Returns during low and high Sentiment levels, for growth and value stocks 
according to BTM quintiles; where Sentiment is the index estimated using principal 
component analysis with proxies as detailed in chapter 4. The sample starts from 
January 1992 until December 1995 (288 months). B is book value of equity at the 
end of fiscal year ending in year t-1 and M is market cap at the end of fiscal year t-
1. Months are sorted into three groups of Sentiment level which is the sentiment 




















Stock returns during low and high sentiment 
levels
growth stocks value stocks
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Appendix 8 
Regression analysis of actual change on forecast change at different horizons 
after controlling for the FCA applying the Transparency Directive requirements 
set by the European commission in December 2004. Regression analysis showing 
Analyst Forecast Bias from 11 to 1 month prior to earnings announcement 
date, including yearly average and yearly weighted average. Original 
regression results are shown in addition to results after deleting forecast 
errors which are greater than 200% (considered as outliers). 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑭𝑭𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊. Where ACit is the actual change in EPS from t-1 to t; 
FCiht, the forecast change (outliers are trimmed at 200%), measures the 
deviation of the forecast in year t at horizon h from the previous earnings per 
share; D is the dummy variable of 1 if the year falls after 2004 and 0 before.   
horizons 
per month 
   Β1                   α                n. 
observations 
R-squared 
  (t-statistics)   (t-statistics) 
11 0.791*** -0.0938*** 3,557 0.565 
  (11.67) (-4.646) 
  10 0.881*** -0.116*** 3,568 0.661 
  (12.50) (-5.398) 
  9 0.895*** -0.119*** 3,587 0.668 
  (13.36) (-5.988) 
  8 0.913*** -0.114*** 3,593 0.677 
  (13.50) (-5.877) 
  7 0.807*** -0.0876*** 3,601 0.676 
  (10.24) (-3.889) 
  6 0.815*** -0.0850*** 3,623 0.666 
  (10.06) (-3.708) 
  5 0.804*** -0.0779*** 3,615 0.710 
  (11.17) (-3.874) 
  4 0.784*** -0.0712*** 3,605 0.731 
  (11.55) (-3.919) 
  3 0.785*** -0.0663*** 3,593 0.766 
  (12.35) (-4.018) 
  2 0.771*** -0.0587*** 3,559 0.770 
  (11.96) (-3.586) 
  1 0.823*** -0.0683*** 3,534 0.777 
  (18.43) (-6.120)     
Average 0.915*** -0.111*** 3,556 0.728 
  (15.05) (-6.724) 
  weighted 0.893*** -0.101*** 3,538 0.753 
average (16.55) (-6.987)     
t-stat in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
 
